#1Post-Fukushima Nuclear Safety Scheme – In Search of a Confluence of Nature and Science - Material prepared for the 5th Annual Institute for Security and Development Policy (ISDP)- Academy of Military Science (AMS)/ 军事科学研究院 Joint Conference: 'Crisis Management' October 19-21, 2012 Rival Hotel Stockholm, Sweden Tsunamis Attacking Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (Source: TEPCO) Jun KURIHARA Research Director, Canon Institute for Global Studies (CIGS), Tokyo A Research Staff Member of the Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission (NAIIC), National Diet of Japan Disclaimer: The views expressed in this presentation are those of Email: [email protected] the author and do not necessarily reflect those of CIGS or NAIIC.#2Slide No. 2 Post-Fukushima Nuclear Safety Scheme -In Search of a Confluence of Nature and Science― Here in Stockholm, the Author Wishes to Share the Lessens Learned from the Bitter but Valuable Experience at the Fukushima Tragedy: Toward A More Robust, Effective and Efficient, Versatile and Resilient, and Collaborative Scheme 1. Personal Memories: Japan and Sweden As a Japanese who cherishes enduring memories connecting the two countries in difficult times, especially a memorable friendship between Swedish Generals (Helge Victor Jung and Carl August Ehrenswärd) and an Imperial Japanese Army General (Makoto Onodera). 2. Personal Memories: Japan and China As a Japanese whose grandfather, a captain of Japan's ocean liner, had a lot of Chinese friends including Admiral Sà Zhènbing () prior to the tragic wars between the two countries, and whose father, former chairman of the Japan Library Association, was frequently invited by the Chinese national and Shanghai municipal governments. Jun KURIHARA, Canon Institute for Global Studies (CIGS)#30.0. Gist of the Argument in Today's Presentation Slide No. 3 Post-Fukushima Nuclear Safety Scheme -In Search of a Confluence of Nature and Science— Now is the Time for Making Lemonade from Fukushima Lemons (Zhuǎn Huò ér Wéi Fú, Yin Bài ér Chéng Gōng/AMAA, OK To Share the Lessens Learned from the Bitter but Valuable Experience at the Fukushima Tragedy Lessons Learned: Not to Be Complacent and Study Strenuously! 1. Keep A Humble and Cautious Attitude toward Nuclear Technology and Accidents As August Strindberg warns: "What men call success serves always as a basis for their next failure (Det människan kallar framgång blir alltid anledningen till deras nästa motgång).” 2. Maintain A Strenuous Effort toward a Confluence of Nature and Science As Johann Wolfgang von Goethe teaches: "Profoundly learned I would grow, . . . Nature and science I desire to know (Ich wünschte recht gelehrt zu werden, . . . Die Wissenschaft und die Natur)." Jun KURIHARA, Canon Institute for Global Studies (CIGS)#40.1. Implications of the Globalization Age: Photos and Fears Travel Fast on the Globe Crises: A Typology A Typology of Collective Stress Situations Global/National Nuclear war Sudden Enemy invasion Economic crash Rebellion Regional Segmental Local Earthquake Blackout (in the Tsunami Cyber/Mechanical malfunction Tokyo region) Typhoon/Hurricane (Global Supply Chain) Tornado Major flood Ethnic massacre Explosion Nuclear plant Corporate layoff Terrorism meltdown Expropriation of property of a class Ghetto riot (Severe Accident) Plant closing Global warming Environmental decay Depression Gradual Epidemic Drought Famine Price collapse Government breakdown Aborigines dying off Obsolete occupation Group discrimination Land exhaustion Addictions to harmful substances Poverty Enslavement Backward regions Endemic disease Class discrimination Chronic Endemic disease Wartime bombing Colonialism Persecution Civil war Gender discrimination Decline of main industry Environmental pollution Land sinking Coal seam fire Slum, ghetto High crime areas Source: the author's modification and rearrangement of a table in Allen H. Barton's article, “Disaster and Collective Stress," in What Is A Disaster? New Answers to Old Questions, edited by Ronald W. Perry and E.L. Quarantelli, 2005.#50.2. Implications of the Globalization Age: Photos and Fears Travel Fast on the Globe Disaster Management Center, Minami Sanriku, Miyagi, (Source: Kyodo) OPHYZ Fukushima I NPP (Source: New York Times/AFP) Tokyo (Source: Nihon Keizai Shimbun) Fukushima Prefecture (Source: New York Times/Asahi Shimbun/European Pressphoto Agency) Jun KURIHARA, Canon Institute for Global Studies (CIGS)#6Slide No. 6 Post-Fukushima Nuclear Safety Scheme -In Search of a Confluence of Nature and Science― Now is the Time for Transforming Disaster to Good Fortune, Failure to Success (Zhuǎn Huò ér Wéi Fú, Yīn Bài ér Chéng Gōng/ATAA, OKKU To Share the Lessens Learned from the Bitter but Valuable Experience at the Fukushima Tragedy: Toward A More Robust, Effective and Efficient, Versatile and Resilient, and Collaborative Scheme 1. The Fukushima Disaster: A Complex and Catastrophic Crisis Series of the 3/11 Earthquakes, tsunamis, and resultant blackouts . . . 