Annual Report 2018
Administration
With respect to the professional profile, the data revealed the need for technical
staff and managers to develop specific competencies, such as initiative, proactivity,
multifunctional skills, innovative attitude, and the ability to work in teams and to
negotiate with partners, customers and suppliers.
CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE STUDY
•
The study was conducted with an original analytic framework, based on the as-
sumption that firms define their business model in line with their competitive
strategy, and this in turn is influenced by the role the firm plays in global (or local)
value chains.
CORRUPTION OR INEFFICIENCY: WHICH IS
WORSE, AND HOW CAN THEY BE AVOIDED?
A laboratory experiment demonstrated that voters overwhelmingly
condemn corrupt politicians but often are tolerant of those who only
cause waste of public resources.
•
APPLICATIONS OF THE RESULTS AND POSSIBLE EXTENSIONS OF THE STUDY
Based on discussion of the results of the project, SENAI started to review its meth-
odological framework, to build scenarios, perform diagnoses and prospect for the
training of technicians in various industrial sectors. This discussion can be incorpo-
rated by other public institutions engaged in professional training.
In 2017 a new project was begun, with a related conceptual framework, involving a
network of international researchers led by the China Europe International Business
School (CEIBS), on the theme of upgrading strategic capability in emerging markets.
AUTHOR:
Maria Tereza Leme Fleury.
RESEARCHERS:
Afonso Fleury, Arnaldo Mauerberg Jr, Claudia Frias, Luis Fernando Oliveira, Mauricio
di Mauro and Ruben Bonon.
ORGANIZATION:
Sao Paulo School of Business Administration (EAESP).
SUPPORT:
National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq), National Con-
federation of Industry (CNI), National Industrial Training Service (SENAI) and Applied
Research Fund of Fundação Getulio Vargas (FPA FGV).
OBJECTIVE
The aim was to investigate to what extent voters punish corruption and waste in demo-
cratic elections.
RESEARCH METHOD
•
The study was included a simulated election game empirically underpinned by an exper-
iment. In the election game, two politicians run for office in each electoral district in a
majoritarian election, and the winner represents his or her district in the distribution of
public funds. Voters decide between two politicians that have greater or lesser ability to
"bring home the bacon" from the federal budget to the district.
The strictly dominant strategy in the game is that voters always vote for politicians that
they believe will bring more money and thus more benefits for each voter. The total
amount of federal funds to be distributed is fixed and disputed among four districts with
five voters each. The politician better able to bring funds can in this process cause waste
(inefficiency) or pocket part of the money (corruption).
Thus, the experiment has four treatments: 1. waste; 2. corruption; 3. waste with rule; and
4. corruption with rule.
In treatments 3 and 4, the voters, before playing the game, participate in a referendum
that determines whether or not a rule will be established against voting for politicians
that cause waste (treatment 3) or that divert resources (treatment 4). The participants
are informed that, if approved by the majority, the rule will be applied but without any
penalty or monitoring.
Between the treatments, the amount of money wasted or diverted is the same, which
enables distinguishing the effect of corruption from that of waste ceteris paribus. More
than this, the amount wasted or diverted is limited, so that the elected politicians of either
stripe still bring benefits to their constituents after considering these losses.
The politicians were real participants who decided voluntarily to play the role after read-
ing the instructions and receiving the complete information on the game.
The participants who chose to play the role of candidates decided what type of politician
they wanted to be. We adopted this strategy because according to ethical criteria it is not
possible to decide at random that a participant will play the role of a corrupt politician.
The participants chose their roles voluntarily at the start of the session. All the interactions
and roles played were anonymous and the voters did not know who the politicians were.
During the game, the politicians did not make any choice. Only the voters had an active
role in the voting.
Depending on the choice of the voters in each district, the participant playing the role of
the politician who was elected gained a fixed salary, plus an amount corresponding to the
funds diverted if the politician was corrupt.
The game was repeated for ten periods and the participants received information about
the number of politicians of each type elected, the quantity of social losses created (by
corruption of waste), the gains in their districts and the gains of the elected politicians.
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Annual Report 2018
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RESEARCHView entire presentation