Insurgency Success Factors and Rebel Legitimacy
the wars
$230. These safe havens became particularly important and dangerous after 2000, when the
rebellion lost access to political space and was forced to operate in hiding from Russian security
forces. Chechens for an independent state contributed to external support of the movement's
legitimacy.
The movement experienced a stark ideological shift after 1996, which challenged
perceptions of its legitimacy amongst civilians. Growing Wahhabi influence in insurgent
rhetoric, tactics, and motivations alienated large portions of Chechen populations who identified
with less conservative, Sufi forms of Islam and were largely secular in practice 231. Life under an
Islamic state had vastly different implications for Chechen populations than the secular, modern
state headed by Dudayev. In particular, many Chechens found it difficult to identify with a state
that increasingly called for the inclusion of sharia law in the constitution, seclusion of women,
and participating in translation jihadi wars 232. These ideals did not mesh with the realities of a
population that identified more strongly with Europe than the Middle East, had some of the
strongest gender equality in the Russian Federation, and rarely attended religious services 233.
While the full effects of civilian support from 2000 to 2007 are difficult to assess due to
lack of data, state control of media, and implementation of harsh punishment against rebel
supporters and families that could deter expression of anti-Russian opinion. Support for Russian
rule is assumedly low, indicated by low voter turnout in public elections, political brutality
against civilians, and media reports of rampant human rights abuses and corruption 234. Russia's
maintenance of military presence in Chechnya, and growing numbers and scale of terrorist
attacks from 2000 to 2007 indicate the rebellion continues to receive enough recruitment,
resources, and support to sustain activity 235. What portion of recruitment and resources comes
from the population versus external actors, such as al-Qaeda, is more difficult to determine. The
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