2. Emergency Responses amidst Cascading Disasters Crisis management during the first critical hours of the 3/11 Crisis 3. Disruptions of Communication and Organizational Cacophony Sporadic disruptions of communication and organizational disharmony within crisis management team exacerbated the crisis situation 4. Evaluations: Problems re: Communication and Collaboration Preparedness, communication, Multi-sector collaboration in the globalization era. Jun KURIHARA, Canon Institute for Global Studies (CIGS)#7500 km R US I A CHINA HOKKAIDO PACIFIC NORTH KOREA Sea of Japan Miyagiz Iwate. OCEAN (East Sea) Sendai SOUTH 0 Fukushima 2011 03 16 24:00 KOREA HONSHU N= 371 Tokyo EPICENTRE 1.1. Trembling Earth Quakes between Mar. 10 and 16 Number of Quakes, Mar. 10 Mar. 11 6:24 off Sanriku Coast 14:46 off Sanriku Coast 6.6 9.0 15:06 off Sanriku Coast 7.0 15:15 off Ibaragi Coast 7.4 15:26 off Sanriku Coast 7.2 16:15 off Fukushima Coast 6.8 (Richter Magnitude Scale) 16:29 off Sanriku Coast 6.6 17:19 off Ibaragi Coast 6.7 M≥7: 4; 7>M≥6: 43 17:47 off Fukushima Coast 6.0 20:37 off Iwate Coast 6.4 Mar. 12 0:13 off Ibaragi Coast 3:59 Niigata-Chuetsu 4:03 off Sanriku Coast 6.6 6.6 6.2 APAN 4:47 off Akita Coast 6.4 5:11 off Sanriku Coast 6.1 10:46 off Fukushima Coast 6.4 M 22:15 off Fukushima Coast 6.0 Source: The Economist, March 11, 2011 40°N 23:43 off Iwate Coast 6.1 7.0 Mar. 13 7:13 off Fukushima Coast 6.0 Depth 8:25 off Miyagi Coast 6.2 6.0 8:25 off Miyagi Coast 6.2 21 5.0 10:26 off Ibaragi Coast 6.4 41 20:37 off Fukushima Coast 6.0 4.0 61 Mar. 14 14:02 off Ibaragi Coast 6.2 38°N 3.0 15:13 off Fukushima Coast 6.3 91 2.0 Mar. 15 18:50 off Fukushima Coast 6.3 151 1.0 22:31 Eastern Shizuoka 6.0 301 0.0 Mar. 16 UND 700 0:24 off Sanriku Coast 12:52 off East Cost of Chiba 6.0 6.0 138°E 140°E 144°E Source: Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA) Jun KURIHARA, Canon Institute for Global Studies (CIGS)#81.2. Lethal Danger Is NOT Quakes BUT Tsunamis Slide No. 8 All Nuclear Power Plants Withstood Quakes, but... JASDF Matsushima Air Base, Miyagi Prefecture (Source: Kyodo) Kesennuma, Miyagi Prefecture (Source: Kyodo) Sendai City, Miyagi Prefecture (Source: Nihon Keizai Shimbun) Jun KURIHARA, Canon Institute for Global Studies (CIGS)#91.3. Blackouts, and Lack of Fuels, Water, and... No. of Houses Suffering Blackouts, Unit: Million Tokyo Electric Tohoku Electric Time Notes Slide No. 9 Mar. 11 15:30 4.05 4.40 20:00 3.94 4.38 22:00 3.44 4.40 Mar. 12 0:00 2.58 4:00 1.62 Tokyo: 0 5:00 1.44 4.40 6:00 1.24 4.40 7:00 1.77 4.40 Kanagawa and Shizuoka: 0 Saitama and Yamanashi: 0 Gunma: 0 10:00 1.00 4.11 21:00 0.45 2.30 Mar. 13 15:00 0.26 1.58 Mar. 14 16:00 0.07 0.97 Mar. 15 14:00 0.05 0.76 Chiba and Tochigi: 0 (Ibaragi: 5,100) Mar. 16 22:00 0.03 0.48 (Ibaragi: 2,561) Mar. 17 19:00 0.36 Note: The size of the largest blackout in the Tokyo metropolitan area in recent years is the case of August 14, 2006, when 1.26 million houses suffered the blackout. Source: Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) and Tohoku Electric Power Company Jun KURIHARA, Canon Institute for Global Studies (CIGS)#101.4. Unfolding Tragedies and Spreading Fears of Nuclear Disasters Rising Death Toll Primarily by Tsunamis Radiation, as of Mar. 22 19:00; Unit: µSv. Isolat- Sapporo, Hokkaido: 0.028 Akita: 0.035 Miss- In- Death ing jured ed in inac- cessible areas Evacu- ees Aomori: 0.022 Yamataga: 0.095 3/14 4,227 8,194 2,282 3/17 5,692 9,508 2,409 3/19 7,348 10,847 2,603 3/20 8,133 12,272 2,612 3/21 8,649 13,261 2,644 16,150 429,180 16,160 389,870 22 366,858 4,140 362,887 Niigata: 0.046 Morioka, Iwate: 0.033 Fukushima I NPP 367.90 337,300 Utsunomiya, (Peak: 11,930 (3/15)) 3/22 9,080 13,565 2,675 268,510 Tochigi: 0.148 Radiation Level, Unit: μSv. Satitama: 0.114 Chest X-Ray Test: 50 Tokyo-New York round trip: 200 Tokyo: 0.054 Mito, Ibaragi: 0.378 Narita Abdominal X-Ray Test: 600 Airport Chest CT Scan: 6,900 Chigasaki, Maximum Acceptable Level per year: 80,000 Kanagawa: Higher Risk of Cancer: 100,000 Source: Author's compilation based on statistics published by various organizations 0.138 Ichihara, Chiba: 0.106 Jun KURIHARA, Canon Institute for Global Studies (CIGS)#111.5. Evaluation: Crisis Management at the Time of the Great East Japan Earthquake Slide No. 11 1. Disaster Preparedness: Effectiveness and Efficiency Are of Great Essence Redesigning contingency plans regarding, e.g. rolling blackouts, metropolitan commuters, hospitals, and elderly people 2. Disaster Responses: Resources Are Limited and Speed is of Great Essence Assessment and prioritization of simultaneously occurring crises Sophistication of organizational structure for optimum division of labor 3. Disaster Recovery: A Pile of Uncertainties Fiscal strength of Japan's economy Restoration of global supply chain networks Legal consideration of the reconstruction of tsunami-hit areas Resuscitation of quake-hit communities and social capital 4. Evaluations: Time to Think Seriously Disaster preparedness: Institutional and Organizational Restructuring of Nuclear Policy Implications of globalization: Status and Construction Plan Nuclear Power Facilities (As of December 2006) Power Ca-Kahi Hoc Power Co-Sha The Amic Power Co-Thum 34 Theric Pro-Mihama Thetic Power- Thic: Power C-Toba The Chugctric Power Co-Shiman The Chic Co- Output Power Co-Genkai LEROY 1 Information travels fast and forcefully like tsumami TPD.-H TC-H Power-Sal contr Pngtruction : Power C-Tewari 旧旧旧 PD-O Tohoku cc Power Co-O TP-N-Dida TokyoFric Power Co-Fu Dulichal Tokyowar Co-Fukushima D The JAP-TD Char Co.