#1Situation with radiation safety under exploitation of RTG of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation in the Chukotka Autonomous District W.Ya.Reka, Yu. V. Skobelev, RosTekhNadzor Presenter: Skobelev Yuri Victorovich#2*36 Крестовский остров (70, 71,314) 32 Пушкарева (32) 33 Грибок (177) 53 Четырехстолбовый(06,08,10) 56 Шелагский (007,008,01) 38 Куйвывеем 10) 30 Айон-северный(178, 179) 35 Козьмина (300) 3 ва манкууль (220) 57 9 55 Шалаурова остров(18) Шелагский западный(164) 00 29 Аачим-северный(204,205,484) 31 Биллингса (481;17) - 18 Роутеи ПС3 (11), 46 Роутан, коса(428,429) 32 Большой Баранов (173) 39 Летякин (151) 40 Малая бараниха (3) 51 Хранилище на острове 41 Милькера (78) Большой Роутан(07,08) Апапельгино гезек 4. 44 Проливный ПС 3(166). 47 Роуган ЗСЗ(14) 43 Проливный 33(157) 54 Шалаурова изба (224) 34 Иннукай (438) 0 59 Энмытагын(346) 60 Якан(172.176) Билибино • Кеперваем п. Валькумой 58 Энмыкей (156) 49 Рывеем ЭС3(79) 50 Рыпильгин(169) Легенда: РИТЭГИ: Кол-во: Бета-М 45 58 Гонг 01 6 *23 Роджерса (451) Горн 8 Эфир-МА 13 Итого РИТЭГов: 85 42 Охотничий(155.170) ZZA 28 Шмидта, мыс 10:006) Мыс Шмидта 20 Островной (421) 37 Кувэквын(57) 5 Двух пилотов, коса(419.420;002) Иультин 16 Нутэвій (364) 3 Вангарем (452) 19 Онман(365) 17 Нутэпэлмэн (148) 6 Джэнрэтлен(52,134) 2 Беляка(145) Амгузма Эгвекиноте -Уэлькаль, Озерный •Конергино 7 Идлидля(49) 25 Сердце Камень (301) 8 Икигур(302) 27 Чегитун (219) 9 Инин(362) 21. Памятник Дежневу (003;56.54) 4 Верблюжий (138) Go Лаврентия пвх Нунямо 15 Нунямо(143) 1 Кригуйгун(140,16,17) 18 Ныгчигэн(55)#3Average time of the RTG exploitation in the Chukotka AD is 30,8 years Number of the batching Sealed Radioactive Sources - 93 - • Total passport activity of the RTG in the Chukotka AD – 232 PBq (6,26 millions Curie) • Total current activity of the RTG in the Chukotka AD – 131 PBq (3,55 millions Curie) • Total average activity of the RTG in the Chukotka AD – 1,7 PBq (46 100 Curie) -#4Number of the RTG situated near inhabited localities (including national populated places) – 13 Consistence of the RTG current activity on the Chukotka AD one square km – 182 GBq (4,92 Ci) Consistence of the RTG current activity per one the Chukotka AD inhabitant - 2,6 TBq (70,33 Ci) The RTG are under control of two FGU Hydrographical Enterprise branches (Pevek, Providenie locality)#5The relation between the RTG activity and other RS in the AD is 628 thousand : 1 - • The latest full-scaled RTG inspection by the exploitative organization was made in 1992. Until the above date systematic inspection of the exploitation points by personal has not be done.#6State supervision under GGP branches activities • The first inspection of the GGP Providenie locality branch was made by the Magadan Gosatomnadzor radiological safety inspection in the period 11-18 of March, 1994. There were 13 inspections between 1994 and 2009. Detected more then 80 safety disturbances.#7The RTG Radioecological Investigations in the Chukotka AD There were done the radioecological inspections with the ordinant bodies specialists. In 1997 (52 RTG between Pevek and Providenie) and in 2003 (36 RTG to the West and East of Pevek). In April 2010 the group of specialists made Commission inspection of 45 RTG.#8Normative documents on RTG exploitation IAEA Safety Instruction “Designing, production and exploitation of RTG for use on the land and on the sea". IAEA series publication on the safety # 33. Vienna, 1970. It shows the legal base for the RTG exploitation on the land.#9The RTG Classification as radioactive sources • Attributed to the 1st grope of potential danger: Resources which are utterly dangerous for a man. • In the Russian Federation the absolute majority of RTG are attributed to the III group of the potential radiological danger. According to NP-034-01 this group demands certain requirements to the organization of physical security system.#10RTG and substantiation policy • Experience of withdrawal of RTG from exploitation shows its value in about USD 500 thousand. • For 25 years use of the RTG it made about kWh 3,5 thousand. The cost of the made electric power is USD 140 which exceeds the market price in 3,5 times. • Liquidation of the Navarine RTG incident (the Chukotka AD) resulted in about USD 1,6 million. • There are alternative sources which are worth nothing as compared to the RTG and are absolutely safe. • The substantiation policy for the RTG as energy source is not obeyed.#11RTG and substantiation policy The situation can be fundamentally changed if see on the RTG as mini storages for nuclear waste. The most low-powered RTG contains (under Sr-90 activity) in two times more activity then PZRO SK "Radon❞ in Khabarovsk which existed in the Far East for about 50 years. Storage of the activity of the Chukotka AD RGT require to made more then 100 PZROS. • In fact the perennial use of the RTG as points of storage fundamentally contradicts to the principles of handling nuclear waste formulated in NP-058-04 "Safety with handling nuclear waste. General conditions". RosTech Nadzor, 2004. The use of the RTG as points of storage is not righteons also.