Investor Presentaiton
International Crisis Group
Asia Report N°310
5 August 2020
Raising the Stakes in Jammu and Kashmir
I.
Introduction
On 5 August 2019, Prime Minister Narendra Modi's Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
government revoked Indian-administered Kashmir's semi-autonomous status, exac-
erbating local disaffection and raising tensions with Pakistan.' An overbearing secu-
rity presence and a military clampdown on movement and communications only
temporarily suppressed Kashmiri opposition to New Delhi's unilateral decision. The
BJP government's actions chafed at Kashmiris who now lack even the vestiges of con-
stitutional autonomy at a time when New Delhi's heavy-handed response to militancy
threatens their security and livelihoods.² A recently introduced domicile law granting
non-Kashmiris access to permanent residency in Jammu and Kashmir has aggravat-
ed this sense of alienation, raising local fears that the BJP government is trying to
engineer demographic change to dilute the region's ethnic and religious identity.
Anger and frustration in one of the most militarised conflict zones in the world is
only pushing more Kashmiris, particularly the youth, toward joining the ranks of the
armed insurgency. New Delhi's forcible suppression of Kashmiri dissent and denial
of political and civil liberties are providing militant groups, local and foreign, with
new opportunities to recruit young Kashmiri Muslims to their cause.
The BJP government's decision to redesign Jammu and Kashmir's administrative
and legal structures has also further aggravated relations with Pakistan, already tense
following the 14 February 2019 Pulwama suicide bombing, conducted by a Kashmiri
and claimed by the Pakistan-based militant group Jaish-e-Mohammed. The attack,
which killed scores of Indian military personnel, and the tit-for-tat Indian and Paki-
stani airstrikes that followed, had raised the risk of higher-intensity conflict.3"
.3 Though
that risk subsequently receded, relations between the two neighbours have plum-
1
For previous Crisis Group analysis of Jammu and Kashmir's conflict dynamics, see Crisis Group
Asia Reports N°s 224, Pakistan's Relations with India: Beyond Kashmir?, 3 May 2012; 79, India/
Pakistan Relations and Kashmir: Steps Towards Peace, 24 June 2004; 70, Kashmir: Learning
from the Past, 4 December 2003; 69, Kashmir: The View from New Delhi, 4 December 2003; 68,
Kashmir: The View from Islamabad, 4 December 2003; 41, Kashmir: The View from Srinagar, 21
November 2002; and 35, Kashmir: Confrontation and Miscalculation, 11 July 2002; and Briefings
N°106, Steps Towards Peace: Putting Kashmiris First, 3 June 2010; and N°51, India, Pakistan and
Kashmir: Stabilising a Cold Peace, 15 June 2006.
2 The term "Kashmiri" in this report refers to Kashmiri Muslims. Jammu and Kashmir is 68 per
cent Muslim overall. India's only Muslim-majority state, it has three regions: the Muslim-majority
Kashmir Valley, often referred to as "the Valley", which has the largest population, Hindu-majority
Jammu and Buddhist-majority Ladakh. The report focuses on dynamics in the Kashmir Valley, the
conflict's epicentre.
3 For Crisis Group analysis of the Pulwama attack and its aftermath, see Crisis Group Commen-
taries, "Deadly Kashmir Suicide Bombing Ratchets up India-Pakistan Tensions", 22 February 2019;
and "Calming India and Pakistan's Tit-for-Tat Escalation", 1 March 2019. See also "India struck
biggest training camp of JeM" - Full statement from Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale", The Hindu,
26 February 2019; "2 Indian aircraft violating Pakistani airspace shot down; pilot arrested", Dawn,
27 February 2019; "Tracing the path that led to Pulwama," BBC, 1 May 2019.View entire presentation