-Hamac Shika Perwer C Source: Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC) Importance of communications (accountability & transparency): Both domestic and global Jun KURIHARA, Canon Institute for Global Studies (CIGS)#122.1. Emergency Responses: Timeline (1): First 1 Hour Slide No. 12 14:46 Quake off Sanriku Coast M9.0 14:46 Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA), the Japanese counterpart of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), establishes an emergency headquarters 14:49 Fire and Disaster Mgmt Agency (FDMA), through J-Alert, a satellite warning system, warns 37 local governments against huge tsumamis 14:50 Prime Minister's Official Residence sets up an emergency team, aiming at (1) damage assessment, (2) ensuring the safety of people, (3) recovery of infrastructure, and (4) providing of accurate information 15:06 Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) establishes an emergency headquarters 15:06 Quake off Sanriku Coast M7.0 15:14 Central Disaster Management Council is established 15:15 Quake off Sanriku Coast M7.4, Tsunami 3.2m Ofunato, Iwate 15:21 Tsunami 4.1m Kamaishi, Iwate, Tsunami 4.0 m Miyako, Iwate 15:26 Quake off Sanriku Coast M7.2 15:27 Prime Minister orders the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) to make a maximum effort for disaster response 15:27 The first tsunami attacks TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) 15:30 TEPCO makes its first announcement: All reactors of NPPs, found automatically shut down; it also reports blackout of 4.05 million houses 15:35 The second tsunami attacks TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi NPP 15:37 Fukushima Daiichi NPP: Station Black Out (SBO) 15:37 Gov't convenes the 1st Central Disaster Management Council 15:42 TEPCO reports to NISA about malfunctioning of Fukushima I NPP's Reactor Nos. 1, 2, and 3 و Source: Author's compilation from various materials Jun KURIHARA, Canon Institute for Global Studies (CIGS)#132.2. Two Tsunamis Paralyzed Fukushima Daiichi All Nuclear Power Plants Withstood Quakes, but at Fukushima I NPP Slide No. 13 Two Tsunamis Brought Station Black Out (SBO) to Fukushima Daiichi 49 Minutes after the Source: TEPCO Quake タンク Jun KURIHARA, Canon Institute for Global Studies (CIGS)#142.3. Fighting against the Clock in the Cold, Dark and Contaminated Rooms A Herculean Effort Spearheaded by the “Fukushima Fifty” at the NPP Slide No. 14 Reading Gauges amidst Seismic Aftershocks and Relentless Tsunami Warnings Source: TEPCO 12 Jun KURIHARA, Canon Institute for Global Studies (CIGS)#152.4. Emergency Responses: Timeline (2): Next 3.5 hours Slide No. 15 15:50 Tsunami 7.3m at Soma, Miyagi 15:57 Quake off Ibaragi Coast M6.1 16:00 Gov't convenes the 2nd Central Disaster Mgmt Council 16:00 NISA initiates an emergency headquarters to collect information on all nuclear reactors in Japan 16:15 Quake off Fukushima M6.7 16:29 Quake off Sanriku M6.6 16:30 TEPCO makes its second announcement: All NPPs are under control but 7 thermal power plants have been closed 16:36 TEPCO reports NISA about malfunctioning of the emergency cooling systems of Fukushima I NPP's Reactor Nos. 1 and 2 16:36 Prime Minister's Official Residence sets up an emergency headquarters 16:36 Fukushima I NPP prepares a vent operation of Reactor No. 1 (Implemented 22 hrs. later) 16:45 TEPCO reports to NISA about malfunctioning of Fukushima I NPP's Reactor No. 2 17:35 Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) Minister endorses an emergency announcement 17:42 METI Minister arrives at Prime Minister's Official Residence for the emergency 18:12 Prime Minister meets with opposition party leaders until 18:50 (Lapse of Time without Any Concrete Actions) ... 19:03 Prime Minister declares a nuclear emergency Source: Author's compilation from various materials Jun KURIHARA, Canon Institute for Global Studies (CIGS)#162.5. Emergency Responses at Fukushima I NPP Tohoku Electric Onagawa NPP Miyagi No. 1: 3/11 15:42 Slide No. 16 amidst Continuing Quakes and Tsunamis 19:03: Nuclear Emergency Prefecture TEPCO Fukushima I NPP No. 2: 3/11 15:42 Fukushima Prefecture Pacific Ocean No. 3: 3/11 15:42 Hydrogen Explosions 3/12 15:36: No. 1 3/14 11:01: No. 3 Explosion and Fire 3/15 06:10: No. 2 3/15 09:38: No. 4 Cooling reactors with seawater and boron Evacuation 3/11 20:50: 2km 3/12 01:45: 3km 3/12 05:44: 10km TEPCO Fukushima II NPP (1.2 mi.) 1.2 mi.) (Fukushima Governor) (2.4 mi.) (6.2 mi.) 3/12 18:25: 20km (12.4 mi.) No. 4: 3/15 09:38 3/12 20:20: No. 1 3/13 13:12: No. 3 3/14 16:34: No. 2 3/12 07:45: Nuclear Emergency Evacuation (Fukushima II NPP) 3/12 07:45: 3km; 17:39: 10km Source: Author's compilation based on materials published by Prime Minister's Official Residence Jun KURIHARA, Canon Institute for Global Studies (CIGS)#172.6. Imperative Scientific Approaches to Rehabilitate Contaminated Nature The Contaminated Area Is Extremely Limited Compared with the 1986 Chernobyl Disaster (¹). . . . (1) Estimated iodine-131 equivalent radioactive material released in the air at the Fukushima accident was 17 million curies, while 378.4 million curies at the Chernobyl case. But A Painful Process to Come. Japanese and Russian Wrecked NPPs (Fukushima and Chernobyl) presented at the same center on the same sale City awamada Soma City litate Village M Slide No. 17 Area 2: Residents are not permitted *to live Ty From July 17. D Deliberate Evacuation Area 11 Belarus Moscow Katsuro Village Russia Tamura City Kiev Tokyo, Ukraine 名古 Source: http://matome.naver.jp/odai/2131468288290995401/2131481678194194803 Deliberate Evacuation Area Namie Town Tow Futaba Fukushima Daiichi NPP Area 3: Restricted Area Town Area 1: Evacuation Vilage orders are ready to lifted Source: IAEA Naraha Towi Naraha Town! A from