Insurgency Success Factors and Rebel Legitimacy
relationships, and processes 120. The de facto government harnessed this power to initiate
economic relationships with foreign states, including Georgia, the U.S., and European states 121
The government was also able to keep economic outputs of oil productivity that could be used to
implement state services and programs¹
122
Russian and rebel groups also held active negotiations during the First Chechen War.
Chechen rebels effectively negotiated several cease-fire agreements with the Russian State 123.
Two key negotiations were the Khasavyurt Accord and the treaty "on peace and principles of
Russian-Chechen relations" signed at the end of the First Chechen War. On August 30, 1996 the
Khasavyurt Accord was signed by Maskhadov (acting as chief of staff), and Russian General
Alexander Lebed 124. This agreement formally ended the First Chechen War and negotiated the
withdrawal of all federal military troops and government entities from Chechnya. The treaty was
followed by the treaty “on peace and the principles of Russian-Chechen relations” signed in 1997
by Yeltsin and Maskhadov (acting as president). This treaty effectively provided a framework
for Russian-Chechen relations and formally recognized de facto status of the Chechen Republic
of Ichkeria 125. This treaty, and its acknowledgement of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria's de
facto status forced Russia to accept the insurgency as the legitimate, if temporary, power in
Chechnya.
Achievement of de facto status marked the highest levels of legitimacy for the Chechen
rebellion 126. De facto status legitimated, legalized, and secured the republic's control of Chechen
economic activity, civilians, and governance. Negotiations also awarded the Chechen rebellion
with the power to voice its concerns, needs, and demands directly to the state. The negotiation
process entailed Russia acknowledging rebellion needs, and addressing them where
appropriate 12
127
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