#1TOSHIBA Leading Innovation >>> T12LIC0005 Rev.0 Fukushima Lessons-Learned and US-ABWR Capabilities for Beyond Design Basis Events Toshiba Corporation June 28, 2012 Copyright © 2012 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved.#2Toshiba Attendees Kenji Arai Fumihiko Ishibashi Hirohide Oikawa Kazuo Hisajima Yoshihiro Naruse James J Powers III Robert Schrauder Dale Wuokko Yuya Aoyagi Toshiba Senior Fellow Toshiba Senior Manager, Nuclear Safety System Design & Engineering Department Toshiba Chief Specialist, Nuclear Safety System Design & Engineering Department Toshiba Chief Specialist, System Design & Engineering Department TANE Senior Vice President Engineering, & Chief Technology Officer TANE Vice President Engineering TANE Vice President Licensing TANE Licensing Specialist TANE Licensing Engineer Daniel Stenger Robert Quinn Caroline Schlaseman Attorney, Hogan Lovells ABWR Project Manager, Westinghouse MPR, DCD Renewal Project Manager TOSHIBA Copyright © 2012 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved. Leading Innovation >>> 2#3Desired Outcomes The Desired Outcomes of this Meeting are: - - The NRC to have an Understanding of: ● How the US-ABWR design currently addresses Fukushima Lessons- Learned The current capability of the US-ABWR design to cope with beyond design basis events Plan for addressing SECY-12-0025 Issues Receive NRC Feedback TOSHIBA Copyright © 2012 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved. Leading Innovation >>> 3#4Agenda ABWR Operating Experience Toshiba Role in US-ABWR Design Certification Rule ■ Toshiba Involvement and Activities Post Fukushima US-ABWR Design for - External Events - Beyond Design Basis External Events - Station Blackout Core Cooling Containment Overpressure Protection - Spent Fuel Pool Cooling - Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Alignment with Fukushima Tier 1 and 2 Activities DC Renewal Application and Fukushima Related Matters Conclusion TOSHIBA Copyright © 2012 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved. Leading Innovation >>>#5US-ABWR Abbreviations AFI ΑΙΑ COPS CTG DCD Design Control Document ECCS EDG ABWR Advanced Boiling Water Reactor ADS Automatic Depressurization System ACIWA AC Independent Water Addition System Alternate Feedwater Injection System (High Pressure Injection System) Aircraft Impact Assessment Containment Overpressure Protection System Combustion Turbine Generator Emergency Core Cooling System Emergency Diesel Generator FPC FPS Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System Fire Protection System HPCF High Pressure Core Flooder System LPFL Low Pressure Flooder System SFP RCIC Spent Fuel Pool Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System RHR Residual Heat Removal System TWL Turbine Water Lubricated Pump TOSHIBA Copyright © 2012 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved. Leading Innovation >>> 5#6ABWR Operating Experience The ABWR is a Proven Safe Design with Over 40 Reactor Years of Safe Reliable Operation ■Currently Four ABWRs in Japan -Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Plant units 6 and 7, commercial operation 1996 and 1997 respectively -Hamaoka Nuclear Plant unit 5, commercial operation 2005 -Shika Nuclear Plant unit 2 commercial operation 2006 Kashiwazaki-Kariwa units 6&7 Hamaoka unit 5 TOSHIBA Copyright © 2012 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved. Leading Innovation >>> 6#7Toshiba Role in US-ABWR Design Certification Rule US-ABWR Design Certification Rule would have expired June 2012 Toshiba submitted application to the NRC to renew the Rule by Letter Dated October 27, 2010 ■ Application incorporated South Texas Project 3 & 4 departures ■ NRC accepted and docketed on Dec. 14, 2010 Toshiba will submit Revision 1 to the application including AIA amendment and PRA update in June 2012 Toshiba will incorporate Fukushima Lessons-Learned in a future revision TOSHIBA Copyright © 2012 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved. Leading Innovation >>> 7#8Toshiba Involvement Post Fukushima Contributed to Plant's