#1restore GameStop More Change Is Needed HESTIA PERMIT CAPITAL Enterprise Fund VOTE THE WHITE PROXY CARD INVESTOR PRESENTATION / MAY 2020#2Table of Contents | Executive Summary 4 || The Need For More Change 17 III = Our Nominees Have the Skillset and Drive to Deliver Necessary Change 40 IV Board Engagement and Misleading Claims 58 > VI Conclusion Appendix I: Drivers of Long Term Underperformance 64 66 VII Appendix II: Consumer Demand is Not the Problem 80 restore GameStop 2#3Disclaimer The materials contained herein (the "Materials") represent the opinions of Hestia Capital Partners LP ("Hestia LP") and Permit Capital Enterprise Fund, L.P. ("Permit Enterprise" and together with Hestia LP, the "Stockholder Group") and are based on publicly available information with respect to GameStop Corp. (the "Company"). The Stockholder Group recognizes that there may be confidential information in the possession of the Company that could lead it or others to disagree with the Stockholder Group's conclusions. The Stockholder Group reserves the right to change any of its opinions expressed herein at any time as it deems appropriate and disclaims any obligation to notify the market or any other party of any such changes. The Stockholder Group disclaims any obligation to update the information or opinions contained herein. Certain financial projections and statements made herein have been derived or obtained from filings made with the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") or other regulatory authorities and from other third party reports. There is no assurance or guarantee with respect to the prices at which any securities of the Company will trade, and such securities may not trade at prices that may be implied herein. The estimates, projections and potential impact of the opportunities identified by the Stockholder Group herein are based on assumptions that the Stockholder Group believes to be reasonable as of the date of the Materials, but there can be no assurance or guarantee that actual results or performance of the Company will not differ, and such differences may be material. The Materials are provided merely as information and are not intended to be, nor should they be construed as, an offer to sell or a solicitation of an offer to buy any security. Each of the members of the Stockholder Group currently beneficially own, and/or have an economic interest in, securities of the Company. It is possible that there will be developments in the future (including changes in price of the Company's securities) that cause one or more members of the Stockholder Group from time to time to sell all or a portion of their holdings of the Company in open market transactions or otherwise (including via short sales), buy additional securities (in open market or privately negotiated transactions or otherwise), or trade in options, puts, calls or other derivative instruments relating to some or all of such securities. To the extent that the Stockholder Group discloses information about its position or economic interest in the securities of the Company in the Materials, it is subject to change and the Stockholder Group expressly disclaims any obligation to update such information. The Materials contain forward-looking statements. All statements contained herein that are not clearly historical in nature or that necessarily depend on future events are forward-looking, and the words "anticipate," "believe," "expect," "potential," "opportunity," "estimate," "plan," "may," "will," "projects," "targets," "forecasts," "seeks," "could," and similar expressions are generally intended to identify forward-looking statements. The projected results and statements contained herein that are not historical facts are based on current expectations, speak only as of the date of the Materials and involve risks, uncertainties and other factors that may cause actual results, performance or achievements to be materially different from any future results, performance or achievements expressed or implied by such projected results and statements. Assumptions relating to the foregoing involve judgments with respect to, among other things, future economic, competitive and market conditions and future business decisions, all of which are difficult or impossible to predict accurately and many of which are beyond the control of the Stockholder Group. Although the Stockholder Group believes that the assumptions underlying the projected results or forward-looking statements are reasonable as of the date of the Materials, any of the assumptions could be inaccurate and therefore, there can be no assurance that the projected results or forward-looking statements included herein will prove to be accurate. In light of the significant uncertainties inherent in the projected results and forward-looking statements included herein, the inclusion of such information should not be regarded as a representation as to future results or that the objectives and strategic initiatives expressed or implied by such projected results and forward-looking statements will be achieved. The Stockholder Group will not undertake and specifically declines any obligation to disclose the results of any revisions that may be made to any projected results or forward-looking statements herein to reflect events or circumstances after the date of such projected results or statements or to reflect the occurrence of anticipated or unanticipated events. Unless otherwise indicated herein, the Stockholder Group has not sought or obtained consent from any third party to use any statements, photos or information indicated herein as having been obtained or derived from statements made or published by third parties. Any such statements or information should not be viewed as indicating the support of such third party for the views expressed herein. No warranty is made as to the accuracy of data or information obtained or derived from filings made with the SEC by the Company or from any third-party source. All trade names, trademarks, service marks, and logos herein are the property of their respective owners who retain all proprietary rights over their use. restore GameStop 3#4restore GameStop INVESTOR PRESENTATION I. Executive Summary#5Why We Are Here • GameStop is a valuable business with significant competitive advantages in the game retailing industry. Despite this fact, GameStop's Board has overseen $2.5 billion in stockholder value destruction, underperforming its peers (a) by 13x, in the past five years. Permit/Hestia signed a Cooperation Agreement (CA) with the Board last year, hoping we could influence the Board through collaborative engagement, but the Board refused to meaningfully engage and have continued to move too slowly. Share price declined 65% in fiscal 2019 and the Company may face a serious liquidity issue by March 2021. - Notes due in less than 10 months, which traded at par 12 months ago, now trade at 74 cents on the dollar as of May 15, 2020 Short interest has increased from roughly 40% when we signed our CA to roughly 100% over the past 14 months. The spot rate on short borrow has stayed above 100% More change is needed and urgently. - Fourteen months ago, we highlighted the need for gaming, turnaround, and shareholder representation on the Board While the Board has done two refreshes, they remain too retail centric and have not addressed the need for turnaround and shareholder representation 2 long-tenured directors, who plan to retire next year, have irrelevant skillsets, minimal ownership and a track record of being ineffective New Board's first test came with GameStop's COVID-19 response. We believe they failed. We have nominated two strong candidates who will bring not only turnaround experience and a shareholder perspective, but also extensive capital market expertise, which is desperately needed as the Company attempts to regain credibility with investors. restore GameStop Source: GameStop earning transactions, articles. (a) Unless otherwise noted, "Peers", "Peer group" or "Peer average" includes those companies listed in GameStop's peer group in both their 2019 and 2020 proxy statements. The 2019 peer group includes Abercrombie & Fitch, Bed Bath & Beyond, Kohl's, O'Reilly Automotive, Advance Auto Parts, Dick's Sporting Goods, L Brands, Ross Stores, AutoZone, Foot Locker, Nordstrom, Tiffany & Co., Barnes & Noble, Gap, Office Depot and Williams-Sonoma. The 2020 peer group includes Abercrombie & Fitch, Ascena Retail Group, Bed Bath & Beyond, Designer Brands, Dick's Sporting Goods, Foot Locker, Gap, Nordstrom, Office Depot, Signet Jewelers, The Michaels Companies, Urban Outfitters and Williams-Sonoma. 5#6About Permit Capital and Hestia PERMIT CAPITAL Enterprise Fund . GameStop stockholder since 2011 . Never led an activist investment campaign previously Founded in 2005 and managed by John Broderick, Permit pursues a fundamentals-based, value-oriented investment strategy Concentrated portfolio with a long-term investment horizon Investment experience in distressed debt, private equity, venture capital and public markets restore GameStop HESTIA • GameStop stockholder since 2012 • Never led an activist investment campaign previously • Founded in 2009 by Kurt Wolf, Hestia pursues a long-term focused, deep value-based investment strategy • Concentrated portfolio rooted in competitive strategy • Investment experience in venture capital and public markets Leverages its General Partner's experience as an entrepreneur and management consultant Together, Permit and Hestia own approximately 7.2% of GameStop shares outstanding 6#7GameStop Company Overview World's Largest Video Game Retailer with Over $6 Billion in Annual Revenues but Negative Free Cash Flow in 2019 · GameStop Operates approximately 5,500 stores across 14 countries Offers new and pre-owned video gaming consoles, accessories and video game titles, in both physical and digital formats Approximately 14,000 full-time employees between 22,000 and 42,000 part-time employees Founded in 1996 and headquartered in Grapevine, Texas Summary Financials ($ in millions) Market capitalization as of 4/30/2020 Net debt (a) as of 2/1/2020 Total enterprise value as of 4/30/2020 2019 free cash flow (b) restore Source: Company's public filings. (a) Excludes lease obligations. GameStop (b) 2019 revenue by segment Collectibles 11% Software 46% Hardware and accessories 42% ($ in millions) $9,364 $8,608 Historical financials $9,225 $8,285 $6,446 EEEEL $369.3 $2,918 $3,009 ($78.0) $484 $394 $291.3 2015 2016 ($493.0) Revenue $3,040 $322 $2,308 $231 $1,909 2017 Gross profit 2018 Free cash flow 2019 ($493) Calculated as cash from operations less capex. Aggressive A/P reduction artificially depressed 2019 FCF. Keeping A/P as % of inventories constant from 2018 to 2019 would have increased FCF by $342M. 7#8GameStop is a Valuable Business with Significant Opportunity SOCIAL GAMING HUB GameStop GameStop BUY SELL TRADE GameStop 5,500+ locations WORLD EXCLUSIVE FIRST LOOK AT MODERN WARFARE Z GAMEINFORMER Game Informer ODDWORLD ABES DDDYSEE Plas Game Informer magazine with flexible lease terms GameStop POWERUP REWARD S 42M PowerUp Rewards members 1 2 INFLUENCER 10,000+ highly knowledgeable employees Ο 3 15M+ purchases or traded-ins in LTM Bring in your stuff Get trade credit Save on what you really want 5M paid members COMMUNITY NETWORK EFFECT restore GameStop Source: Google Images, GameStop.com. Note: Permission has not been sought nor obtained for the use of photos. 