#12RTG and substantiation policy The International commission on radiological safety in its publication 60 indicated: <<The process of substantiation of the relevancy is to be demanded not only when the practical activity starts but under revision the existed kinds of practical activities in site of new data on its efficiency and consequences. If that analyses testify to that fact that the practical activity does not more pretend to make the sufficient benefit which can cover the total loss so it demands to reject such activity". It seems that the said ICRS recommendation should be undeviatingly applied upon the land RTG. Exploitation of the units is to be stopped. The IAEA "Guide on Safety" legalized land using of RTG should be abolished also.#13RTG and optimization principle Optimization is a necessity "to achieve that the value of individual doses, number of irradiated persons and possibility to be irradiated ... were on so lowest levels which can achieved taking into consideration economic and social factors". • The main peculiarity of the existed RTG exploitation system is lack of the firm control. For RTG exploitation time under the control is about 0,23% of the time (if the normative demands are used). • The possibility to fix value of collective dose from non controlled radioactive unit on the low level is excluded in principle. • The RTG optimization principle is not observed. More over it can be observed in principle.#14RTG and normative principle NRB-99/2009 determine the normative principle as “ not exceeding the permissible level of the individual dose of a person irradiation from the all the irradiation sources". The normative principle uses for a EO personal who serve every RTG 1-2 hours a year. But for unauthorized persons these constantly warm units are often objects of interest. Under it the value of individual dose can not be controlled in principle. The disturber under the dismantling of the RTG can provoke deterministic effects of irradiation. It infringes civil rights of irradiation safety formulated the Federal law "On irradiation safety of the population" (Article 22). The Normative principle is not executed for the population i.e. the main defended part of irradiated persons. More over the civil right on the radiological safety formed in the Federal legislation is infringed. The uncovered cases of the increased irradiation of disturbers in their unapproved actions with RTG are not investigated.#15The RTG physical security Normative document NP-034-01 "The rules of the physical security of the radiological sources, points of storage, radiological substances" determines the order to the PSSystem. The PSSystem is to consisted of the following: - - 1 - The PSSystem organizing measures The PSSystem technical means The PSSystem engineering means Demands to actions of security units for 1-3 groups Under lack of only one of the said condition the PSSystem is considered unefficient. As applied to the RTGtThe PSSystem organizing measures is impossible to realize. The PSSystem technical means are not used The Federal Law "About nuclear energy using" (Article 50) contain imperative demand i.e. prohibition to exploit radiological sources whose PSSystem is not provided. The RTG are exploited with violation of the demands of the Russian Federation legislation#16RTG as internal irradiation sources In the RTG is used a fuel composition SrTiO3. It is firm and exceptionally stable substance. It is considered that the RTG is not a source of internal irradiation. Along with physical nuclear reactions there are chemical conversion in RTG strontium - the chemical element of the II group of the periodical system convers into ittrium which is chemical element of the III group III; Ittrium convers into circonium (element of the IV group) in the result of nuclear decay But the same IV group consists titanum - a part of TK. Remains two metals and oxygen. Probably they are a blend of powder- like oxides which contains certain number of "hot" small parts of TK. These micro elements obtain a certain mobility and under damage of the safety coats can leave the cover.#17RTG as internal irradiation sources This hypothesis received an oblique confirmation during the Ministry of Defense RTG of IEU-1 type radiological incident liquidation in the Chukotka AD in August, 2007. Still in 2003 in direct nearness from the wreck RTG was detected a radiological contamination zone. The FGUP "VNIITFA❞ specialists explained the event as the presence of the products of the oxidation of metallic uranium which is in RTG construction. At that the FGUP "VNIITFA" in one of their documents there was fixed the theoretical limit of specific radioactivity tests contaminated by the uranium and its fission fragments. During the liquidation process there has been taken a test in the area. The specific activity of the test prevailed the said limit more than twice. The source of the activity is likely stroncium- 90+yttrium-90.