Stabilization and Recovery - Led US-Japan Team (Toshiba, Westinghouse, B&W, Shaw) - Supported Japanese BWR Utilities for incorporating additional mitigation capability as required by the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) Japanese Utilities Plant Safety Enhancement - Proposed measures for plant safety enhancements - Proposed US SAMG Approach (Toshiba-Exelon-Westinghouse team) TOSHIBA Copyright © 2012 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved. Leading Innovation >>> 8#9Toshiba Involvement Post Fukushima Stress Tests at Japanese Utilities - Supporting safety margin evaluation for earthquake and tsunami Fukushima Accident Investigation and Countermeasure Development - Supported development of the Japan Nuclear Technology Institute (JANTI) report Interaction with US Leaders - NRC Chairman visit to Toshiba - November, 2011 - ACRS Chairman visit to Toshiba - March, 2012 TOSHIBA Copyright © 2012 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved. Leading Innovation >>> 9#10Toshiba Activities Post-Fukushima Involvement in US Industry Forums - Member NEI New Plant Oversight Committee - Member NEI New Plant Working Group - Member EPRI - Member of STP 3&4 Fukushima Response Team - Providing input on Proposed Rulemaking - Attending NRC/Industry Meetings on Orders and 10CFR50.54(f) Request for Information - Developing concepts for US-Utilities to address NTTF recommendations with Westinghouse - Howard Baker Forum for U.S.-Japan Roundtable on Nuclear Energy Cooperation TOSHIBA Copyright © 2012 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved. Leading Innovation >>> 10#11US-ABWR Design and SECY-12-0025 Issues SECY-12-0025 Issues: Tier 1 Activities 2.1 Seismic and flooding reevaluations 2.3-Seismic and flooding walkdowns - 4.1 Station Blackout (SBO) regulatory actions 4.2-Mitigating strategies for beyond design basis events 5.1-Reliable hardened vents for Mark I and II containments 7.1-Spent fuel pool instrumentation 8- Strengthen & Integrate EOPS, SAMGS, & EDMGS 9.3-Enhanced EP staffing and communications TOSHIBA Copyright © 2012 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved. Leading Innovation >>> 11#12US-ABWR Design and SECY-12-0025 Issues SECY-12-0025 Issues: Tier 2 Activities 2.1 Other Natural External Hazards - 7.2-Provide safety-related AC power to the SFP makeup system 7.3 - Revise Tech Specs to address enhanced instrumentation and new AC power requirements 7.4-Seismically qualified spray to SFP TOSHIBA Copyright © 2012 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved. Leading Innovation >>> 12#13US-ABWR Design: Engineered Safety Features RHR(III) AAAH 鳳鳳 ADS AA RHR(II) - - Safety Systems Three Redundant and Independent divisions of ECCS ECCS HPCF: High Pressure Core Flooder LPFL: Low Pressure Flooder HPCF(III) HPCF(II) RHR(I) RCIC: Reactor Core Isolation Cooling ADS: Automatic Depressurization System RCIC EDG LPFL(RHR) RCIC ADS EDG HPCF HPCF EDG LPFL (RHR) LPFL (RHR) LPFL: Low Pressure Flooder System RHR: Residual Heat Removal System HPCF: High Pressure Core Flooder System RCIC: Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System *ADS: Automatic Depressurization System EDG: Emergency Diesel Generator TOSHIBA Copyright © 2012 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved. Leading Innovation >>> 13#14US-ABWR Design: Containment Design Feature Reinforced Concrete Containment ■Horizontal vent system ■Improve seismic performance by lower gravity center D/W Head Reinforced Concrete TOSHIBA Copyright © 2012 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved. Leading Innovation >>> 14 Liner (Inner side) RPV Pedestal Access Tunnel Vent Pipe#15US-ABWR Design: Design Basis for External Events ■The US-ABWR SSCs important to safety are designed to withstand the effects of External Events US-ABWR 0.3g: Max. Horizontal ground acc. 0.3g: Max. Vertical ground acc. Earthquake Flooding (including 1 ft (0.3 m) below grade Tsunami) Tornado US Regulation GDC2 R.G.1.60 GDC2 R.G.1.59 R.G.1.102 GDC2 Hurricane 483 km/h (300mph) Addressed on site specific basis R.G.1.76 Rev 1 