Investor Presentaiton
Raising the Stakes in Jammu and Kashmir
Crisis Group Asia Report N°310, 5 August 2020
Page 18
The Resistance Front is just another name", said a senior police officer in northern
Kashmir.105
Some local militants claim to fight under the banner of ISIS and al-Qaeda. The
Islamic State has a local affiliate, Islamic State Jammu and Kashmir, also known as
Islamic State Hind Province. 106 A breakaway faction of Hizbul Mujahideen, Ansar
Ghazwat-ul-Hind, has also reportedly pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda. 107 The nature
of the relationship between these groups and ISIS in the Middle East or the al-Qaeda
core and whether they receive support from abroad remain unclear. "Although there
is little local support for al-Qaeda's ideology", said a well-informed source in south-
ern Kashmir, "people, especially the youth, are willing to risk their lives in street pro-
tests and armed encounter sites to save militants from any outfit. They feel they are
fighting for them".1
108
D. Impunity and Alienation
India has long used draconian laws to contain militancy, civil uprisings and dissent
in Kashmir, leading to a dangerous climate of impunity for security forces. The prev-
alence of enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, custodial torture and sexual
violence are a direct consequence of legislation that applies solely to the region. In
particular, the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (Jammu and Kashmir) of 1990 sanc-
tions the disproportionate use of force by military personnel against civilians. Mili-
tary personnel are authorised to use force if curbs on the gathering of more than five
persons are violated. 109 A study of the rise of militancy in Kashmir concluded that
the law's "misuse ... has pushed increasing numbers of local youth to militancy" and
"changed perceptions of the Kashmiri citizen towards the Indian state". 110
The Special Powers Act also creates a climate of impunity because it shields sol-
diers from trial in civilian courts without the central government's permission. The
defence ministry's responses to several right to information applications showed that
New Delhi had not approved such trials in even a single case. ¹¹¹ Instead, prosecutions
are conducted by closed court-martial, and seldom lead to harsh sentences. 112 In
111
105 Crisis Group interview, Sopore, June 2020.
106 "ISIS announces new branch in India after 'clashes' in Kashmir", The Economic Times, 12 May
2019. "IS operatives killing reveals power struggle among militant ranks", The Wire, 7 July 2019.
107 Zakir Musa, whose real name was Zakir Rashid Butt, broke away from Hizbul Mujahideen in
May 2018 to set up his group, Ansar Ghazwat-ul-Hind, declaring allegiance to al-Qaeda. Musa was
killed by security forces in Pulwama in May 2019. "Death of Zakir Musa - Start of a New Radical-
ism in Kashmir?", Observer Research Foundation, 27 May 2019.
108 Crisis Group interview, southern Kashmir, May 2019.
109 Officers are authorised to use "force, even to the causing of death" beyond self-defence, against
persons who violate orders prohibiting the gathering of more than five people. Section 4, Armed
Forces Special Powers Act (Jammu and Kashmir), 1990.
110
The study was based on field surveys in Kashmir conducted from 2016 to 2018. Ayjaz Wani, "The
Kashmir Conflict: Managing Perceptions and Building Bridges of Peace", Observer Research Foun-
dation, 9 October 2018.
111 Crisis Group interviews, Jammu and Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society members, Srinagar, June
2019.
112 Around 100 cases were tried in military courts. Sentences either failed to reflect the gravity of
the offence or were often overturned on appeal.View entire presentation