Investor Presentaiton

24 JA.150, confuses the CAA's purposes with its textual reach. See Mexichem Fluor, Inc. v. EPA, 866 F.3d 451, 460-61 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“[W]ell-intentioned policy objectives with respect to climate change do not on their own authorize [EPA] to regulate."). And the D.C. Circuit ignored the myriad other people and entities swept within Section 111's expanded scope-homeowners, for instance, are a potential regulated class tens of millions strong. Fifth, it would be especially wrong to assume Congress charged EPA with taking on these new issues and parties when the questions at stake span multiple sectors- including many well outside EPA's lane. In the CPP, EPA assumed authority to direct investment decisions, assess consumer energy use, resolve questions of energy reliability and need, manipulate energy prices, drive employment markets, and more. Of course, the federal government already has an energy regulator for some of these concerns: FERC. And the Court has had no patience for similarly unauthorized, multi-jurisdictional rulemakings. Gonzales is again a good example. There, forbidding doctors from prescribing regulated drugs for physician-assisted suicide fell outside the Attorney General's authority in part because the issue involved "quintessentially medical judgments" beyond his "expertise." 546 U.S. at 248, 267. Gonzales was no fluke, either. The Court was also concerned when the IRS asserted power over insurance markets in King, 576 U.S. at 486, and when the CDC regulated housing markets in Alabama Ass'n, 141 S. Ct. at 2488. Sixth and finally, these issues are at the center of substantial political and public attention. On the political side, Congress has remained heavily engaged in climate- change-related issues. Before the CPP, Congress considered a carbon tax, S. Con. Res. 8, S. Amdt. 646,

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