8#9Despite Great Assets, GameStop Has Been a Persistent Underperformer S&P 500 Dow Jones Specialty Retailers 2019 Peer Group 1-Year Total Shareholder Returns 4% 9% S&P 500 3-Year Total Shareholder Returns 50% 22% Dow Jones Specialty Retailers 59% 2019 Peer Group 6% 2020 Peer Group -37% GameStop -81% -100% -80% -60% -40% -20% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 2020 Peer Group -22% GameStop 65% -70% -60% -50% -40% -30% -20% -10% 0% 10% 20% 30% S&P 500 Dow Jones Specialty Retailers 2019 Peer Group 2020 Peer Group 5-Year Total Shareholder Returns 79% GameStop 85% -59% -5% S&P 500 10-Year Total Shareholder Returns 89% Dow Jones Specialty Retailers 2019 Peer Group 2020 Peer Group -22% GameStop (71% -100% -50% 0% -100% -80% -60% -40% -20% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% restore Source: FactSet. GameStop Note: Returns through January 31, 2020. 2019 and 2020 Peer Group as defined on page 5. Peers are market-cap weighted. 117% 270% 365% 50% 100% 150% 200% 250% 300% 350% 400% 9#10GameStop Stock Underperformed For At Least A Decade Total Shareholder Returns Over the Ten Years Prior to Our Cooperation Agreement (4/1/19) • • GameStop's stock underperformed for years Shareholders lost billions as the Company allocated capital poorly and operated inefficiently GameStop reacted slowly and minimally to the change in technology and physical retailing In early 2019, Permit and Hestia engaged with GameStop in an effort to promote change S&P 500 Dow Jones Specialty Retailers 2019 Peer Group 2020 Peer Group restore GameStop Source: FactSet. Note: 2019 and 2020 Peer Group as defined on page 5. Peers are market-cap weighted. GameStop 45% 67% 201% 336% 468% -100% 0% 100% 200% 300% 400% 500% TSR Declined -45% over Ten Years 10#11GameStop Continued to Underperform Even After 2019 Changes • • On March 21, 2019, the Company appointed a new CEO Hopeful that Mr. Sherman would lead the Company on a change agenda, we agreed to resolve our differences with the appointment of two directors; our Cooperation Agreement was announced on April 1, 2019 However, performance did not improve, even as GameStop undertook additional self- directed changes GameStop refused to accept our input during 2019 S&P 500 Dow Jones Specialty Retailers 2019 Peer Group 2020 Peer Group TSR During Cooperation Agreement April 1, 2019 - March 11, 2020 GameStop -60% -48% -16% -7% -3% -70% -60% -50% -40% -30% -20% -10% 0% TSR Declined -60% During Cooperation Agreement restore GameStop Source: FactSet. Note: 2019 and 2020 Peer Group as defined on page 5. Peers are market-cap weighted. 11#12Company's Changes Since Our Cooperation Agreement Failed to Increase Value $12 $10 $8 Share price ཚ April 1, 2019 GME announces agreement with Permit and Hestia. April 24, 2019 Lizabeth Dunn and Raul Fernandez join the Board. May 30, 2019 Appoints new leadership team, including CFO. June 4, 2019 Q1 Results: Eliminates quarterly dividend, generates negative free cash flow of $683 million in one quarter. Stock plunges 36% in one day. April 15, 2019 George Sherman begins as CEO. September 10, 2019 Q2 Results: Lowers full-year same store sales declines to "low teens", guides to adjusted EPS of $1.15 to $1.30. January 13, 2020 Holiday Sales Update: Lowers same store guidance a third time:| sees 19-21% decline for the full year. Lowers full year EPS guidance to a loss for the year. Guides to end of year liquidity of approximately $900 million. March 9, 2020 3 new directors added; 4 directors to retire in 2020; 2 directors to retire in 2021. $4 $2 April 2, 2019 Q4 Results: Company discloses material weakness in their internal controls, casting doubt on their liquidity needs for the remainder of the year; guides to 5-10% decline in same store sales for 2019. June 10, 2019 Announces modified tender offer to repurchase 12 million shares between $5.20 - $6.00 per share. ли December 10, 2019 Q3 Results: Lowers same store guidance once again: sees "high teens" decline for the full year. Lowers full year EPS guidance to $0.10 to $0.20. Guides to end of year liquidity of $1 billion+. March 26, 2019 Q4 Results: Reports negative operating free cash flow for first time in the company's history (-$493 million). Indicates year-end liquidity of $770 million, well below guidance provided 19 days before the quarter ended. $0 Apr-19 May-19 Jun-19 Jul-19 Aug-19 Sep-19 Oct-19 Nov-19 Dec-19 Jan-20 Feb-20 Mar-20 Apr-20 restore GameStop Source: Company's public filings. 12#13Growing Pessimism Despite Recent Board and Management Changes $110 $100 $90 $80 $70 Pricing for March 2021 Notes Cooperation Agreement Signed 120% 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% GME Short Interest vs. Peer Average BANK OF AMERICA Banc of America Securities currently has an Underperform rating on the stock with a price target of $1.60 Cooperation Agreement Signed $60 0% May-16 May-17 May-18 May-19 May-20 May-15 May-16 May-17 May-18 May-19 May-20 GME Peer Average restore Source: Capital IQ. Note: Peer Average as defined on page 5. Barnes & Noble is included up until August 6, 2019, when it was acquired by Elliott Management. GameStop 13#14More Change is Required • We believe there is overwhelming evidence that GameStop has not changed enough TSR continues to underperform its peers • Cost cutting has been slow • Employee morale continues to be poor • Customers continue to complain about GameStop . • Valuation multiples are down . Research analysts are more bearish than ever • Short interest is up - suggesting great pessimism about GameStop's future Management guidance has been unreliable, lowering credibility We were not the only 13D filer after the March 2020 board refreshment restore GameStop Source: GameStop earning transactions, articles. 14#15Our Nominees Will Push For More Change restore GameStop Paul Evans ✓ Experienced public and private company CEO and CFO Expert in corporate restructurings Deep capital market experience, having completed over $5 billion in debt financings ✓ Current public company audit committee chairman ✓ If elected, we believe Mr. Evans will become the most experienced finance professional on GameStop's board Kurtis Wolf Chief Investment Officer of Hestia Capital Partners; generated net returns of 430% since inception Founder or Co-Founder of 3 highly successful start-ups in multiple industries, one of which was sold for over $300 million Previous public company director, audit committee chairman, and member of compensation and nominating/governance committees ✓ 8-year shareholder in GameStop 15#16Significant Value Can Be Unlocked With More Change Unique assets that are unappreciated SOCIAL GAMING HUB SELL Game GameStop TRADE GameStop 5,500+ locations with flexible lease terms INFLUENCER Game Informer magazine GAMEINFORMER 0010,000+ highly knowledgeable Game Informer ODDWORLD ASSES employees COMMUNITY NETWORK EFFECT restore GameStop Significant opportunities for improvement Value Creation Opportunity $200 million+ SG&A rationalization • Greater Value to Customers Improved alignment of executive compensation with shareholders • • Higher Shareholder Returns ⚫ Happier Employees Improved capital allocation GameStop POWERUP REWARD S™ Leverage core assets 2 口 Save on what Bring in your stuff Get trade credit you really want Source: Google Images, GameStop.com Note: Permission has not been sought nor obtained for the use of photos. Change the narrative Focus on gaming assets – not traditional retail solutions! restore GameStop · Greater FCF Able to Invest in Future · Greater Value to Vendors 16#17restore GameStop INVESTOR PRESENTATION II. The Need for More Change#18Operational Change Has Been Too Slow Given Failing Top Line Store Count Employees 16,000 12.5% 5.1% 5,830 5,509 14,000 SG&A ($ in millions) Revenue $546 10.7% $3.1 bn $488 28.4% $2.2 bn Q4 2018 Q4 2019 Q4 2018 Q4 2019 Q4 2018 Q4 2019 Q4 2018 Q4 2019 restore GameStop Source: Company's public filings Note: Period represents fiscal years. 18#19Stores Are Performing Worse Than Before 2019 Management Changes restore GameStop Revenue per store (a) ($ in millions) $1.4 2018 $1.1 2019 Gross profit per store (a) $392K $338K 2018 2019 Source: Company's public filings. Note: Years represent fiscal years. (a) Represents average number of stores. Calculated as beginning of the fiscal year number of stores plus ending of the fiscal year number of stores, divided by two. 19#20GameStop's "Four Pillars" Strategy Has Produced Limited Results 1 Optimize the core business SG&A: "As we discussed earlier in 2019, this pillar was expected to deliver the earliest results, and in fact this is where we have made the most progress..." March 26, 2020 - CEO George Sherman on Q4 2019 earnings call Commentary: Adjusted SG&A as a percent of revenue has increased from 23.9% in fiscal 2018 to 28.6% in fiscal 2019. This doesn't seem like "progress" to us. 2 Become the social / cultural hub for gaming Tulsa market test: "Tulsa may or may not be the answer but it's a first experiment."* - March 5, 2020 article - CCO Frank Hamlin Tulsa market test: "So Tulsa is in a bit of a state of limbo right now operating at the same level as other stores at delivery at door and not really a true representation of how the store is intended to work." - March 26, 2020 - CEO George Sherman on Q4 2019 earnings call Commentary: Despite months of planning and implementation, GameStop cannot articulate any actionable intelligence from the Tulsa experiment. 