August 10, 2017) 20 km#183.1. Post-Fukushima Nuclear Security Scheme Time to Examine the “Myth" about Nuclear Power Safety Slide No. 18 Not A Feeble, Ineffective and Inefficient, Limited and Brittle, and Separate Scheme But A More Robust, Effective and Efficient, Versatile and Resilient, and Collaborative Scheme 1. Disaster Preparedness Difficulty of predicting tsunami impacts on NPPs Ill-designed Crisis Management: Underestimation of Sever Accidents 2. Disaster Responses Recovery operations amidst earthquakes and tsunami warnings Inevitable human errors Disruption of communications and evacuation Difficulty of handling simultaneously occurring crises (Fukushima I and II) 3. Disaster Recovery Long way to restore "trust" and to scrap "safely" Fukushima I NPP Difficulty of restoring activities in radiation contaminated areas 4. Evaluations Redesigning disaster preparedness: NPP Security System, Redesigning contingency plans Importance of communication: Intra- and inter-organizational, and public Importance of Multi-sector collaboration: Integrated incident Command System Jun KURIHARA, Canon Institute for Global Studies (CIGS)#193.2. Communication Problems Slide No. 19 Not A Feeble, Ineffective and Inefficient, Limited and Brittle, and Separate Scheme But A More Robust, Effective and Efficient, Versatile and Resilient, and Collaborative Scheme 1. Disaster Preparedness: More Robust, Not Feeble Building of A Communication System to Elaborate A Crisis Management Plan Building of A Communication System for a Well-informed Nation or Region 2. Disaster Responses: More Effective and Efficient Building of A Communication System within the Crisis Management Team Building of A Communication System for Intra-Agency Collaboration Knowledge Communication for Crisis Assessment and Monitoring Knowledge Communication for Crisis Response to Specific Needs Risk Communication for Disaster Mitigation and Evacuation Mass Communication for Prevention of Ungrounded Rumors 3. Disaster Recovery: More Versatile, Resilient and Collaborative Postmortem Analyses to Share and Restore the Lessons Learned Knowledge Retention/Prevention of Knowledge Loss Knowledge Dissemination to Enhance a More Resilient Nation or Region Jun KURIHARA, Canon Institute for Global Studies (CIGS)#20Slide No. 20 3.3. Multi-Agency Collaboration Problems Beyond Cultural and Physical Constraints Types Organization Communication Information/Knowledge Management Situation Awareness Equipment Cultural Issues Challenges Clear and effective leadership: Competent Incident Commander Adequate multi-agency response procedure: Smart Incident Command System Clear and reasonable role and responsibility of each agency Clear coordination principle of conflicting goals Clear common communication structure Communication of accurate, consistent, and complete information Communication with an appropriate interval Adequate knowledge/information management Clear common operational picture Entire membership of coordinating agency Adequate common situation awareness Adequate understanding of each agency's role, capability, and resources Adequate and compatible communications technology Common level of sophisticated equipment Compatible procedures Adequate understanding of each agency's organizational culture Training Sufficient multi-agency training exercise Each agency's working experience with other agencies Source: the author's modification and rearrangement of a table in the article of Paul Salmon et al., “Coordination during Multi-agency Emergency Response: Issues and Solutions,” Disaster Prevention and Management, Vol. 20, No. 2 (April 2011). Jun KURIHARA, Canon Institute for Global Studies (CIGS)#21Slide No. 21 4.1.1. Postmortem Analysis: First Responders Amidst the Catastrophe, the Planned Scheme Was Evaporating ―Disaster response is merely the continuation of war by other means- TEPCO: Absence of Key Incident Commanders (ICs) Chairman (in China, retuned to TEPCO HQ on 12th at 16:00), and President (in Nara, on 12th at 09:00); Obscure incident command system (ICS) Governments: Serious Damage to the Off-site Center and Key Infrastructure Ill-trained ICs (NISA) and Incompetent Advisors (NSC), Obscure ICS and Prime Minister's Direct Intervention Neglecting the Danger of Mobile Phone and Radio Communications At the time of the 3/11 Crisis, the government's pre-crisis plan proved to be based on a sandy foundation (obscure ICS) with optimistic scenarios, leading to the establishment of ad hoc crisis management scheme Kantei (Prime Minister's Office) Emergency Disaster Response Headquarters Director-General: Prime Minister Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters Director-General: Prime Minister support Emergency Response Office in the Prime Minister's Office (Emergency Operations Team) Crisis Management Center support Cabinet Office report report NISA ERC Secretariat of Emergency Disaster Response Headquarters Secretariat the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquaters advice Dispatch of members. advice Nuclear Safety Commission Source: NAIIC, Final Report, Figure 3.2.1-1 Delegation of authority Instructions Dispatch of personnel Off-site Center Local Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters Prefectural Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters Joint Council for Nuclear Emergency Response Municipal Headquarters for Disaster Control Instruction Direction/ Supervision Request, etc. Dispatch of