Insurgency Success Factors and Rebel Legitimacy
After losing the power of law, accounts of insurgent activity among populations and
growing acts of terrorism indicate that rebels increasingly relied on intimidation and terrorism to
negotiate with Russian and civilian populations 286. Laws implemented by the rebellion after 2000
were heavily embedded in sharia law and included policies such as the seclusion of women,
stoning and beheading as punishment, and trial by Islamic council. Many of these laws contained
elements that do not adhere to international law or democratic practices 287. Implementation of
sharia law also contributed to delegitimizing the insurgency among populations that did not want
or follow sharia law. Such laws reduced civilian and international perceptions of legitimacy of
the insurgency. Civilians failed to perceive the laws as legitimate interpretations or
representations of their identities and livelihoods, and the laws often failed to protect secular and
female populations288. Similarly, such laws reinforced perceptions of terrorism in the eyes of the
international community, and a movement away from commitment to democratic practices and
liberal ideals.
Mobilization of Goods, Services, and Programs
Mobilization of goods, services, and programs is another key indicator of rebel
legitimacy. A rebel group's ability to mobilize goods, services, and programs supports its claims
that it can and should function as a successful political entity 289. Effective mobilization of goods,
services and programs significantly impact perceptions of legitimacy amongst a number of
actors. First, ability to mobilize these services supports rebel claims that it is able to function as a
government, and can serve the best interests of populations. Second, rebel management of
governance confirms the ability to adequately function in political space, through participating in
and facilitating political, economic, and social activity.
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