GDC2 R.G.1.221 Extreme wind 177 km/h: Non-Safety Related 197 km/h: Safety Related GDC2 TOSHIBA Copyright © 2012 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved. Leading Innovation >>> 15#16US-ABWR Design: Mitigation of External Events ■The US-ABWR SSCs important to safety are designed to withstand the effects of External Events US-ABWR Backup Power Supply EDG × 3 CTG × 1 Physical Separation All Safety-Related SSC SBO Coping System (Core Cooling) Separated CTG + DC batteries RCIC ACIWA/RHR + FPS pump or Fire truck US Regulation GDC 17, 2, 4, 5 RG 1.6, 1.9, 1.32 10 CFR 50.48, GDC 17 RG 1.189, 1.75 10 CFR 50.63 RG 1.155 Addition and upgrading of fire barriers and doors Aircraft Impact Coping Addition of AFI Extensive Damage Mitigation B.5.b equipment TOSHIBA Copyright © 2012 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved. Leading Innovation >>> 16 10 CFR 50.150 10CFR50.54 (hh)(2) EA-02-026, Section B.5.b#17US-ABWR Capability For Beyond Design Basis Events ■US-ABWR design fully addresses NRC requirements for design basis events ■ US-ABWR design includes numerous design features that provide capabilities to cope with beyond design basis conditions Examples: - - Combustion Turbine Generator (CTG) provided to cope with SBO Alternate Feedwater Injection System (AFI) capable of injecting water directly to reactor AC Independent Water Addition (ACIWA) mode for core cooling, spent fuel pool cooling, or containment overpressure protection using either diesel driven fire protection system pump, or fire truck TOSHIBA Copyright © 2012 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved. Leading Innovation >>> 17#18US-ABWR Consideration for Beyond Design Basis External Events ■US-ABWR design includes consideration for beyond design basis external events Examples -Earthquake: HCLPF (High Confidence Low Probability of Failure) capacity at least equal to twice the SSE is demonstrated for all Standard Plant safety related SSCs. -Flooding (including Tsunami): Reactor and Control Building doors are protected with tornado missile barriers, which will limit leakage due to external flooding above the design basis level. Site specific evaluation can be performed by COL applicant to add additional flood protection as necessary. -Tornado: The tornado wind speed and pressure drop in DCD are more conservative than those in R.G. 1.76 revision 1. -Extreme Wind: The tornado wind provides substantial margin above the extreme wind. (See the previous table) TOSHIBA Copyright © 2012 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved. Leading Innovation >>> 18#19J-ABWR Experience of Beyond DB Earthquake Kashiwazaki Kariwa (KK)6/7: Chuestu-Oki Earthquake: July 16, 2007 - Observed Peak Acceleration at Reactor Building Lowest Level Horizontal Vertical KK-6 0.33 g 0.50 g US-ABWR Design Basis Peak ground acc. =0.3 g for SSE KK-7 0.36 g 0.36 g - KK-7 in Operation accomplished Major Safety Functions - Fundamentally Same Seismic Design in US-ABWR IAEA Mission Report (Feb. 26, 2008) 'From the presentations made by TEPCO experts as well as reports by the regulatory authority NISA, and as was confirmed by plant walkdowns performed by IAEA experts, it is indicated that the safety related structures, systems and components of all seven units of the plant (in operating, start-up and shut down conditions) demonstrated exceptionally good apparent performance in ensuring the basic safety functions concerning control of reactivity, cooling and confinement.' TOSHIBA Copyright © 2012 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved. Leading Innovation >>> 19#20US-ABWR Coping Capability against SBO US-ABWR ECCS Configuration & Power Supply Overview ADS Feed Water Line Main Steam Line Operational Bus A Operational Bus B Operational Bus C CTG Division I Division II Division III EDG EDG EDG HPCF Pump LPFL Pump LPFL LPFL Pump Pump DG DG Reactor Core HPCF Pump Diesel Generators External Power Source RCIC Pump Power Supply ✓ 3 redundant EDG ✓ Alternative AC power (CTG). Connection to Bus in 10 minutes 7 Day onsite fuel supply AC Independent ECCS (RCIC) ✓ Reactor