personnel Nuclear operators/ relevant organizations, etc. Prefectural Headquarters for Disaster Control Jun KURIHARA, Canon Institute for Global Studies (CIGS)#224.1.2. Postmortem Analysis: ad hoc Scheme 'Improvised' Crisis Management Emerged Slide No. 22 Government: Serious Damage to the Off-site Center and Key Infrastructure Ill-trained ICs (NISA) and Obscure ICS and Govn't Silo Structure Prime Minister's Direct Intervention Local Governments: Serious Damages amidst Multiple Disasters Neglecting the Danger of Mobile Phone and Radio Communications [Kantei] Amidst the complex and catastrophic crisis, the prime minister was preoccupied with the nuclear crisis, passing other parts of crisis management to the hands of his subordinates. NERHQ Director-General: Prime Minister Deputy Director-General: METI Minister NERHQ members: Ministers of each ministry Secretariat of the NERHQ Director-General of the Secretariat: NISA Director-General Deputy Directors-Genera of the Secretariat 1: NISA Deputy Director-General, [Off-site Center] Director-General: METI Senior Vice Minister [NISA-ERC] NISA Deputy Director-General Deputy Director-General of the Cabinet Secretariat for Crisis Management, Deputy Director General of the Cabinet Office for Disaster Management, and Assistant Commissioner of the Fire and Disaster Management Agency Secretariat members: Personnel of NISA and relevant ministries and agencies General Affairs squad ■ Comprehensive coordination of activities of the secretariat, etc. Plant squad ■ Collection of information on plants, examinations of activities of nuclear operators, etc. Source: NAIIC, Final Report, Table 3.2.2.-1 Radiation squad • Collection, sorting-out and sharing of monitoring information, etc. Local NERHQ Deputy Director-General: Local NERHQ members: Representatives from relevant ministries and agencies Resident Safety squad • Collection of information on relief activities and restrictions on the intake of beverages Public relations squad • Support for press conferences and provision of information to relevant organizations, etc. " Medical squad Support for emergency medical care related to radiation, etc. Jun KURIHARA, Canon Institute for Global Studies (CIGS)#234.1.3. Postmortem Analysis: Lack of Evacuation Drills History of Impracticable Plans, Shrouded in the "Safety Myth" Government: Perfunctory Nature of Evacuation Plans and Exercises Prior to the 3/11 Crisis Kawa mata Iidate Minami Soma Slide No. 23 0% 10% 20% Katsu 双葉町 rao Namie I According to a 大熊町 questionnaire survey, Ta 楢葉町 prior to the 3/11 Crisis, mura 富岡町 Okuma ✰ Fukushima Daiichi NPP most of the residents in the nuclear crisis areas did not experience any evacuation drills. Even in the towns of Futaba and Okuma, less than 20% of people had Futaba 広野町 双葉 浪江町 Tomioka 川内村 富岡 Kawauchi experience of such drills (See the Right Chart). 葛尾村 田村市 川俣町 南相馬市 Naraha 楢葉 飯舘村 Hirono 広野 Source: NAIIC, Final Report (Japanese version p. 408) Jun KURIHARA, Canon Institute for Global Studies (CIGS)#244.2.1. Postmortem Analysis: Disruption of Communications Slide No. 24 Culprit of the Execrated Situation Is Insufficient and Disrupted Communication? A Feeble Communication System within the Crisis Management Team TEPCO (Tokyo HQ, Fukushima I NPP & II NPPs, Thermal Power Stations, Central Gov't (Prime Minister's Office, NISA, NSC, FDMA, MOD/SDF, MEXT, … . . ) Local Governments (Prefecture, Town) A Feeble Communication System for Intra-Agency Collaboration Prime Minister's Office-NISA-NSC-TEPCO Central and Local Governments Embassies and Consulates in Japan Knowledge Communication for Crisis Assessment and Monitoring Prime Minister's Office-NISA-NSC-TEPCO MEXT (SPEEDI, Monitoring Posts) Knowledge Communication for Crisis Response to Specific Needs Local Governments, MOD/SDF-U.S. Forces, IAEA, U.S. NRC Risk Communication for Disaster Mitigation and Evacuation • • .) Local Governments, Residents incl. Vulnerable People during the Disaster Mass Communication to Prevent the Explosion of Ungrounded Rumors Media both Domestic and Foreign "Exchange information.” . . . This is of great importance in achieving a common language. “互通情报”。... 这对于取得共同的语言是很重要的。 (Máo Zédōng/毛泽东) Jun KURIHARA, Canon Institute for Global Studies (CIGS)#254.2.2a. Postmortem Analysis: Risk Communication (1) Slide No. 25 Risk Communication: For Those Who Need Vital Information Government: Ill-trained PIO/Team at NISA Evacuation Guidance issued by Local Governments with varying success rates Certainly Connected (Leaving No People Left)? Well-Timed (Leaving Ample Time and Means to Evacuate)? Well-Coordinated (Avoiding Traffic Jams) Sufficient (Leaving No Problems Left Behind)? 