Fukushima Report Analysis
Example of Cumulative Database
Reading Lis▾
ба
Fact Cod T Fact
Icf21
14
If4
4
T102
4
T72
4
T74
To the question, "Don't you think it was possible to propose the
development of AM based on seismic PSA?" He (Kondo, chairman of the
Special Committee on Safety Goals by NSC) answered, "We could have made
such a decision. The question was when to make that decision. With regard
to seismic PSA, we intended to start it on the occasion of the periodical
safety review (PSR). Although the first-round PSR reviewed only internal event
PSA, we had no choice about that, I intended to include external event PSA in the
second-round PSR 10 years later. (p. 365)
"moreover, those additional protective measures were not reviewed and
approved by the regulatory authority" (p. 13 and 45)
"The legally mandated METI order to continue seawater injection was issued at
10:30 on March 15. This information was shared via teleconferencing at 10:37. The
document containing the METI order stated that "reactor injection is to be
performed as early as possible, with D/W venting performed as needed."""
(p.219)
"The station and head office response HQs were notified that the TEPCO
government attaché decision was "the Prime Minister has not approved seawater
injection" at 19:25. After deliberation between the head office and station, it was
decided that seawater injection would be halted." (p. 183)
"However, due to the decision by the Site Superintendent that
injection was vital in preventing accident
continued in act
Category
Regulatory culture
T
Attribute/Qualifier ▾ Description▾
Regulatory practice
Timeline (B,D,A▾
B
Organization
NSC, Government
Regulatory Framework
Roles & Responsibilities
B
Regulator
Organizational Interfaces.
D
IF, TEPCO, METI
Roles &
Responsibilities
Roles &
Responsibilities
Organizational Structure
(Hierarchy)
4,900 facts classified into 26 categories,
3
D50
96 attributes
3
D5-94
ron chamber and its
ve been injecting seawater into the nuclear
run throttle and have begun to temporarily move our contractors and
employees not directly involved in this operation to a safe location." [140]
As compared with the report made to the regulators, the press release was
evidently delayed with severely constrained content. P.43
From their position as an operator under the regulation of the Kantei and other
regulators, this action may make sense. But to give this position priority over
transparency, while the safety of local residents was at risk, uncovered issues
related to their corporate culture. p43 (see page 44 Excerpt from Statements
material created by TEPCO)
IAEA
TEPCO
Partion
to the public
Regulatory Culture
Adhered to Procedures or
Requirements
Corporate
Culture
TEPCO, other regulators
and the Kantei
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