steam driven ✓ High pressure RPV coolant makeup ✓ 8 hours DC Battery for electrical operation TOSHIBA Copyright © 2012 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved. Leading Innovation >>> 20#21US-ABWR Back-Up Power Supply ■US-ABWR design includes Power Source Redundancy and Diversity - 3 redundant Emergency Diesel Generators (separated physically and electrically) - 8 hours of DC battery power (for SRV operation, RCIC controls, and other instrumentation) - Combustion Turbine Generator • • • • Operates during SBO without external AC power Has a 7 day on site fuel storage volume Provides backup power to any one of three ECCS divisions Housed above the design flood level and is in a building protected from adverse site related weather conditions TOSHIBA Copyright © 2012 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved. Leading Innovation >>> 21#22US-ABWR Core Cooling ■RCIC available for Core Cooling with availability of DC Control Power Alternate Feedwater Injection System - - With availability of CTG, system capable of injecting water directly to reactor - Evaluating AFI piping modification to accommodate temporary portable pump if CTG is unavailable ■RHR AC Independent Water Addition (ACIWA) mode provides for core cooling using either diesel driven fire protection system pump, or fire truck TOSHIBA Copyright © 2012 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved. Leading Innovation >>> 22#23US-ABWR RCIC Design Turbine Water Lubricated (TWL) Pump - - - - - - TWL is a combined pump and turbine with single shaft Compact size (Simple auxiliary machinery, no external shaft seal part etc.) No vacuum pump and No condensate pump (Less battery load required) Mechanical flow control system (No battery required for flow control) Self water lubricated (oil-less) Functional up to ~250°F (Design temperature is 171°F) TOSHIBA Copyright © 2012 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved. Leading Innovation >>> 23#24US-ABWR Core Cooling with ACIWA ■Diverse means of low pressure water injection - Installed diesel driven fire pump - All necessary valves are accessible and can be operated manually PRIMARY CONTAINMENT DRYWELL SPRAY SPARGER 1 RPV RHR WETWELL SPRAY SPARGER M X33-XX-3. 12 E- FROM REACTOR BUILDING EXTERNAL CONNECTION FPC FPC| RHR 2 FPC M 2 RHR TO FPC HPCF-C RHR TO FCS EX M FP RHR NNS FROM FP FCS RHR 2 NNS 2 M JOCKEY PUMP FE S/P HX MAIN PUMP RHR 2 RCW-C RCW-C 2 RHR RCW RCW TOSHIBA Copyright © 2012 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved. Leading Innovation >>> 24 FE#25US-ABWR Containment Overpressure Protection ■Containment Overpressure Protection System -Venting provided from suppression pool -Passive System does not require operator action -System valves are normally open and fail open -System can be isolated post disk rupture 1st if desired Rupture disks -1st rupture disk: part of the primary containment boundary setpoint pressure = 2 Pd -2nd rupture disk: PLANT STACK OUTER 2nd rupture AC 3 RUPTURE disk rupture disk D&K TO REACTOR BLDG HVAC EXHAUST HVAC AC 2 SGTS AC 2 * P SGTS P INNER RUPTURE | DISK 2 BLEED LINE VALVE P F P DIVV. DRYWELL S/P SP installed to maintain inerted condition in COPS pipe CONTAINMENT OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION SYSTEM System valves TOSHIBA Copyright © 2012 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved. Leading Innovation >>> 25 DIV. IV#26US-ABWR Containment Pressure Reduction with ACIWA ACIWA can be aligned to Drywell or Wetwell Spray headers; Capable of connecting a fire truck to the system through an existing connection at grade level Supply Tank Diesel Reactor Building Wall Driven Fire Pump (Installed) Outdoor Fire Truck Connection LPFL Pump MO MO Drywell Spray MO Drywell Standpipe MO Wetwell Spray TOSHIBA Copyright © 2012 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved. Leading Innovation >>> 26 Reactor Vessel#27US-ABWR Spent Fuel Pool Cooling During SBO ■Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup (FPC) system is available if connected to CTG ■ With no FPC, under the maximum abnormal heat