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% Futaba According to a Okuma Tomioka Naraha questionnaire survey, a majority of the residents in the nuclear crisis areas Namie was helped via risk Hirono communication organized Tamura by local governments Minamisoma (See the Right Chart); but Kawauchi the evacuees were instructed to leave their houses expecting that evacuation would be very brief. Katsurao Kawamata litate Municipalities Police TEPCO Others Family or neighbors TV, radio, or internet Source: NAIIC, Final Report, Table 4.2.2-2 Jun KURIHARA, Canon Institute for Global Studies (CIGS)#264.2.2b. Postmortem Analysis: Risk Communication (2) Risk Communication vs. Mass Communication Government: Ill-trained PIO/Team at NISA Slide No. 26 Crisis information provided by Local Governments Proved to Be Ineffective Certainly Connected (Leaving No People Left)? Well-Timed (Leaving Ample Time and Means to Evacuate)? Well-Coordinated (Avoiding Traffic Jams) Sufficient (Leaving No Problems Left Behind)? According to a questionnaire survey, a larger number of the residents in the nuclear crisis areas were depended on mass communication through TV, Radio, and Internet (See the Right Chart); accordingly evacuees were not effectively instructed where to evacuate. Towns, cities 0% and villages Futaba Okuma Tomioka Naraha Namie Hirono Tamura Minamisoma Kawauchi Katsurao Kawamata litate 20% Municipalities Police TEPCO Others Source: NAIIC, Final Report, Table 4.2.1-2 40% 60% 80% 100% Family or neighbors TV, radio, or internet Jun KURIHARA, Canon Institute for Global Studies (CIGS)#274.2.2c. Postmortem Analysis: Risk Communication (3) Evacuation from the Invisible Danger Misguided Evacuation Guidance MEXT (Ministry of Education) Was Criticized for keeping the SPEEDI (System for Prediction of Environment Emergency Dose Information) as a 福島第一原発から漏れた放射能の広がり Radiation contour map of the Fukushima Daiichi accident 2011年3月に地表に落ちた放射性物質がそのままの 状態で保存されている場所の放射線量で色分けしま した。芝生など草地で現在計測される数値です。 この 数値は3年で半分になります。 8 uSv/h 以上 | 4 uSv/h以上 2 μSv/h E 1 Sv/h E 0.5 μSv/h E 0.25 Sv/h 0.125 Sv/h μSv/h (マイクロシーベルト/時) 0.123 "White Elephant. Wind, 12 Mar. 長野 () 的福岛第一原子力発電所 Fukushima Daiichi The Simple Guidance 'Head Westward' Ended in More Dangerous Radioactive Exposure 宇都宮 甲府 新潟 前橋 さいたま 東京(新宿) 横浜 0.1251 0.25 宇都宮 Slide No. 27 EXEB 盛岡 全福岛 250km Wind, 12 Mar. 0.425 ※ 福島第一原子力発電所 Fukushima Daiichi 水口 |Wind, 15 Mar. 250km 四訂版2011年9月11日 (初版4月21日) :() kipuka.blog70.fc2.com By Yukio Hayakawa, Gunma University 地図製図:萩原佐知子 #R:870-9 (portal.cyberjapan.jp) この地図の作成には、 文部科学省科学研究費補助金 「インターネットを活用した 情報共有による新しい地学教育」 (番号23501007)を使用しました。 Source: Prof. Yukio Hayakawa; see also http://www.spiegel.de/fotostrecke/fotostrecke-65845-12.html#284.2.2d. Postmortem Analysis: Risk Communication (4) Inadequate Evacuation Led to Slide No. 28 Ordeals of Evacuees Kawa Iidate mata 飯館 Minami Soma Evacuation Information: Was It Well-connected, Timely, Well-coordinated, and Sufficient? According to a questionnaire survey, over 40% of Namie Town people experienced an 0% 20% 40% Katsu rao 浪江町 双葉町 富岡町 南相馬 Wind 12 Mar. Ta mura Namie 浪江 Futaba Okuma * Fukushima Daiichi NPP 南相馬市 emergency 飯舘村 双葉 evacuation to 大熊町 Tomioka radioactive Kawa 川俣町 富岡 contaminated areas uchi 葛尾村 (See the Right 田村市 Naraha Chart). 楢葉 川内村 楢葉町 広野町 Hirono 広野 Source: NAIIC, Final Report Table 4.2.2-6 (Japanese version p. 408) Jun KURIHARA, Canon Institute for Global Studies (CIGS)#294.2.2e. Postmortem Analysis: Risk Communication (5) Slide No. 29 Evacuation Process: Orderly? Timely? Correctly? or Adequately? Correct and Updated Evacuation Information: Was It Well-connected, Timely, Well-coordinated, and Sufficient? Confusing Expression: "Nenno-tame (to make absolutely sure)" Experience of Evacuation by the End of March, 2011 According to a questionnaire survey, Amidst the 3/11 Crisis, evacuees closer to the NPP left their houses earlier and were forced to migrate from one shelter to another; over 50% of Namie Town people experienced 5 or more evacuations (See the Right Chart). Towns, cities and villages 0% Namie Futaba Naraha Okuma Tomioka Hirono Katsurao Kawauchi Tamura Minamisoma litate Kawamata 20% 1 2 Source: NAIIC, Final Report, Table 2.2.2-4 40% 60% 80% 100% 5 6 or more Jun KURIHARA, Canon Institute for Global Studies (CIGS)#304.2.2f. Postmortem Analysis: Risk Communication (6) One-Size-fits-All Information Is Not Enough Evacuation Information: Was It Sufficient? Vulnerable People during the Disaster ("") Should Be Well Taken Care of. Hospitals and Their Number of Patients within a 20km Radius of the Fukushima Daiichi 104 Hospitalized Patients 2 68 Minamisoma City Hospitalized Patients Fukushima City Slide No. 30 Ordeal of Evacuation on March 14: Patients of Hospital ⑥ About 14:00 Screening at the Minamisoma City Soso Public Health Center completed. No fatalities 20km Radius } Namie Town 10km 3 Radius 75 136 Futaba Town Fukushima Daiichi 5 NPP Okuma Town 35 6 339 People Evacuation from 6 (Futaba Hospital) Futaba Hospital Tomioka Town Naraha Town Source: NAIIC, Final Report, Figures 4.2.3-1 and -3. 96 at Hospitals 245 Successfully and Swiftly Evacuated Iwaki City Jun KURIHARA, Canon Institute for Global Studies (CIGS) Fukushima Daiichi NPP 10:30 Departure 20:00 Evacuees arrived at a high school in Iwaki City. Three people died in the vehicle. Eleven people died the following day.#314.2.3. Postmortem Analysis: Mass Communication Poorly trained Public Information Officers (PIOs) Inaccurate and Unclear Information Led Only to Uncontrollable Confusion and Unallayed Suspicion Slide No. 31 The Importance of Recognition of Strengths and Weaknesses of the Mass Media 1. The mass media play a dominant role at almost all levels of communication on nuclear emergency issues (cf. Tanja Perko et al., “Media Reporting of Nuclear Emergencies: The Effect of Transparent Communication in a Minor Nuclear Event,” Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management Vol. 20, No. 1 (March 2012), pp. 52-63; IAEA, “Manual for First Responders to a Radiological Emergency," in Emergency Preparedness and Response, 2006, pp. 1-86). 2. Nuclear events predictably induce enormous media coverage. 3. No one can control over the mass media's information distribution because of freedom of the press. 