3 Build a frictionless digital ecosystem Buy Online, Pick-up In Store: "In 2019, we have built a new web platform, introduced new omnichannel capabilities, including buy-online-pick-up-in- stores with encouraging results. However, we are still early in that activity.” – March 26, 2020 - CEO George Sherman on Q4 2019 earnings call Commentary: - This concept is nothing extraordinary, nor is it strategic. Customers expect retailers to have these capabilities already. GameStop's activities here are an attempt to catch up to the rest of the retail universe, not a strategic initiative to create a sustainable competitive advantage. • 4 Transform vendor relationships Vendors: "...we began testing the concept of digital revenue sharing with select key partners." - March 26, 2020 - CEO George Sherman on Q4 2019 earnings call Q: "[can you discuss]...how that might be different from how you previously participated in the digital gaming market?"*: A: "We're not going to get into much detail on that...." - March 26, 2020 - CEO George Sherman on Q4 2019 earnings call Commentary: Management is unable to articulate how this strategic pillar is any different than what they've done in the past. restore GameStop Source: GameStop earnings transcripts, GameStop press releases. *https://nordic.ign.com/company/34442/feature/how-gamestop-plans-to-save-itself. **Question asked by Ray Stochel of Consumer Edge Research, LLC. 20 20#21High Short Interest Suggests Growing Pessimism with Current Plan Despite lower stock prices, short interest has increased materially Stock Price $10.55 March 2019 66% decline $3.60 February 2020 restore Source: FactSet GameStop Note: March data is as of March 21, 2019 (day George Sherman was announced as CEO). February data is as of February 28, 2020. Short Interest as a percentage of float 101% 35% Nearly 3x increase March February 2019 2020 21#22Despite Low Stock Price, Capital Markets Are Betting Against GameStop GameStop has the highest short interest amongst its self-defined peer group, nearly double its next closest peer 22% 23% 24% 24% 20% 8% 9% 10% 11% 11% 12% 13% 14% 6% 1% 1% 3% 3% 4% ROSS DRESS FOR LESS* 51% 101% O'Reilly Advance Auto Partsl AutoZone Office DEPOT OfficeMax Lbrands BR WILLIAMS Gap Inc. TIFFANY KOHLS [db] Foot Locker DICK'S NORDSTROM SIGNET MICHAELS Abercrombie. BED BATH & GameStop ascena NITA at BEYOND I " POWER TO THE PLAYERS restore GameStop Source: GameStop proxy statements, Capital IQ. Note: Data as of February 28, 2020. Peer Group as defined on page 5. 22 22#23Sell-side Analysts Are More Negative Now Average Price Target $11.91 $4.43 2 Buy Ratings Analyst Estimates for ($in millions) FYE 2020 EBITDA $413 0 March 2019 February March February March 2020 2019 2020 2019 restore Source: FactSet. GameStop $133 February 2020 23#24Despite Low Valuation, Sell-side Seem Negative on Current Plan and Team 69% GameStop has one of the lowest net scores by Wall Street analysts amongst its peers... Analyst net ratings (a) / total number of ratings 55% 50% 45% 32% 29% 29% 22% 14% 13% 6% 5% 0% 0% -6% -22% -25% -30% -30% -33% -60% ROSS AutoZone DRESS FOR LESS Advance Auto Parts O'Reilly Foot Locker DICK'S Lbrands Abercrombie db KOHLS BED BATH & BEYOND WILLIAMS NORDSTROM TIFFANY Gap Inc. Office EFT OfficeMax MICHAELS GameStop SIGNET arenting s ascena KETA EUR ...and is only one-of-three with a target price that is below its current price Target price premium / (discount) to current price (b) 48% 45% 41% 41% 36% 34% 27% 26% 22% 22% 19% 18% 18% 14% 8% 6% 5% - -2% -8% -25% WILLIAMS db Office DEPOT NORDSTROM Lbrands MICHAELS KOHL'S OfficeMax Gap Inc. BR BED BATH & BEYOND ROSS Foot Locker DICK'S Abercrombie Advance AutoZone TIFFANY Auto Parts O'Reilly GameStop SIGNET POWER TO THE FLAT Source: GameStop proxy statements, Bloomberg. Note: Peers as defined on page 5. restore GameStop (a) (b) Calculated as the sum of Wall Street analyst ratings based on the following grid: buy rating =1, neural rating =0, sell rating =-1, divided by the total number of ratings. Calculated as consensus target price divided by current price. Excludes Ascena Retail Group. 24 24#25Business Has Not Performed Even to Management's Expectations Management has lost credibility in forecasting the business MANAGEMENT EXPECTATIONS OUTCOME (3/26/2020) Two-day stock reaction to Q4 Earnings Item Date Expectation Metric Comparable store sales 9/10/2019 "As a result, at this time, we expect the percentage decline of comparable same- store sales for 2019 to be in the low teens..." -19.4% - Q2 2019 earnings call, CEO George Sherman 12/10/2019 Liquidity 1/13/2020 "Despite the top line declines in the business, our balance sheet remains strong as we anticipate ending the year with total cash and liquidity in excess of $1 billion...” - Q3 2019 earnings call, CFO Jim Bell "The Company now expects capital expenditures for FY2019 to be in the range of $75 million to $80 million, and forecasts total cash and liquidity, including availability under the revolving line of credit, at the end of the fiscal year to be approximately $900 million.” – Holiday sales results 8-K -17% $770 million -17% $770 million -17% Adjusted Diluted EPS "Finally, given my earlier comments related to our sales outlook for both the 9/10/2019 industry and our business, we expect adjusted diluted earnings per share for fiscal 2019 to be in the $1.15 to $1.30 range." - Q2 2019 earnings call, CFO Jim Bell $0.22 -17% restore GameStop Source: GameStop earnings transcripts, Company's public filings. 25#26Employees Have Soured on GameStop, Too Gamers should love working at a gaming company, but poor leadership seems to have destroyed morale restore GameStop 55% Recommend to a friend Peer average 37% GameStop rank against peers: 20 out of 20 34% GameStop Positive business outlook Peer average 66% Peer average GameStop rank against peers: 20 out of 20 3.3 15% GameStop Source: Glassdoor. Note: Peers and Peer average as defined on page 5 except for Designer Brands and The Michaels Companies as there was not sufficient data. (a) Based on a five-point scale. CEO approval GameStop rank against peers: 20 out of 20 Overall rating (a) 30% GameStop GameStop rank against peers: 18 out of 20 2.9 Peer average GameStop 26#27GameStop Employees Have No Confidence in New Leadership Employee reviews from Glassdoor highlight poor employee morale 9+ months after new leadership "Corporate is completely disconnected from the challenges and issues retailers face on the sales force. They push forward ill- researched initiatives and punish stores for being unable to implement unrealistic goals successfully. There is no upward movement, and there is no incentive to grow. Hourly pay is low compared to talent and expectations. Advice to Management: Listen to real data from the sales floor and take customer feedback seriously. Invest new ways to stay competitive in a difficult market without expecting lover volume stores to achieve 3.0 mil store results." February 11, 2020 "As times get tougher the higher ups expect you to get every penny from every person and to disagree is treason." February 19, 2020 G glassdoor ⭑ 2.9 ✰✰✰✰ "Screw GameStop. I worked at GameStop full-time for more than 3 years. No recognition, 34% Recommend to a Friend 29% Approve of CEO George Sherman 165 Ratings unreasonable expectations, awful management." February 1, 2020 restore GameStop "Corporate is awful and is pretty much running the company into the ground." March 10, 2020 "Not what it used to be. VP's and above are out of touch with what their departments actually do." January 7, 2020 "Poor management, company knows it's going under and forces you to sell at every opportunity or you're fired." January 18, 2020 "Extremely poor communication from the corporate office, even and especially on the most important [issues]." February 27, 2020 Source: Glassdoor. Note: Permission has not been sought nor obtained to use quotes. 27#28Customers are Unhappy with GameStop Despite a new CEO and Board members, social media post regarding GameStop have become increasingly negative restore GameStop Mention Volume 40k 30k 20k 10k I I May 2019 Jul 2019 Sep 2019 Nov 2019 Jan 2020 Mar 2020_ May 2020 Anger Disgust Fear Joy Sadness Surprise Source: Brandwatch. Note: Brandwatch aggregates posts on various social media channels associated with GameStop. Using their algorithm Brandwatch assigns an emotion to each post. Negative social media post regarding GameStop spiked during the COVID- 19 pandemic 28#29Despite Claims of "Change", Governance Remains Poor Executive compensation program remains poorly constructed - NEOs and directors were paid over $38 million in fiscal 2019 while stock declined ~65% • Governance provisions limit shareholder rights Bylaws and Charter require 80% shareholder approval for amendments - No right to call special meetings No right to act by written consent - Director removal requires 80% of shareholder approval Proxy put in 2021 bond that practically precludes a shareholder from nominating a majority slate absent a willingness to refinance the bond (currently trading at $0.74) restore GameStop Source: Company's public filings. 29#30GameStop Still Owns a Jet Despite a New Team and Flailing Performance While employees were fired and profitability plummeted, management maintained its 22-seat luxury Bombardier CL-604 private jet GameStop's plane was in use at least until December 10, 2019 GameStop's policy is that NEOs are eligible to use the Company plane for personal use The jet is listed for sale (only after we complained), but still has not been sold The Dallas/Fort Worth Airport is only 7 minutes away from GameStop corporate offices N213GS restore GameStop Source: GameStop Q3 2019 10-Q, 2019 proxy statement. Plane photo: https://www.flickr.com/photos/98639661@N07/ Note: Permission has not been sought nor obtained for the use of photos. 30#31Reactive Not Proactive to Shareholder Concerns Over the last two years, many of the significant changes from the Board came after shareholder pressure Date of demand GameStop response Shareholder(s) Shareholder demand Date of response May 16, 2018 Tiger Management Sell the noncore Tech Brands division January 16, 2019 Spring Mobile was sold for $700 million February 12, 2019 Hestia Implement significant SG&A cost savings April 2, 2019 Announced plan to reduce SG&A by $100 million February 12, 2019 Hestia Initiate tender offer to repurchase undervalued shares June 10, 2019 March 13, 2019 Permit and Hestia Add new directors with the ability to lead a turnaround effort April 24, 2019 July 22, 2019 Permit and Hestia Sell the 22-seat luxury Bombardier CL-604 private jet December 11, 2019 August 16, 2019 Scion Asset Management Utilize the remaining $237.6mm share buyback authorization December 11, 2019 September 12, 2019 Permit and Hestia Individual members of the Board should personally purchase shares Late September 2019 Announced tender offer of up to 12 million shares Appointment of Raul Fernandez and Liz Dunn to the Board of Directors Reported the jet as an asset held for sale in Q3 2019 10-Q Repurchased 22.6 million shares at an average price of $5.11 Five Directors purchased almost 96,268 shares, at a total value of $483,286 restore GameStop Source: Press releases, March 12, 2020 Investor Group letter to GameStop Board of Directors. 