load with the pool gates closed, pool will boil in approximately 16 hours - Provides sufficient time for operator to connect fire hoses for pool make-up Without make-up water the fuel will remain covered for approximately 77 hours ■Permanent redundant plant pipe installed at opposite ends of the RB with external temporary connections to allow hook up for make-up water to spent fuel pool ■Diesel-driven Fire Protection System (FPS) pump capable of supplying water to pool via RHR and FPC piping TOSHIBA Copyright © 2012 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved. Leading Innovation >>> 27#28US-ABWR SBO Response Capability Without CTG US-ABWR design can mitigate 72 hour SBO without CTG First 8-Hours Core Cooling RCIC After 8-Hours ADS (powered by DC batteries) RHR/ACIWA (FPS or portable diesel driven pump) Containment Integrity No action required COPS (Press./Temp. < Design value) SFP Cooling No action required (Temp. (Passive PCV venting system rupture disk press. = 2Pd) RHR/ACIWA Boiling temp.) (FPS or portable diesel driven pump) TOSHIBA Copyright © 2012 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved. Leading Innovation >>> 28#29US-ABWR SBO Response Capability Without CTG Sequence of Events 1250 Firewater Addition Starts Time 0.0 - - Event MSIV Closure 4.2 s Reactor Scrammed 52.0 s RCIC Injection, Suction from CST 1.3 h RCIC Suction Switched to Suppression Pool 4.4 h RCIC Suction Switched to CST 8.0 h RCIC Failure 9.0 h 9.8 h Manual ADS 9.9 h 32.3 h Suppression Pool began to overflow to Lower Drywell Collapsed Water Level Falls below Top of Active Fuel Firewater Addition System Injection Begins Rupture Disk Opened Core temperature peaks before fuel damage occurs due to ACIWA water injection Containment pressure is maintained below allowable limit by COPS - No Core Damage Pressure (MPa) UO2 Temperature (K) 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 1000 750 500 250 RCIC Fails 1500 1250 1000 750 500 Maximum 250 0 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 Time (h) RCIC Fails UO2 Temperature Rupture Disk Opens Upper Drywell 0.0 - No Loss of Containment Integrity 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 Time (h) TOSHIBA Copyright © 2012 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved. Leading Innovation >>> 29 Drywell Pressure 0 UO₂ Temperature (°F)#30US-ABWR SFP Instrumentation ■Temperature and Level Monitors - Provide indication via plant computer and annunciate in the main control room - Powered by non-Class 1E vital 120 AC, from separate Plant Investment Protection (PIP) buses, backed by the CTG Local Area Radiation Monitors - Annunciate locally and in the main control room - Powered by non-Class 1E vital 120 AC, from separate PIP buses, backed by the CTG TOSHIBA Copyright © 2012 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved. Leading Innovation >>> 30#31SECY-12-0025 Issues: Tier 1 Activities - 2.1 Seismic and flooding reevaluations 2.3-Seismic and flooding walkdowns 4.1-Station Blackout (SBO) regulatory actions 4.2-Mitigating strategies for beyond design basis events 5.1-Reliable hardened vents for Mark I and II containments 7.1-Spent fuel pool instrumentation 8- Strengthen & Integrate EOPS, SAMGS, & EDMGS 9.3-Enhanced EP staffing and communications TOSHIBA Copyright © 2012 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved. Leading Innovation >>> 31#32SECY-12-0025 Issues: Tier 2 Activities 2.1-Other Natural External Hazards 7.2 - Provide safety-related AC power to the SFP makeup system 7.3-Revise Tech Specs to address enhanced instrumentation and new AC power requirements 7.4-Seismically qualified spray to SFP TOSHIBA Copyright © 2012 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved. Leading Innovation >>> 32#334.1 SBO Rulemaking New Regulation will be issued in 2014 US-ABWR can cope with Prolonged SBO - Alternate Power Source: CTG Core Cooling w/o CTG: RCIC, ACIWA with FPS Pump - SFP Cooling w/o CTG : ACIWA with FPS Pump - Containment Integrity: COPS Toshiba will incorporate requirements of the new SBO Regulation TOSHIBA Copyright © 2012 