Insurgency Success Factors and Rebel Legitimacy
Support of Chechen elites declined drastically by the start of the Second Chechen War.
Maskhadov's inability to gain control over a rapidly deteriorating economy, political system, and
security environment challenged assumptions that an independent Chechen state would produce
greater avenues to economic, political, and social power in Chechnya 92. Perhaps the strongest
indicator of a shift in the Chechen political elites is the actions of Akhmad Kadyrov, the
Republic of Ichkeria's then-Chief Mufti. Kadyrov, initially a staunch supporter of Chechen
independence, became disillusioned with the insurgency, growing Wahhabi influence, and the
protracted conflict with Russia³. He negotiated a deal with the Russian government, leading
insurgent troops to a devastating ambush in 2000, that contributed significantly to Russian
victory over insurgent forces. In return, Kadyrov was inserted as interim President of Chechnya,
and received state backing during the 2003 elections, that put him in power. Back in power,
Kadyrov reinstated the power of Chechen political elites who retained a pro-Russian stance and
retained connections from Soviet Chechnya 94. Many of those inserted into power were belonged
to Kadyrov's Sufi administration under the rebellion 95.
The removal of Chechen elite support effectively reduced the rebellion's access to
political space in Russia and Chechnya. Under Kadyrov, Chechen elites returned to activity
mimicked under the Soviet system, such as attending Orthodox Christian services with Russian
politicians. Rebel leaders were isolated form this system and its resources, and Russia was
reintroduced into political space, by supporting Chechen elites 97. It has been argued that Ramzan
Kadyrov, elected as President of Russian-mandated Chechnya in February 2007, is under control
of Russia due to Russian financial payments and certain types of support that directly benefit
Kadyrov and Chechen political elites⁹8.
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