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36 Federal Energy Administrator to prohibit "any powerplant" "from burning natural gas or petroleum products as its primary energy source"). Because Congress did not write Section 111 that way, "system of emission reduction" is different from "system of emission elimination." 2. Though the majority faulted the CPP repeal for purportedly adding words to Section 111(a)(1), JA.118, its own reasoning depends on subtraction. The court latched onto the terms "system" and "application" and gave them decisive weight-at the expense of the five other key words in the definition (just discussed) pointing another way. Even so, the majority's select words do not decide this case. Take first its view of "system." The majority relied on a definition from a "widely criticized" dictionary, see MCI, 512 U.S. at 228 n.3 (discussing WEBSTER'S THIRD), to conclude that EPA could impose any "complex unity... subject to a common plan or serving a common purpose," so long as it "place[d] a high priority on efficiently and effectively reducing emissions." JA.118-19. The court thought this broad term gave EPA maximum "flexibility"-the genesis of its "no limits" holding. JA.118. Yet "words that have one meaning in a particular context frequently have a different significance in another." United States v. Raynor, 302 U.S. 540, 547-48 (1938). All the more for a general term like “system”: In one statute it refers to a device for making phone calls, Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid, 141 S. Ct. 1163, 1167 (2021) ("automatic telephone dialing system"), in another it describes a series of related waters, United States v. Dist. Ct. In & For Eagle Cnty., 401 U.S. 520, 523 (1971) (“river system"). Particularly for a term like this, "construing

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