Investor Presentaiton
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III. Lastly, the lower court construed Section 111 in
a way that raises grave doubts about its constitutionality.
If the D.C. Circuit majority is right, then Section 111 is an
enormous delegation of legislative power with only trifling
standards to guide EPA's work. The Court should reject
that reading because the canons- and context-based
alternative avoids this serious non-delegation concern.
ARGUMENT
I. Section 111 Does Not Vest EPA With Industry-
Transforming, State-Displacing Power.
The lower court faulted EPA for not assuming a
broader mandate under Section 111(d). It urged EPA to
not just reorder the power sector, but also undertake
whatever other sweeping changes it decides will help
reduce carbon emissions. Yet neither Section 111 nor
anything else in the CAA provides a clear statement from
Congress that it intended EPA to take this power on.
Without a clear statement, two independent canons of
construction-the major-questions doctrine and the
federalism canon-confirm that the text does not grant
EPA these powers. Congress must delegate with
unmissable clarity if it intends to give an agency economy-
transforming abilities to decide major questions or alter
the power balance between the States and the federal
government. Here, it did no such thing.
A. Congress Did Not Clearly Delegate to EPA
Power to Tackle the Major Questions
Inherent in Restructuring Full Industries.
1. The "nature of the question" is critical when
answering whether Congress delegated powers to an
agency. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159.
Ambiguous statutory text may be enough to delegateView entire presentation