31#32Covid-19 Communications Caused Confusion and Fear While other retailers closed stores to protect the health and safety of employees and customers, GameStop remained open... On March 19, 2020, GameStop sent a letter to all employees titled, "Store Letter to Law Enforcement" "...we believe GameStop is classified as essential retail and therefore is able to remain open during this time." "We have received reports of local authorities visiting stores in an attempt to enforce closure despite our classification. Store Managers are approved to provide the document linked below to law enforcement as needed." On March 22, 2020, following a public outcry from employees, customers and the media, GameStop reversed course and closed its stores. Store Letter to Law Enforcement Sent to: Category: Posted: Priority: Read By Store: Read By You: All users at brand GameStop All users at brand ThinkGeek Public Relations 3/19/20 1:48 PM Normal 3/19/20 1:59 PM 3/19/20 1:59 PM Due to the products we carry that enable and enhance our customers' experience in working from home, we believe GameStop is classified as essential retail and therefore is able to remain open during this time. We have received reports of local authorities visiting stores in an attempt to enforce closure despite our classification. Store Managers are approved to provide the document linked below to law enforcement as needed. Law Enforcement Letter - COVID-19 > Contact your District Manager with questions. "Be proud. You guys stood up for whats right and worked through the most chaotic environment I've ever seen. I am not proud to work for GameStop right now, but I am proud to work with all of you." - March 30, 2020, iBleed Gamestop (Posted as GameStop District Manager on Reddit.com) GameStop POWER TO THE PLAYERS Thank you for what you are doing to keep us all safe. If you have questions about our store's hours, operations or policies could I ask you to please call our corporate office: GameStop Corporate Office 844-993-3145 Thank you for understanding. restore Source: GameStop employee communications; Reddit. GameStop 32 32#33GameStop Fumbles the Covid-19 Crisis RetailWire. March 20, 2020 Will GameStop lose more than it wins keeping stores open during the coronavirus outbreak? https://retailwire.com/discussion/will-gamestop-lose-more-than-it- wins-keeping-stores-open-during-the-coronavirus-outbreak/ VICE GameStop Has No Idea What to Do About Coronavirus March 17, 2020 Employees have been asked to buy their own cleaning supplies, and re-install demo stations after some stores took them down. https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/4agpwp/game-stop-struggling-coronavirus-cleaning-supplies-employees The Boston Globe March 27, 2020 GameStop to employees: wrap your hands in plastic bags and go back to work. The company has instructed employees to wrap one hand in a plastic bag to accept payments at the door "Workers have been told to wrap a plastic bag around one hand to protect it from exposure to the virus, open the door a crack, and take the customer's credit card, the manager said. Employees are then to run the card with a hand still encased in the bag, flip the bag inside out, leaving the card inside, put the purchase in the bag, and hand it back through the door." https://www.bostonglobe.com/2020/03/27/business/gamestop-employees-wrap-your-hands-plastic- bags-go-back-work/ CAN March 20, 2020 New York (CNN Business) GameStop will close all of its storefronts starting Sunday following outcry from employees and calls from lawmakers to stay at home as coronavirus spreads in the United States. https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/20/tech/gamestop-open-essential- business/index.html restore GameStop Source: online news articles. 33 33#34Dejected Employee Comments During Covid-19 Crisis We encourage you to read through the comments on Reddit discussing employees' concerns over GameStop's mismanagement of the Covid-19 crisis "District manager here... I can tell you this company is NOT taking the situation seriously. Our regional call today was about taking more tech trades and "taking advantage" of the situation. This phrase was sincerely said on our call. They will not shut down a store if they can avoid it. Even if an associate has come down with the virus, which has happened by the way. They expect associates from another location to come in, clean the location and re-open. This is mind-boggling. Many DMs have expressed concerns with taking in trades - They will not halt the trade business. We are also not allowed to email anyone about the coronavirus issue. Everything HAS to happen through voice calls. It's insane team. I wish I had better news to bring you, but they are putting profits before their people and customers. They will risk spreading infection until the government in your area shuts down retail hours of operation." - iBleed Gamestop, Reddit "I work at a store in the midwest area and I'm terrified even though we only have around 6 confirmed cases in the area. I have a mom with heart disease and brain cancer and I can't risk bringing it home to her. When I talk to other stores their managers just say "you'll be fine! Just wash your hands!". This is not fine. This is not okay. I do not feel safe. I'm honestly thinking either today or tomorrow may be my last day because my mental state can't take working in these conditions right now." - Guardian_Down, Reddit "I feel unsafe at work. We were up trades las[t] week over 2,300% I can just imagine how much of the product we took in is contaminated. And what sucks the most is that we are getting lines out the door with no support from Gamestop. 134 hours a week to work with is a freaking joke. When my store alone needs a minimal of 145 hours to operate. How dare you.." - SSGSS_Husky, Reddit & reddit "I've been with this company for over a decade and have worked retail for most of my adult life, and this whole situation has only reinforced the fact that customers and corporate don't care about anyone but themselves. Over the last 3 days, we've had people beating a path to our door to buy anything and everything, despite being told to reduce exposure as much as possible. Mom and dad just want to make sure their kids that are out of school have stuff to play with to keep them occupied so they're out of the parents' hair. I've had people calling left and right to make sure they'll still be able to get MLB, Doom, and AC this week. They touch anything and everything in the store and get pissed that the demo units are off. Corporate talks about all the steps they've taken to ensure safety measures are being taken, but we get no cleaning supplies beyond what we already had and with the low payroll and heavier volume, we barely have time to clean the counters, pinpads, and door handles multiple times a day, let alone try and clean the way we should be to reduce risk. The statements sent out from George and on GSTV are lip service to protect against liability so that if someone gets sick after being in one of stores, the company is protected against being sued because "we took steps to ensure everyone's safety". Honest question, which is worse: doing a midnight and splitting the crowd over 2 days or having everyone show up at 10am Friday elbow to elbow? We, as the frontline employees are [-----] either way, because people want their stuff and they want it now and corporate wants their sales and profits and they want them now." - Dzuraismyhomeboy, Reddit restore GameStop Source: Reddit. 34#35During the COVID-19 Pandemic, GameStop Was Among the Last of Its Self-Defined Peer Group to Close its Stores... After allegedly telling employees that the Company was 'essential', GameStop decided to close its stores on March 22, 2020 S 8 15 Abercrombie & Fitch Gap Inc. Mo March 2020(a) T W T F S 10 11 12 13 14 16 17 18 19 20 21 db ascena BED BATH & BEYOND RETAIL GROUP INC. Foot Locker DICK'S KOHLS SPORTING GOODS NORDSTROM ROSS DRESS FOR LESS* Lbrands WILLIAMS-SONOMA, INC. 22 23 24 SIGNET OTEWELERI GameStop: POWER TO THE PLAYERS 25 26 TIFFANY & CO. Negative press from GameStop's indecisiveness! "GameStop: We Can Stay Open During Lockdowns Because We're 'Essential Retail"" Kotaku, March 19, 2020 "GameStop also allegedly told employees to encourage police officers to call corporate headquarters if they wish to attempt to enforce closures." New York Post, March 19, 2020 22 27 28 "GameStop to employees: wrap your hands in plastic bags and go back to work" Boston Globe, March 27, 2020 restore GameStop Source: Company's public filings, press releases Note: Peer Group as defined on page 5 except for Barnes and Noble as it was acquired by Elliott Management in August 2019 and businesses that are deemed essential. Essential businesses include Advance Auto Parts, Autozone, Office Depot, O'Reilly Automotive and The Michaels Companies. (a) Represents the date the store closures became effective. If the effective date was not specified in the press release, it is assumed to be the date of the press release. 35#36...and Near Last to Reduce Executive Compensation March 2020(a) S M T W T F S 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 DICK'S SPORTING GOODS Lbrands 29 29 db 30 ascena RETA GROUP INC Gap Inc. KOHLS 31 BR Number of days between first store closures and executive compensation reductions (a) Lbrands DICK'S SPORTING GOODS KOHL'S db ascena RETAIL GROUP INC. 10 11 11 12 12 ROSS DRESS FOR LESS* M T April 2020(a) W T F S BED BATH & BEYOND NORDSTROM 1 NORDSTROM 2 3 4 BED BATH & Gap Inc. BEYOND ROSS DRESS FOR LESS BR 5 6 8 10 11 Abercrombie & Fitch 12 13 19 20 22 14 15 16 17 18 Abercrombie & Fitch GameStop " POWER TO THE PLAYERS 21 22 23 24 25 GameStop Foot Locker (b) POWER TO THE PLAYERS' 13 13 15 15 17 22 30 7 47 restore GameStop Source: Press releases. Note: Peer Group as defined on page 5 except for Barnes and Noble as it was acquired by Elliott Management in August 2019 and businesses that are deemed essential. Essential businesses include Advance Auto Parts, Autozone, Office Depot, O'Reilly Automotive and The Michaels Companies. (a) Represents the date the executive compensation reductions became effective. If the effective date was not specified in the press release, it is assumed to be the date of the press release. (b) Foot Locker executive compensation reduction was effective as of May 3, 2020. 