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved. Leading Innovation >>> 33#34Order 4.2 Mitigation Strategy for Beyond-DBE - Three phase approach required for mitigating beyond-DBE - The initial phase: use of installed equipment and resources - The transition phase: portable, onsite equipment and consumables - The final phase: offsite resources to sustain those functions indefinitely US-ABWR Design Even w/o CTG, three safety functions are sustained for more than 72 hr - Core Cooling for the initial 8 Hours: RCIC with DC batteries - Core Cooling after RCIC termination: ACIWA/RHR with FPS pump - SFP cooling: ACIWA/RHR with FPS pump External hookup of portable pump Containment: passive containment hardened vent TOSHIBA Copyright © 2012 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved. Leading Innovation >>> 34#355. Reliable Hardened Vent (RHV) Order: 5.1 RHV for Mark I/II Containments - Remove decay heat and maintain control of containment pressure within acceptable limits following beyond design basis events Accessible and operable under a range of conditions, including a prolonged SBO and plant conditions resulting from inadequate containment cooling Tier 3: 5.2 RHV for Other Containments US-ABWR Design Containment Design: Reinforced Concrete Containment Vessel (RCCV) Containment Vent Design: Hardened Vent Passive Design (Rupture Disks with Normally Open Valves) TOSHIBA Copyright © 2012 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved. Leading Innovation >>> 35#36Order 7.1 Reliable SFP Instrumentation - Instruments: a permanent, fixed primary instrument channel and a backup channel with independent power source - Measurement range: from normal water level to top of fuel rack - Arrangement: reasonable missile protection for level instrumentation - Mounting: seismically qualified to retain its design configuration - Qualification: reliability at boiling condition and SFP radiation level - Power Supply: separate power supply for permanent instruments - Display: Control Room, Alternate Shutdown Panel or other appropriate accessible location US-ABWR Design Temperature/Level/ Area Radiation monitors provided and displayed in Control Room - Powered by non-Class 1E vital 120AC from PIP buses, backed-up by CTG NRC ISG issued by August 31, 2012 - New Instrumentation will be added consistent with NRC Order TOSHIBA Copyright © 2012 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved. Leading Innovation >>> 36#377.2 SFP Makeup Capability (Tier 2) Recommendation - Safety-related AC power for SFP makeup system US-ABWR Design - Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system can be used for the SFP makeup, which is powered by safety-related AC power (EDG) TOSHIBA Copyright © 2012 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved. Leading Innovation >>> 37#38Other Tier 2 Activities 7.3 - Revise Technical Specifications to address enhanced instrumentation and new AC power requirements - Monitor NRC and BWROG efforts in this area for application to US- ABWR ■ 7.4 - Seismically qualified spray to SFP Design spray to meet seismic requirements TOSHIBA Copyright © 2012 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved. Leading Innovation >>> 38#39US-ABWR: DC Renewal Application Appendix 1E will be added to address Fukushima- related Tier 1 and Tier 2 matters similar to existing Appendix 1A, "Response to TMI Related Matters" TOSHIBA Copyright © 2012 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved. Leading Innovation >>> 39#40Conclusion The US-ABWR design is robust for Fukushima-like Beyond Design Basis Events Safety of US-ABWR will be further enhanced by addressing the NRC recommendations and new NRC regulations Toshiba appreciates the opportunity to meet with the NRC and discuss the robust safety design of the US-ABWR and our plans to further enhance this safety TOSHIBA Copyright © 2012 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved. Leading Innovation >>> 40#41TOSHIBA Leading Innovation >>> TOSHIBA Copyright © 2012 Toshiba Corporation. All rights reserved. Leading Innovation >>> 41