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Investor Presentaiton

14 III. Lastly, the lower court construed Section 111 in a way that raises grave doubts about its constitutionality. If the D.C. Circuit majority is right, then Section 111 is an enormous delegation of legislative power with only trifling standards to guide EPA's work. The Court should reject that reading because the canons- and context-based alternative avoids this serious non-delegation concern. ARGUMENT I. Section 111 Does Not Vest EPA With Industry- Transforming, State-Displacing Power. The lower court faulted EPA for not assuming a broader mandate under Section 111(d). It urged EPA to not just reorder the power sector, but also undertake whatever other sweeping changes it decides will help reduce carbon emissions. Yet neither Section 111 nor anything else in the CAA provides a clear statement from Congress that it intended EPA to take this power on. Without a clear statement, two independent canons of construction-the major-questions doctrine and the federalism canon-confirm that the text does not grant EPA these powers. Congress must delegate with unmissable clarity if it intends to give an agency economy- transforming abilities to decide major questions or alter the power balance between the States and the federal government. Here, it did no such thing. A. Congress Did Not Clearly Delegate to EPA Power to Tackle the Major Questions Inherent in Restructuring Full Industries. 1. The "nature of the question" is critical when answering whether Congress delegated powers to an agency. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159. Ambiguous statutory text may be enough to delegate
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