36#37Share price ($) Recent Changes Are Latest in String of Unsuccessful "Change" Effort $30 $25 $20 $15 - GameStop Five CEOs in Three Years Michael Mauler J Paul. Raines Shane S. Kim Daniel A. DeMatteo $10 $5 $0 Apr-17 Oct-17 Daniel A. DeMatteo Apr-18 Oct-18 George E. Sherman Apr-19 Oct-19 Apr-20 restore GameStop Source: GameStop annual proxy statements, press releases, various company public filings and press releases. Number of CEOs Since Q4 2017 Advance Auto Parts! 1 DICK'S 1 SPORTINE E BE Abercrombie & Fitch 1 AutoZone 1 TIFFANY & CO. 1 Foot Locker 1 WILLIAMS-SONOMA, INC. 1 Lbrands 1 Office DEPOT OfficeMax 1 ROSS DRESS FOR LESS* Gap Inc. NORDSTROM KOHL'S O'Reilly BED BATH & BEYOND GameStop POWER TO THE PLAYERS 1 2 2 2 2 3 5 37#38While Management "Change" Hasn't Produced Results, It Has Been Expensive Over the past two years, GameStop has paid over $32 million in bonuses for the appointment, promotion and resignation of its executives - representing over 13% of the Company's 2019 fiscal year end market capitalization Date Executive Compensation ($ in millions) Description Oct-19 Troy W. Crawford $2.4 Severance for resignation as Chief Accounting Officer Jul-19 Robert A. Lloyd $5.1 Severance for resignation as Chief Operating Officer and Chief Financial Officer Jul-19 James A. Bell $1.3 Jul-19 Chris R. Homeister $1.3 Jun-19 Frank M. Hamlin $1.0 Appointment as Chief Financial Officer Appointment as Chief Merchandising Officer Promotion to Chief Customer Officer May-19 Robert A. Lloyd $1.0 Cash retention program May-19 Daniel J. Kaufman $1.0 Cash retention program May-19 Troy W. Crawford $0.5 Cash retention program May-19 Frank M. Hamlin $0.4 Cash retention program Apr-19 George E. Sherman $10.5 May-18 Shane S. Kim $1.5 Feb-18 Tony D. Bartel $4.2 Feb-18 Michael P. Hogan $2.5 Appointment as Chief Executive Officer Appointment as Interim Chief Executive Officer Severance for resignation as Chief Operating Officer Severance for resignation as EVP, Strategic Business and Brand Development Total $32.7 restore GameStop Source: GameStop annual proxy statements. 38#39Investors Seem Excited for Further Change $160 $140 $120 $100 $80 $60 Our pressure on the Company seems to have created optimism that the right change is coming 03/23/2020 P&H nominates two candidates to the Board 1-day stock price reaction: +1.3% Stock price returns (indexed to $100) 03/26/2020 GameStop reports fiscal Q4 2019 earnings 1-day stock price reaction: -4.3% 04/10/2020 Michael Burry files 13D disclosing 5.3% stake up from 3.7% 1-day stock price reaction: +21.9% 04/24/2020 P&H file definitive proxy 1-day stock price reaction: +22.0% 3/11/20 3/13/20 3/15/20 3/17/20 3/19/20 3/21/20 restore GameStop Source: Capital IQ. Note: Peer Average as defined on page 5. 3/23/20 3/25/20 3/27/20 GME 3/29/20 3/31/20 4/2/20 4/4/20 S&P 500 04/03/2020 P&H file preliminary proxy 1-day stock price reaction: +10.4% 4/6/20 4/8/20 4/10/20 4/12/20 4/14/20 4/16/20 Peer Average 4/18/20 4/20/20 4/22/20 4/24/20 4/26/20 4/28/20 4/30/20 39 +6% -3%#40restore GameStop INVESTOR PRESENTATION III. Our Nominees Have the Skillset and Drive to Deliver Necessary Change#41Our Nominees Have the Experience Necessary to Create Value restore GameStop Our nominees are accomplished professionals with shareholder perspectives and an objective viewpoint Paul Evans Chief Financial Officer of Sevan Multi-Site Solutions Board member at Hill International (NYSE: HIL), Chairman of both the Audit and Risk committees and previously served as Interim Chief Executive Officer Previously CFO at MYR Group (Nasdaq: MYRG) Former Treasurer at North Western Energy (NYSE: NWE) Kurtis Wolf Founder, Managing Member and Chief Investment Officer of Hestia Capital Management LLC Co-Founding Partner at Lemhi Ventures LLC Co-Founding Partner at Definity Health Corporation Strategy consultant at Deloitte/Braxton, Lemhi Consulting and BCG Former Director, Audit Chair at Edgewater Technology, Inc. 41#42Our Nominees - Paul Evans Paul Evans Mr. Evans is the Chief Financial Officer of Sevan Multi-Site Solutions, a private equity-backed construction and program management company that serves many leading fortune 500 retail companies. Additionally, Mr. Evans is a Board Director at Hill International, Inc., a NYSE-listed company that provides program management, project management, construction management and other consulting services. As a Board Director at Hill International, Mr. Evans is the Chairman of both the Audit and Risk Committees and previously served as Interim Chief Executive Officer. Prior to this, Mr. Evans served in a variety of senior executive roles at MYR Group Inc., a NASDAQ-listed holding company of specialty electrical construction service providers that service the electrical infrastructure industry. These positions included Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer, President of MYR Real Estate Company and MYR's Principal Financial and Chief Accounting Officer. Earlier in his career, Mr. Evans held a number of executive management positions at several energy-related businesses, including Chief Executive Officer of Conex Energy Corporation, a privately-held company that developed renewable energy projects; Treasurer and Corporate Officer at NorthWestern Energy, an energy service provider assisting customers in Montana, South Dakota and Nebraska; Vice President of Finance at Duke Energy North America, a subsidiary of Duke Energy, a NYSE-listed company; and as Executive Director of Finance at NRG Energy, Inc., a NYSE-listed integrated power company. Mr. Evans is a Certified Public Accountant and a member of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. Mr. Evans received a B.B.A. in Accounting from Stephen F. Austin State University and a Masters of International Management from Thunderbird School of Global Management. restore GameStop 222 42#43Our Nominees - Paul Evans restore GameStop Kurtis Wolf Mr. Wolf is the Managing Member and Chief Investment Officer of Hestia Capital Management LLC, a value-oriented investment firm that he founded in January 2009. Previously, Mr. Wolf worked in a variety of financial, investing and operating roles, including as a Senior Analyst at First Q Capital, LLC, a hedge fund focused on investing in public companies that had previously been financed by venture capital or private equity firms and as a co-Founding Partner at Lemhi Ventures LLC, a health care services focused venture capital incubator. Mr. Wolf was also a co- Founding Partner at Definity Health Corporation, a leading company in the consumer-driven health care space that was purchased by UnitedHealth Group Inc. in December 2004. Earlier in his career, Mr. Wolf worked as a consultant both with Deloitte Consulting and The Boston Consulting Group. Mr. Wolf earned a Master of Business Administration degree from the Stanford Graduate School of Business and a Bachelor of Arts degree in Economics and Mathematics from Carleton College. 43#44We Are Seeking to Replace GameStop's Lame-Duck Directors Thomas Kelly and Jerome Davis agreed not to stand for re-election at the Company's 2021 Annual Meeting Thomas N. Kelly Jr. Jerome L. Davis Tenure • 8 years Committees Compensation Committee (2013 - present), Chair (2020 - present) • 15 years × × Recent experience Former EVP, Transition Integration and Chief Strategy Officer of Sprint Nextel Corp. x x Former EVP, COO and CMO of Nextel Communications, Inc. Shares purchased x None during tenure Shares sold × None during tenure Committee Outcome Compensation Committee (2006 - 2010) Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee (2007 - present), Chair (2010-present) EVP and Chief Revenue Officer of the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority in Washington, D.C. Former Corporate Vice President of Food and Retail for Waste Management, Inc. × Bought only 890 shares, in 2006, for $16,888 × Sold 38,900 shares, worth $1,479,639, that were granted as part of his annual director compensation Misaligned compensation structure - NEO and director pay equaled 15% of the Company's market cap in fiscal 2019 × restore Source: GameStop 2020 proxy statement, FactSet. GameStop Board refreshment was neglected for years; over half of the directors announced they were leaving at once 44 14#45Total Return Performance Over Time TSR performance under Jerome Davis vs. S&P 500 TSR performance under Thomas Kelly vs. S&P 500 $450 $450 $400 +266% $400 $350 $350 $300 $300 +177% $250 $250 $200 $200 $150 $150 $100 $100 $50 $50 -63% -65% $0 $0 Oct-05 Feb-08 Jul-10 Dec-12 Apr-15 Sep-17 Jan-20 Jul-12 Oct-13 Jan-15 Apr-16 Jul-17 Oct-18 Jan-20 GME -S&P 500 -GME -S&P 500 Significant underperformance under the leadership of Jerome Davis and Thomas Kelly! restore GameStop Source: FactSet. Note: Share price data until January 31, 2020. 45#46Even With the Most Recent Appointments, GameStop's Board is Predominately Retailers Board member Experience George Sherman • Former Chief Executive Officer of Victra, one of the largest authorized retailers for Verizon Wireless Jerome Davis • EVP and Chief Revenue Officer of the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority in Washington, D.C. • Former Corporate Vice President of Food and Retail for Waste Management, Inc. • Thomas Kelly Jr. Former EVP, Transition Integration and Chief Strategy Officer of Sprint Nextel Corp. . Former EVP, COO and CMO of Nextel Communications, Inc. Interim Executive Chair of Ascena Retail Group • Former EVP and CFO of Crocs, Inc. • Founder and CEO of Pro4ma Inc., an information technology services consulting firm • Carrie W. Teffner Primary industry expertise Turnaround expertise Retail Air travel, waste management Telecom Retail Lizabeth Dunn Retail • Founder and CEO of Talmage Advisers, a retail and branded consumer products consulting firm • Former President and CEO of Walmart U.S. William Simon • Former EVP and COO of Walmart U.S. Retail X x • President and CEO of PetSmart James Symancyk Retail • Former President and CEO of Academy Sports & Outdoors, Inc., a retail and ecommerce sporting goods chain x Kathy P. Vrabeck • Senior Client Partner at Korn Ferry, a global talent and organizational advisory firm President of Legendary Entertainment, a media company Executive Recruiting, Digital Entertainment(a) x Raul Fernandez • Vice Chairman and Owner of Monumental Sports & Entertainment, which co-owns several Washington sports teams, Team Liquid eSports, Wizards District Gaming NBA 2K and co-owns Capital One Arena Sports Team and Arena Ownership ✓ Reginald Fils-Aimé • Former President and COO of Nintendo of America, Inc. Game Publishing x The Board is Dominated By Retailers that Lack the Skillset GameStop Needs restore GameStop Source: GameStop 2020 proxy statement. (a) Predates digital distribution. 