Investor Presentaiton
US Direct Sanctions - SDNS (cont'd)
Note: State Dep't Oct. 2017 CAATSA section 231(e) listing of Russian defense / intelligence sector
entities (see slide 54) - supplemented with 45 more individuals and entities in late 2018 (see below),
and 6 more in early March 2021 (see slide 7)
This is the List of Specified Persons ("LSP"): doesn't itself impose SDN (or any other sanctions) on them
But
many were already SDNS and some were SSIS (including Rosoboronexport - now is both), and
there is likely chilling effect in practice on US / other companies' willingness to do business with them (see linked list of
them at slide 51), and
other companies risk having some SDN-like sanctions imposed on themselves under CAATSA section 235 for some kinds
of "significant transactions" with them (see State Dep't announcement (slide 51), and slides 54 and 57)
See further discussion on this at slides 54, 56-57 and 60 below
And SDN designations of Sept. 2018 – per CAATSA section 231 (defense/intelligence-related)
Against
EDD (Equipment Development Dep't), a weapons-purchasing entity of the Chinese military - for taking delivery of
advanced aircraft and missiles from Rosoboronexport of Russia, which is on the CAATSA section 231 List of Specified
Person (LSP), and is also an SDN (see slide 54 below) and EDD's director
these were the first-ever SDN designations under CAATSA section 231 (for significant transactions with the Russian
defense or intelligence sectors)
announced by State Dep't (which also set out the specific sanctions chosen and being applied) - and also corresponding
OFAC SDN designations announcement of Sept. 2018
See also new Turkey sanctions mandate in NDAA 2021 (section 1241) - for purchase of Russian S-400 air-
defense missile system - including statutory finding that this was a "significant transaction" per CAATSA section
231 (see next slide and slide 57)
Morgan Lewis
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