4. The mass media can have enormous audiences, but they have several limits- (a) Even huge audiences represent only about 10% of the population and the audiences. (b) Those large media audiences are often specific segments of the public. Public Information Officers (PIOs) must understand local media and local media audiences. (c) The mass media, especially network media, tend to paint a broad picture. Media statements may be sufficient for a general news audience but they do little to inform persons in a specific community whether they should evacuate at the time of emergency. (d) Some media do not carry news reports even in a community struck by disaster because of their news- value judgments. (cf. Joseph Scanlon, “Unwelcome Irritant or Useful Ally? The Mass Media in Emergencies,” in Handbook of Disaster Research, edited by Havidán Rodríguez, Enrico L. Quarantelli and Russell R. Dynes, New York: Springer, 2007). Jun KURIHARA, Canon Institute for Global Studies (CIGS)#324.3.1a. Postmortem Analysis: Multi-Agency Collaboration (1) Conpartmentalized and Segregated Regulatory Agencies Slide No. 32 Silo Structure Management and Labyrinthine Regulations Have Led to a Lack of Transparency and a Slovenly System of Checks and Balances Program / Safety regulation on substance Safety Radiation safety Non-proliferation Import/export control Safeguards Security Nuclear security Main foundational ordinances Japan Atomic Energy Commission NSC MEXT • Law for the Regulations of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors • Electricity Business Act • Industrial Safety and Health Act • RI Act, etc. Peaceful use Screening of planned execution, etc. Policy deliberation Regulation screening Guide • Double-checking, etc. • Research reactor •Act on Technical Standards for Prevention of Radiation Hazard Policy deliberation ⚫ Guide • Foreign Exchange Act • Trade Control Order Export Control Order Law for the Regulations of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors Policy deliberation Policy deliberation • Double-checking Safeguards " Law for the Regulations of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors • Act on Punishment of Acts to Endanger Human Lives by Generating Radiation • Policy deliberation Double-checking • • Radiation Council • RI facilities, etc. • Monitoring METI • Commercial reactor Cycle facilities (Radiation Council) • Imports/exports • Practice in control • Waste facilities, etc. MOFA MHLW • Labor safety •Health impacts MLIT • Transport, ships Source: NAIIC, Final Report, Table 5.4.6-1. International negotiations • Research reactor RI facilities, etc. • Commercial reactor Cycle facilities Waste facilities, etc. • International negotiations Jun KURIHARA, Canon Institute for Global Studies (CIGS)#334.3.1b. Postmortem Analysis: Multi-Agency Collaboration (2) Conpartmentalized and Segregated Regulatory Agencies Silo Structure Management Have Led to Slide No. 33 a Lack of Transparency and a Slovenly System of Checks and Balances New Nuclear Regulatory Organization Independence: Separate nuclear regulation function and nuclear promotion function and establish the "Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA)", as an independent commission body affiliated to the MOE. Chairman and Commissioners are appointed by the Prime Minister after the approval of the National Diet. Integration: Integrate nuclear regulation functions, namely, nuclear safety, security, safeguards, radiation monitoring and radioisotopes regulation, into the NRA. Crisis Management: Establish "Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Commission (NEPC)" in a cabinet and implement nuclear emergency prevention measures in close cooperation with relevant organisations. Cabinet Office Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) - Nuclear Security Policy Organisations Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) Agency for Natural Resources and Energy (ANRE) Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC) Double Checking Ministry of Education. Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (HEXT) Research Reactors. Regulation Safeguards.* Radiation Monitoring" Radioisotopes Regulation, Nuclear Power Plants Regulation, etc. atc. New Organisation Ministry of the Environment (MOE) Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) Commission: Chairman and 4 Commissioners Secretariat Merged into the NRA after necessary legal arrangements JNES Independent Administrative Agencies - JNES: Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organisation JAEA Japan Atomic Energy Agency - NIRS. National Institute of Radiological Sciences JAEA Nuclear Research, etc. NIRS Radiation Research, etc *Transferred by 1st April 2013 Source: IAEA, "Fukushima Daiichi Status Report," September 28, 2012, Figure 1. JAEA Nuclear Research, etc. NIRS Radiation Research etc JNES Jun KURIHARA, Canon Institute for Global Studies (CIGS)#344.3.2a. Postmortem Analysis: Multi-Sector Collaboration (1) Slide No. 34 A Segregated Nuclear Energy Sector as well as Govn't Agencies —Japan's Nuclear Sector Is An Epitome of Japan's Stovepipe Culture― Stovepipe Culture of the Nuclear Energy Sector (both Business and Academic) Has Led to (a) Lack of Transparency, and Rigid and Empty Formalism, (b) Lack of Inter-disciplinary Communication among Academics, (c) Negligence of Closely Related Fields and Multidisciplinary Approaches to Develop Safety Measures, (d) Resultantly, an