#18Fig. 06. The powdered heat coat of the RTG IEU-1 contaminated by the products of the uranium oxidation Cape Navarin, the 07th of August, 2007#19On absence of RTG feature to internal self- defense The diagnostic of the development of the Cape Navarin radiological incident by the FGUP "NIITFA" specialists said <<"The unauthorized mechanic influence on the RTG resulted in decompression of its case and its radiation defense coat. So it had been opened the oxygen enter to the uranium of radiological defense. It has been initiated the process of oxidation and gas swelling inside the RTG temperatures (up to 4000 C) which leaded to serious mechanic strains which demolished the RTG case. The oxides of the uranium unloaded to the land thru the crack which resulted in increasing of the capacity of the entering brake gamma irradiation over the normative levels. The unloaded uranium oxides created the RTG surface radiological contamination and of the earth near it. The radiological datum of RTG and mechanic condition of its construction do not allow to fulfill its safe transportation without extra coat". The processes resulted in full destruction of the RTG (the capacity of the expose dose exceeded 170 R per H) are absolutely internal. So the RTG has no feature to internal self-defense.#20Top left: The RTG of the IEU-1 type in working condition. A thermo radiator unit is in the top side. SNO "Ptychy". The Kamchatka AD, 2006. Top right: The RTG of the IEU-1 type from the Cape of Navarin after several years from the unauthorized activities. The thermo unit was demolished by the infractors. Deformation more over the infraction are not detected. Left: The RTG of the IEU-1 type from the Cape jf Navarin in 2003. Destruction of the case and thermo isolation inside contaminated with the uranium oxides. Traces of infractors have not been detected. Molecular energy of metallic uranium provoked Self- destruction.#21On inapplicability of wide-spread defense conception to the RTG The wide-spread defense conception relating to the RTG does not applied in full range as the whole physical barriers system limited only by the RTG construction elements • From 17 wide-spread defense indexes there are realized only 3 as regards RTG • The wide-spread conception of the RTG is not applicable in nowadays exploitation system.#22The systems and elements essential for the RTG safety Radiological source provided with sealed radionuclide source The main systems of the source safety Block system for phisical barriers System of ventilation of the safety systems of radiological source Radiological danger notification system Automatic "put on" notification signal for personal Providing systems of radiological source The protection system from the direct ionizing radiation Ruling safety systems of the radiological System for localization radionuclide source in the radiological source Systems and elements essential for the radiological source Physical barriers system for electro magnetic radiation Radiological source benchboard Radiological source movements and fixing system Radiological source energy supply system Terms and conditions of normal Radiological source exploitation Deviations from the normal Radiological source exploitation Forming of the operable signal for impact on Radiological source Physical barriers system for spread and dispersion of radionuclide#23The systems and elements essential for the RTG safety As one can see on the figure the elements absolutely essential for radioactive sources and first of all these RS which are extremely dangerous for a human being are: - systems to operate radionuclide source in the event of the normal exploitation deviation; - increased radiation danger notification system. The construction of any RTG land types does not foresee these systems.#24Empty#25Resume: Practical activity on the RTG exploitation as energy sources does not suit to principles of radiological safety Practical activity to use the RTG as mini storages of the nuclear waste formally based but complicates to the principles RAE using and does not at the slightest meets requirements to the points of the storage. The current RTG exploitation system leaves them off the exploitation organizations control. The civil right of radiological safety is infringes. The RTG physical safety system can not be provided in principle as the organizing part of it lacks. The RTG exploitation without it is restricted in the Russian Federation which places the RTG apart the law. The RTG with metallic uranium in their construction do not provide with the internal safety. They are able to make worse infringements greatly. The land RTG not at a slight do not correspond to the safety requirements for the radiological sources. Their exploitation to be abolished. The IAEA Guide on the safety of 1970 # 33 is to be canceled as regard the land RTG.