Investor Presentaiton
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grammatically correct sentence conveying that they told
the story to someone.
Though the D.C. Circuit imagined other potential
indirect objects such as "the air pollutant to be
limited" it explained neither the textual basis for those
alternatives nor how they would work in practice. JA.113.
This leap-before-you-look approach leaves States and
regulated entities with empty assurance that the agency
will figure it out later. Still, it is hard to fathom how
"applying]" a "system" to carbon dioxide in the abstract
results in a standard of performance for an individual
stationary source. Even EPA has not stretched so far. To
offset the CPP's "very broad" view of "system," EPA
understood "application" to mean “measures that can be
implemented-applied-by the sources themselves."
JA.543. The CPP tried to get around this concededly
"important [textual] limitation" by improperly redefining
"source" to include "owners and operators." But unlike
the D.C. Circuit, it never snatched "application" from its
context. Neither should the Court.
B. Other Parts Of Section 111 Confirm EPA's
"Inside-the-Fenceline" Power.
Determining whether Section 111 is “plain” requires
reading its "words in their context and with a view to their
place in the overall statutory scheme." King, 576 U.S. at
486 (cleaned up). As the CPP repeal correctly concluded,
Section 111's operative provisions also show that "best
system" is narrower than the majority thought.
Section 111(a)(1)'s "standard of performance"
definition applies to Sections 111(b) and (d) alike, so its
construction must make sense of both provisions. The
majority found "no basis" to read "the source-specific
language of subsection (d)(1) ... upstream into subsectionView entire presentation