Obsolescent, Vulnerable, Ineffective and Inefficient Safety Scheme, and (e) Danger of Knowledge Loss (by reducing the number of prospectively competent researchers). Jun KURIHARA, Canon Institute for Global Studies (CIGS)#354.3.2b. Postmortem Analysis: Multi-Sector Collaboration (2) Slide No. 35 The Nuclear Sector Is An Epitome of Japan's Stovepipe Culture Stovepipe Culture of the Nuclear Energy Sector (both Business and Academic) Has Led to (a) Lack of Transparency, and Rigid and Empty Formalism, (b) Lack of Inter-disciplinary Communication among Academics (c) Negligence of Closely Related Fields and Multidisciplinary Approaches to Develop Safety Measures, (d) Resultantly, an Obsolescent, Vulnerable, Ineffective and Inefficient Safety Scheme, and (f) Danger of Knowledge Loss (by reducing the number of prospectively competent researchers). • Collect findings • Reflect experts' and residents' voices International trend Collect findings Collect findings Experts Development/Revision Process of Regulation and Guide • Develop ideal regulation Regulatory authorities Concerned Residents Voices Set standards Regulatory authorities Draft regulations (for discussion) Voices Ideal standards necessary for safety (for discussion) • Reflect operators' views on effectiveness Regulatory authorities Hear opinions Ideal standards necessary for safety Turning Voices/ Negotiations Operators • Establish realistic regulations while maintaining ideal safety Ideal regulations for securing rational safety Open to public • Collect findings Lobbying from operators to experts and regulatory bodies • Adjust possible effects on existing reactors International trend Collect findings • Develop safety standards as plausible safety measures while not decommissioning • Operators propose the details for regulation Ask to Experts propose Voices detailed contents Regulatory authorities Lobbying Operators Lobbying Operators Regulatory authorities Set standards Review details Regulations to be compiled without decommissioning any existing reactors Source: NAIIC, Final Report, Table 5.2-1. • Experts opinions as "approval" • Operators' voices heard to make adjustments Regulatory authorities Hear opinions Regulations to be complied without decommissioning any existing reactors Fine- tuning Voices Experts Voices Operators Open to public • Establish plausible standards to save face without decommissioning any existing reactors Regulations to be complied without decommissioning any existing reactors Jun KURIHARA, Canon Institute for Global Studies (CIGS)#364.4.1. Global Implications of Fukushima Slide No. 36 Lessons Should Be Learned from the Fukushima Tragedy, Because Nuclear Threats Do Not Recognize National Borders The "Lessons Learned”: A Precious Legacy for Entire Human Beings Irrespective of Nationality The World's Nuclear Reactors (as of October 2012) No. of Reactors Electricity Generation Country Under Operable Planned Proposed Billion kWh Construction United States 104 1 13 13 790.4 France 58 1 1 1 423.5 Japan 50 3 10 5 156.2 Russia 33 10 17 24 162.0 South Korea 23 4 5 0 147.6 India 20 7 18 39 28.9 Canada 18 2 2 3 88.3 United Kingdom 16 0 4 9 62.7 Ukraine 15 0 2 11 84.9 China 15 26 51 120 82.6 Sweden 10 0 0 0 58.1 World 434 64 160 323 2,518 Source: World Nuclear Association (WNA) Jun KURIHARA, Canon Institute for Global Studies (CIGS)#374.4.2. Global Implications of Fukushima Lessons Should Be Fully Utilized for A More Robust, Effective and Efficient, Versatile and Resilient, and Collaborative Nuclear Safety Scheme Slide No. 37 Irrespective of Future Energy Policy, Japan Has and Will Have to Maintain Rich Human and Technological Resources for A Safer Nuclear Energy World 泊 Tomari 1 2 3 敦賀 柏崎刈羽 Tsuruga 1 2 3 4 Kashiwazaki Kariwa 1234567 高浜 silth Takahama 234 Fugen 志賀 もんじゅ Shika 2 島根 Shimane 上関 Kaminoseki 123 Monju 美浜 Mihama 大飯 Ohi 1234 玄海 Genkai 1234 長崎 川内 Sendai 23 2 松江 広島 Matsue Hiroshima 小佐賀 O o Saga Nagasaki 鹿児島 Matsuyama 福井 Fukui 青森 Aomori 仙台 Sendai Niigata о 福島。 Fukushima 東京 Tokyo *F 名古屋 Nagoya 請問 Shizuoka the Osaka Mito FLAR • Sapporo 大間 Ohma Kagoshima 炉型 運転中 建設中 計画中 Reactor OP UC PL 閉鎖 CD 伊方 Ikata 123 PWR 0 ☑ BWR I ☐ ☑ その他 A A A ☑ Others Source: Japan Atomic Industry Forum Inc. (JAIF) 東北・東通 Higashidori 12 東京・東通 .00 Tokyo-Higashidori 12 .女川 Onagawa 123 一浪江・小高 □ Namie odaka ·福島第一 Fukushima I12345678 ·福島第二 Fukushima I 1234 東海 Tokai 12 浜岡 Hamaoka 1 2 3 4 5 6 Jun KURIHARA, Canon Institute for Global Studies (CIGS)#384.5. Conclusion Slide No. 38 Post-Fukushima Nuclear Safety Scheme -In Search of a Confluence of Nature and Science― Now is the Time for Making Lemonade from Fukushima Lemons (Zhuǎn Huò ér Wéi Fú, Yin Bài ér Chéng Gōng/ATH, OKT To Share the Lessens Learned from the Bitter but Valuable Experience at the Fukushima Tragedy 1. Keep A Humble and Cautious Attitude toward Nuclear Technology and Accidents As August Strindberg warns: "What men call success serves always as a basis for their next failure (Det människan kallar framgång blir alltid anledningen till deras nästa motgång).” 2. Maintain A Strenuous Effort toward a Confluence of Nature and Science As Johann Wolfgang von Goethe teaches: "Profoundly learned I would grow, . . . Nature and science I desire to know (Ich wünschte recht gelehrt zu werden, . . . Die Wissenschaft und die Natur)." Thank You! / Tack Så Mycket! / ★*! / Merci beaucoup! / #^44! / Arigato Gozaimasu (Ħ¿ð›› ‡ F)! Jun KURIHARA, Canon Institute for Global Studies (CIGS)