46 46#47Board Lacks True Public Company Finance Experience Existing board Our Nominees Metric Members with experience Kurt Wolf Paul Evans Prepared Forecasts 1 out of 10 Prepared Financial Statements 1 out of 10 Capital Markets / Finance Experience 1 out of 10 Financial Turnaround Experience 0 out of 10 restore Source: Stockholder Group Analysis. GameStop 47#48Investors Seem to Want Further Change "I fully support your effort to create a board that is shareholder friendly and provide GameStop with the expertise in growing shareholder value. Please let me, shareholders, know how we can help with this endeavor." "Please get rid of this management that only comes up with ideas after they are forced too! I can't imagine where GME would be with a better board and any vision." "It's about time someone did something constructive there besides pay high director fees! Please fix this mess." "I own 61,623 shares. I support your efforts and voted white. Good luck." "Go for it!! As a shareholder, very supportive." "Shareholder destruction has gone too far." "Thank you for the effort you put into to this fight and the guidance provided to stockholders about how to ensure their shares will be voted at the 2020 Annual Meeting. More and more people are supporting your actions." "I've had stock in GameStop for years and feel the company has neglected shareholders for those years. I believe the company needs someone fighting for shareholders on the board. Thank you for addressing this matter." restore GameStop Source: Comment section from Permit/Hestia website for proxy contest www.RestoreGameStop.com Note: Permission has not been sought nor obtained to use quotes. 48#49Permit and Hestia Have Ideas to Help Correct Underperformance Drivers of Long-Term Underperformance Permit and Hestia Response Value Creation Opportunity 1 Bloated Cost Structure Aggressively Reduce SG&A 2 Undisciplined Capital Allocation Address Liquidity Concerns 3 Poor Strategy and Strategic Focus 4 Lack of Shareholder Advocacy 5 Poor Culture and Leadership restore GameStop Articulate Long-Term Strategy Align Compensation with Shareholders Establish Corporate Culture Which Values All Stakeholders restore GameStop SIGNIFICANT UPSIDE 49#501 Aggressively Reduce SG&A Adjusted SG&A as a % of revenue(a) 20.9% 16.4% Adjusted SG&A as a % of gross profit(a) 23.9% 63.7% 70.3% 85.6% 2008 2008-2017 average 2018 2008 2008-2017 average 2018 ($ in millions) Revenue Adj. SG&A Adj. SG&A as % of Revenue Savings above Mgmt Plan Adj. SG&A as ($ in millions) Gross Profit Adj. SG&A % of Revenue Savings above Mgmt Plan 2018 Actual $8,285 $1,977 23.9% ($100) 2018 Actual $2,308 $1,977 85.6% ($100) With additional $100M savings $8,285 $1,877 22.7% $0 With additional $100M savings $2,308 $1,877 81.3% $0 At 2008-2017 Average Levels $8,285 $1,731 20.9% $146 At 2008 Levels $8,285 $1,360 16.4% $517 At 2008 - 2017 Average Levels At 2008 Levels $2,308 $1,623 70.3% $253 $2,308 $1,469 63.7% $408 Even if we account for expense deleveraging in 2019, there is potentially a $146M - $517M SG&A improvement opportunity, over and above management's $100M SG&A target restore GameStop Source: Company's public filings. Note: Adjusted SG&A provided by GameStop for 2019 and 2018. For prior years, calculated as SG&A less business divestiture expenses. (a) GameStop 2018 revenue of $8,285 million. GameStop 2018 gross profit of $2,308 million. 50#511 Aggressively Reduce SG&A The Board's current cost reduction plan does not go far enough SG&A as a % of revenue 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% SG&A as a % of gross profit 110% 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 10% 50% 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 GME -Peer Average GME Peer Average restore GameStop Source: Company's public filings, Bloomberg Note: Peer Average as defined on page 5. SG&A represents the unadjusted figure. 51#522 Address Liquidity Concerns • Develop and quickly implement significant cost cuts and a meaningful profit improvement plan • Take advantage of current market discount for the March 2021 Senior Notes, by executing open market purchases · Explore opportunities to improve short-term liquidity through ABL to provide bridge financing - - Identify unencumbered assets, such as the corporate jet and real estate, to leverage as part of an expanded revolver or short- term stand alone debt facility. Amend the borrowing base limitations and upsize the ABL revolver, which is currently limited to $420 million - even if rate increases Extend the maturity date of the ABL revolver due in November 2022 Aggressively pursue new debt issuance to refinance the Senior Notes - We believe GameStop can support a $400 million new issuance at a reasonable interest rate if the company can demonstrate immediate steps have been taken to significantly reduce corporate costs The benefit of removing GME's potential liquidity concern likely far exceeds any downside associated with higher cost debt Explore sale of non-core assets restore Source: Stockholder Group analysis GameStop 52#533 Articulate Viable Long-Term Strategy 퓨 Shape Strategy Around Core Gaming Assets Better leverage the Company's knowledgeable and passionate employees, who are gaming experts and effective influencers Harness the full value of the trade-in business, which benefits from a network multiplier effect Utilize the large physical store base and the PowerUp Rewards program to build a powerful gaming community - which is increasingly important in the gaming ecosystem Recognize the synergistic value of the Game Informer magazine across the entire business and use it more effectively to build additional value restore Source: Stockholder Group analysis. GameStop Right-size the Asset Base Explore the possibility to monetize foreign operations through asset sales Implement store-level profit improvement initiatives to ensure a long-term, sustainable store operating model Sell other non-core assets, including the corporate jet Invest in the Future Recognize the value of front-line employees, and invest more into training, job satisfaction and career development Examine new ways to leverage the Company's core gaming assets and invest in them for the future. Creating a winning gaming experience requires a different model than today's traditional GameStop Make high ROI-driven investments or prudently return capital to shareholders 53#543 Articulate Viable Long-Term Strategy GameStop must think beyond a traditional retail model and its existing footprint GameStop POWER TO THE PLAYERS" . More than 5,500 stores with approximately 14,000 full-time employees that are viewed as subject matter experts and key influencers with customers As gaming grows increasingly social, GameStop is well positioned to become a gaming hub GameStop POWERUP REWARDS • • U.S. loyalty program called PowerUp Rewards had approximately 42 million members as of February 1, 2020 5.0 million paying members with 15.2 million members that have purchased or traded at GameStop in the past year 22.2 million members in non-PowerUp Rewards loyalty programs outside the United States gameinformer Game Informer magazine restore GameStop Source: Company's public filings. . World's largest print and digital video game publication Fifth largest consumer publication in the United States and the largest digital magazine in the United States Part of the PowerUp Rewards membership 54#553 Articulate Viable Long-Term Strategy As a result of the Board's missteps, GameStop's credibility has been destroyed • Various stakeholders have embraced negative perceptions of GameStop Customers question the long-term sustainability of the PowerUp Rewards program and whether trade-in commitments will be honored - Slow drip of store closures has eroded employee morale and led them to question their job security Vendors have discounted GameStop's involvement in their future Debt holders have an unreasonable concern of potential insolvency These factors have likely contributed to over a 100% short interest and stock price decline of 85% in the past five years restore Source: Hestia/Permit Diligence; Company's public filings, Capital IQ. GameStop 55#564 Better Align Compensation 0 EXECUTIVES Executive base compensation should be adjusted to levels in line with similar market capitalization peer companies. Short term incentive compensation metrics should lead to higher shareholder capital appreciation. Long term incentive compensation should be based on total shareholder returns as opposed to a time-based metric. Require higher stock ownership levels. • • • BOARD Board compensation is out of line with companies of similar profit and market capitalization profiles. Reduce cash as a percentage of overall compensation. Fixed annual share grant - stock compensation should be directly tied to shareholder value. Require higher stock ownership levels. restore GameStop Source: Stockholder Group analysis. 56#575 Establish Corporate Culture Which Values All Stakeholders Customers Build a customer centric culture that prioritizes long- term relationships over a transactional focus Employees Recognize the critical value of all our employees by treating them with respect and investing in their personal and professional success Vendors Leverage unique role as the industry influencer through knowledgeable employees, Game Informer magazine, and PowerUp Rewards program to deliver additional value to vendors Shareholders Demonstrate commitment to shareholders by aligning compensation, implementing and maintaining rigorous cost controls, increasing transparency, truly listening to their input, and returning significant capital to them, when financial conditions permit restore GameStop Source: Stockholder Group analysis. Customers Employees Create value here Vendors Shareholders to realize value here 57#58restore GameStop INVESTOR PRESENTATION IV. Board Engagement and Misleading Claims#59Offer of Assistance Met With Disdain and Dismissal 2011 - 2018 Permit/Hestia attempt to engage constructively with GameStop's management and Board March 29, 2019 Cooperation Agreement to add 2 new directors to expanded Board. New directors include Lizabeth Dunn + 1 Company- identified director May-September 2019 Several unsuccessful attempts to engage directly with the Board Numerous discussions with management regarding: Share repurchases Expense reductions Selling corporate jet Exec & Board Compensation Board member stock ownership Board refreshment October 15, 2020 Permit/Hestia increase ownership to 5.1% Dec 15, 2020 Permit/Hestia increase ownership to 7.5% January 15, 2020 Call with GameStop management to discuss being involved in Board refreshment process Proposal to put 1 representative from Permit or Hestia on the Board Proposal Rejected March 23, 2020 Permit/Hestia nominate 2 candidates to the Board April 14, 2020 Permit/Hestia have first conversation with Lead Director and Nominating Committee members Permit/Hestia offer to expand Board by 1 and add 2 nominees, but indicated willingness to consider other alternatives Proposal Rejected April 17, 2020 Follow-up discussion with Board to discuss Permit/Hestia proposal or examine other possible alternatives Proposal Rejected No Counterproposal April 22, 2020 Follow-up discussion with Board to discuss Permit/Hestia proposal or possible counterproposal Proposal Rejected Counterproposal: Offer to discuss Board refreshment in 2021 2011 - 2018 March 13, 2019 Permit/Hestia form an investment group with 1.3% combined ownership; send letter to the Board expressing concerns about the Company's performance and need for leadership changes 2019 April 24, 2019 Company appointed Ms. Dunn and Raul Fernandez to Board. Permit/Hestia had virtually no engagement re: Mr. Fernandez's selection despite the terms of Cooperation Agreement September 26, 2019 Meeting at GameStop HQ with Permit, Hestia and GameStop management Discussions included performance improvement initiatives, cost reductions and Board refreshment March 9, 2020 2020 GameStop announced 3 new directors; 4 directors to retire in 2020 and 2 directors to retire in 2021 March 10, 2020 Permit/Hestia express disappointment to GameStop regarding lack of engagement with Board; CEO indicated Board did not take Permit/Hestia proposal seriously Despite numerous attempts, Permit and Hestia have had very little contact with GameStop's Board over the past year restore Source: 2020 definitive proxy statement submitted by Permit and Hestia. GameStop 59#60Board's Limited Engagement with Hestia/Permit Was Not in Good Faith Event 2019 Cooperation Agreement Selection Process of Two New Directors • • • . • • Engagement No Board member would speak directly to Hestia or Permit during settlement discussions. The Board insisted all discussions needed to be made through advisors or by email. The Company refused to include the stockholder representative as a potential appointee, despite Hestia and Permit's offer to agree to a two-year standstill. On March 29, 2019, GameStop rushed to issue a press release stating that Hestia and Permit had rejected GameStop's settlement proposal, when in fact 30 minutes beforehand, Hestia and Permit accepted GameStop's proposal. In the interest of giving the new CEO time, Hestia and Permit agreed to have the Company pick 1 of their 3 candidates (excluding the stockholder representative) and consultation rights with respect to the second director to be appointed. No incumbent director would agree to step down at the 2019 annual meeting. Of the remaining 3 candidates recommended by Hestia and Permit, the retail candidate was selected despite potentially greater need to add a director with turnaround experience or gaming experience (our other two nominees). Hestia and Permit were to have consultation rights over second independent director but were largely kept out of the process and presented only with the Company's final selection (not multiple candidates). Recent Board Refreshment No Attempt to Avoid a Proxy Contest . From May 2019-March 2020, Hestia and Permit repeatedly tried to push for further Board refreshment without having to wait for the next annual meeting. • After the Company lowered earnings guidance 3x in four months and then missed its 2019 forecast, Hestia and Permit encouraged the Board to add a stockholder representative to improve the Company's credibility. • Board refused Hestia and Permit's offer to assist with the Board refreshment. • Hestia and Permit had very limited engagement with independent directors while under standstill. • Board refresh announced 3 days before our standstill expired. • The Board would not make any settlement proposal or accept even one stockholder joining the Board to avoid a proxy contest. Only offer by the Board was to support the Board's slate. restore Source: 2020 definitive proxy statement submitted by Permit and Hestia. GameStop 60 60#61GameStop's Claims Are Misleading GameStop Claim FACTS • GameStop has undertaken • sufficient change Change in management has not produced positive financial, TSR, morale or outlook changes Confuses movement for progress • High short interest suggests shareholders remain unconvinced • GameStop needs constructive disruption More change would be disruptive • Trend lines all heading in wrong direction • Board remains retail centric and lacks sufficient capital allocation, turnaround experience and "skin in the game" GameStop claims shareholders should be passive bystanders and have no place on a Board; we believe our perspective is critical to proper Board deliberations Hestia and Permit nominees • Our nominees have decades of financial, capital markets and turnaround experience do not have relevant skills • restore GameStop Source: Company's public filings. Directors with skin in the game will make the Board start acting like owners instead of professional managers 61#62GameStop's Claims Are Misleading GameStop Claim FACTS Board's prudent and balanced capital allocation strategy has strengthened GameStop's balance sheet Board has delivered value to stockholders with its decision to sell Spring Mobile for $700 million Permit and Hestia are short- term investors who wanted a large share buyback that would have left the company weaker • • • • • Company failed to refinance March 2021 Senior Notes coming due in 10 months - resulting in potentially a serious liquidity crisis Allocated $38M in executive compensation in fiscal 2019 despite a 65% decline in the share price SG&A increased as a percentage of revenue and gross profit in fiscal 2019 The Board announced the sale of Spring Mobile in November 2018, after investing over $740 million in telecom acquisitions and 6 months after a large stockholder (Tiger Management) publicly called for its sale Thomas Kelly who was added to the Board in 2012 for his Telecom experience to help drive this ill- advised M&A strategy into the Telecom space should have resigned last year after the sale of Spring Mobile not remain on the Board until 2021 Permit and Hestia have been invested in GameStop since 2011 and 2012 and are committed to helping the company prosper We recommended a significant buyback based on the healthy financials and guidance provided by management at the time What we didn't know at the time was that the Company would announce on April 2, 2020 material weaknesses in their internal controls, casting doubt on their liquidity needs for the remainder of the year restore GameStop Source: Company's public filings. 62 62#63Continuity Has Little Value When Performance is Bad 2019 comparable same-store guidance 0% -5% -5% -5% -7% -10% -13% -10% -15% -10% -11% 13% -16% -19% -20% -16% -19% -19% -19.4% -19% -21% -25% Q4 2018 Q1 2019 Q2 2019 Q3 2019 Holdiay Outcome sales update -High Low Analyst projections Company revised its comparable same store sales estimate three times in four months... ($ in millions) Year end 2019 liquidity guidance $1,200 $1,100 $1,100 $1,000 $1,000 $900 $900 $800 $700 $770 $600 Q3 2019 Holdiay sales update Outcome High Low ...and missed its liquidity target by $130mm after providing guidance just 19 days earlier Long-tenured Board that touts the value of their experience and knowledge of business was unable to support incoming management with information to avoid embarrassing forecasting issues restore Source: GameStop earnings releases, GameStop press releases, Wall Street research. Wall Street research includes Jefferies, Bank of America and Credit Suisse. GameStop 63#64restore GameStop INVESTOR PRESENTATION V. Conclusion#65Your Vote is Important! Permit and Hestia urge shareholders to vote on the WHITE proxy card! GameStop's Board has repeatedly failed shareholders contributing to a share price decline of 85% over the past five fiscal years • We initially signed a Cooperation Agreement with GameStop, but the Company refused to engage with us in good faith • Management and the Board are content spending shareholder capital to defend two long-tenured directors that should be held accountable for the Company's disastrous performance GameStop's Board is ill-equipped to address the uncertainties posed by COVID-19, an upcoming debt refinancing, non-core. asset sales and the launch of a new console cycle Shareholders deserve a Board with fresh perspectives on growth, a commitment to cost reductions, prudent capital allocation and compensation targets, and have significant stock ownership We have nominated two independent professionals that can serve the interests of shareholders better than two lame duck directors that own little stock restore GameStop PLEASE VOTE TODAY! 65#66restore GameStop INVESTOR PRESENTATION APPENDIX I: Drivers of Long Term Underperformance#67GameStop Has Been in a Downward Trajectory For Years 5-year stock performance $200 +94% 4.8x +79% $150 $100 $50 -85% TEV / LTM EBITDA multiple 3.5x 3.6x 2.8x 2.5x 2.2x $0 Jan-15 Jan-16 Jan-17 Jan-18 Jan-19 Jan-20 Jan-15 Jan-16 Jan-17 Jan-18 Jan-19 Jan-20 GME S&P 500 Index Dow Jones Specialty Retailers Index $100 invested on January 30, 2015, in GameStop would have been worth just $14.64 on January 31, 2020... ...as GameStop's multiple suggests declining investor faith in the Company's future restore GameStop Source: FactSet, Capital IQ. Note: Jan-15 through Jan-20 represents the last trading day of the calendar year. 67 57#68Wall Street Analysts Have Been Lowering Targets For Years, Price Targets Continue to Decline $60 $50 $40 $30 $20 $10 $0 May-15 restore Source: Wall Street research, Bloomberg. GameStop Analyst price target Since April 24, 2019, at which the Board refresh and CEO change were effectuated, the consensus price target has declined over 60% $3.98 May-16 May-17 May-18 May-19 May-20 68#69Loss of Physical Market Share If you were shopping for a brand-new video game today, where would you be most likely to purchase it? 34% 30% 29% 32% 19% 16% 11% 10% 8% 6% GameStop Amazon Walmart BestBuy Target Feb-15 ■Feb-20 restore GameStop Source: Bespoke Intel Survey Research February 2020, Stockholder Group Analysis. 2% 2% 1% 1% Costco Other 69#70Investors Are Actively Betting Against the Current Plan restore GameStop 120% 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% GME Short Interest vs. Peer Average 0% May-15 May-16 May-17 May-18 May-19 May-20 -GME Peer Average Source: Capital IQ. Note: Peer Average as defined on page 5. Barnes & Noble is included up until August 6, 2019, when it was acquired by Elliott Management. 70#71Examples of SG&A Bloat NEO compensation ($ in mm) The number of NEOS has grown while revenue has declined... 8 $12,000 5 5 5 5 5 5 $9,000 $6,000 $3,000 $0 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Number of NEOS Revenue ...and NEO compensation as a percentage of revenue has increased significantly $40 $34.7 $35.7 0.6% 0.6% $30 $24.0 $26.6 $19.9 0.4% $22.7 $23.3 $23.4 0.4% $19.3 $18.9 $20 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% $10 $0 0.0% 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 INEO Compensation % of revenue restore GameStop Source: GameStop annual 10-Ks, GameStop annual proxy statements. % of revenue 71#72Examples of SG&A Bloat (continued) Instead of reducing executive team, the C-Suite has only grown, with duplicate responsibilities GAMESTOP REBOOT RESPONSIBILITIES Optimize the Executive George Sherman Appointed core business Become the social / cultural gaming hub Build a frictionless digital ecosystem Transform vendor relationships April 2019 Chief Executive Officer Jim Bell June 2019 Chief Financial Officer Frank Hamlin Chief Customer Officer June 2019 Chris Homeister June 2019 Chief Merchandising Officer Dan Kaufman May 2019 Chief Transformation Officer Consultants restore GameStop Approximately April 2019 Source: GameStop annual 10-Ks, GameStop annual proxy statements, GameStop website. Two other NEOs already doing these things 72 22#73Company Has Been Slow to Reduce Its Physical Footprint Store closures: (156) (119) (131) restore GameStop Video Game Stores (112) (278) Company guidance (320)(a) Lack of Clarity 6,202 6,046 5,927 5,796 5,684 5,406 5,086 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020E Future target Slow decline of business has also perpetuated negative narrative Source: Company's public filings. Note: Only includes video game stores. Does not include collectibles and technology segment stores. (a) Company guidance of approximately 320 stores closures for 2020 provided on the Q4 2019 earnings call. 73#74Management Faces a Challenging Refinancing In March 2016, GameStop issued $475 million of 6.75% Senior Notes to fund an ill-advised M&A strategy The Notes are due in March 2021 and currently have an outstanding balance of approximately $420 million • In late 2019 and early 2020, when credit market conditions were much more favorable than they are now, we urged the Company to refinance the Senior Notes that were due in slightly over a year • . • However, GameStop's management team was overly optimistic in the Company's financial forecast and did not act Fast forward, the COVID-19 pandemic has drastically changed the credit markets and GME's financial projections A sophisticated Chief Financial Officer and executive team, would not have waited! The Company's refinancing becomes more challenging every day that passes, as GME loses negotiating leverage over new capital restore GameStop Source: Stockholder Group Analysis. 74#75Including 7 Current Directors, Directors Sold Stock While Having GameStop Buy Shares While the Board was using shareholder capital to repurchase stock, they were personally selling their own shares! ($ in millions) restore GameStop $500 $40 $409 $400 $300 $35 $339 $333 $258 $30 $239 $202 $25 $200 $100 $123 $20 $75 $15 $0 $0 $10 ($9) ($16) ($17) ($100) ($62) ($69) ($54) ($73) $5 ($200) 50 $0 2009 2010 2011 2012 Director net sellers Shares repurchased 2013 2014 2015 2016 Year end share price Source: Company's public filings, FactSet. Share price 75#76Executive Team and Pay Bloated The number of NEOs has grown while revenue has declined... ($ in millions) $9,474 8 $9,364 restore GameStop 6 $6,446 5 ...and NEO compensation has increased significantly ($ in millions) $24.0 $23.3 $35.7 2010 2015 2019 2010 2015 2019 Number of NEOS Revenue NEO Compensation Source: Company's public filings. 76#77Executive Compensation Programs Have Been Poorly Designed Single, Absolute Metric Use of an absolute performance condition as sole metric for the LTIP is inappropriate May largely reflect economic factors outside the control of executives One-Off Awards GME granted certain NEOs supplemental awards outside normal incentive plans Awards may undermine the relationship between performance and pay ola • Excessive Severance Payments Provided excessive payments to outgoing executives unrelated to change-of-control situations MY PROPOSAL Measure performance with a mix of absolute and relative measures PROPOSAL Redesign incentive programs to provide appropriate incentives PROPOSAL Eliminate payments that are unrelated to company performance restore GameStop Source: Glass Lewis 2019 Report. 77#78($ in millions) Executive Compensation Programs Have Been Poorly Designed $1.4 2010 restore GameStop Revenue per store(a) $1.4 2015 2010-2019 change(b): -21% $387K $1.1 Gross profit per store (a) $452K $337K $259K 2019 2010 2015 2019 2010 2010-2019 change(b): -13% Source: Company's public filings. (a) Represents average number of stores. Calculated as beginning of the year number of stores plus ending of the year number of stores, divided by two. (b) 2010 excludes the technology and collectibles business. 2019 includes the collectibles business but excludes the technology business as it was sold. SG&A per store(a) $339K $327K 2015 2010-2019 change(b): +31% 2019 78#79Management Bonuses Have Been Misaligned with Shareholder Value ($ in millions) Year Performance Measure Target Actual STI Earned Weighting % Payout as % of Target 2015 Technology brands and other new 300 stores 591 stores 125% 25.0% 31.3% concepts store growth 2016 Technology brands operating earnings $88 $90 102% 25.0% 25.5% 2019 G&A cost savings vs. Fiscal 2018 Baseline $30.0 $44.7 196% 16.7% 32.7% BONUSES MISALGINED WITH SHAREHOLDER VALUE Acquisition and development of AT&T stores, which were eventually sold Bonuses paid based on non-core business segment SG&A increased dramatically as a percentage of revenues 2019 Successful completion of Tulsa Test 100.0% 100.0% 100% 16.7% 16.7% Completing a test is their job, not an accomplishment worthy of a bonus restore GameStop Source: GameStop annual proxy statements. 79#80restore GameStop INVESTOR PRESENTATION APPENDIX II: Consumer Demand is Not the Problem#81GameStop Retains Mindshare with Customers Where would you purchase a new game? 27.8% 26.2% 14.1% 12.4% 9.6% 7.3% 1.5% 1.1% 40.0% Where do you prefer to buy used games? 23.9% 12.4% 7.4% 7.1% 5.8% 3.5% Amazon GameStop Walmart Digital Best Buy Target Costco Other GameStop Amazon Walmart Best Buy NA / Other Target Ebay Download How did you purchase games for the Nintendo Switch? 60.9% Physical restore Source: Bespoke Intel Survey Research February 2020. GameStop 39.1% Which do you prefer? 68.4% 31.6% Digital New releases purchased up-front Free games with in-app purchases 81#8227% Jan-15 Mar-15 May-15 Jul-15 Source: Bespoke Intel Survey Research February 2020. Sep-15 Nov-15 Jan-16 Mar-16 May-16 Jul-16 Sep-16 Nov-16 Jan-17 Mar-17 Physical -Digital Despite recent digital share gains, largely driven by increased market share by highly digital games Fortnite and Minecraft, due to slow game launches, digital penetration has plateaued May-17 Jul-17 Sep-17 Nov-17 Jan-18 Mar-18 May-18 Jul-18 Sep-18 Nov-18 45% 46% 42% 39% 38% 40% 39% 39% 40% 41% 38% 41% 39% 42% 40% 35% 34% 29% Jan-19 Mar-19 May-19 due to slow traditional game launches Recent trend reflective of Minecraft and Fortnite (both 50%+ digital) grabbing share Jul-19 73% 71% 65% 66% 61% 62% 61% 61% 61% 62% 60% 59% 58% 59% 61% 60% 58% 55% 54% Digital Downloads Have Slowed Share Gains Percentage of purchases made in the past year Sep-19 Nov-19 Jan-20 restore GameStop 82#83Physical Games Offer Value to Customers I enjoy having a physical copy of the game/game-box The limited storage capacity on Xbox One / Sony PS4 prevents me from downloading multiple games There is no trade-in value with digital games The time it takes to download digital games it too long I typically lend and borrow physical games, and digital downloads would prevent me from doing so I am unable to download digitally because of a poor Internet connection Other 4% 12% 11% 29% 32% 32% Consumers demand, and will continue to get, physical games restore Source: Bespoke Intel Survey Research February 2020. GameStop 54% 83#84GameStop Has Not Taken Bold Action restore GameStop "If E3 is the Vatican, why is GameStop not the local church?" - CCO Frank Hamlin, 2014 • • • After attending an E3 event in 2014, Frank Hamlin, Chief Customer Officer, pitched the idea of becoming the 'local church' of gaming Management and the Board seemed to reject this proposal by focusing their efforts on a failed retail strategy It took six years for GameStop to reverse its strategy In 2019, to create an experiential gaming experience, GameStop initiated its Tulsa market test in 12 stores including: try-before-you buy, eSports competitive gaming, and a collectibles experience Results have yet to be announced Source: GameStop earnings transcripts, articles. Note: Permission has not been sought nor obtained to use quote. 84#85Vote the WHITE Card If you have any questions regarding your WHITE proxy card or need assistance in executing your proxy, please contact: restore GameStop saratoga PROXY CONSULTING, LLC Saratoga Proxy Consulting LLC 520 8th Avenue, 14th Floor New York, NY 10018 (212) 257-1311 Stockholders may call toll-free at (888) 368-0379 Email: [email protected] John Broderick Permit Capital [email protected] Kurt Wolf Hestia Capital [email protected] 85