Investor Presentaiton
Raising the Stakes in Jammu and Kashmir
Crisis Group Asia Report N°310, 5 August 2020
Page 29
Optimally, New Delhi would reduce its military presence and rely more on local
policing in Kashmir, though admittedly such a step appears far removed from its
current approach. Reducing the numbers of soldiers, starting with the additional
troops deployed after 5 August, and relying more on local police, though with greater
oversight, could help reduce tensions. It would require maintaining a clear distinc-
tion between the police's roles in counter-insurgency operations and in maintaining
law and order, for example during protests. Promoting Kashmiris to higher echelons
of the police could improve relations between the security forces and locals.
3.
Allowing political process of all shades
The Indian government's treatment of Kashmir's political class over the last year not
only damages its international reputation but threatens to leave New Delhi bereft of
moderate opposition or partners in Kashmir. That some Kashmiri politicians are still
in detention after a year, with no valid reason provided, is by any standard a violation
of democratic rights guaranteed under the Indian constitution. The recent extension
of PDP President Mehbooba Mufti's house arrest until November is, in this regard,
particularly self-defeating.
The prohibition of political activity in the Valley is stripping New Delhi of any po-
tential Kashmir allies. Even if most Kashmiris question their bona fides after their
collaboration with past Indian governments, the mainstream Kashmiri parties will
likely continue to play an important role in any future Kashmiri parliament. India's
attempt to sidetrack them will almost certainly push them toward less conciliatory
positions. After the events of the past year, the National Conference and People's
Democratic Party have little choice but to firmly oppose New Delhi's hardline poli-
cies if they are to retain any credibility with their base. On 29 July, ex-chief minister
Omar Abdullah said New Delhi's policies had played into the hands of separatists. "I
don't know how much political space today actually exists for mainstream political
parties”, he admitted, adding he would not participate in elections unless statehood
is restored.159
The BJP government's refusal to talk to Kashmiri separatist parties is equally prob-
lematic. Banning Jamaat-e-Islami and the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front will not
necessarily reduce their appeal. Nor will the government's refusal to engage with
Hurriyat leaders bring peace to the troubled region. By spurning separatist leaders,
and keeping them in jail or under house arrest, the Modi government is creating the
space for harder-line elements to take their place, including militants. The absence
of traditional separatist voices from the public sphere is creating a dangerous vacuum
at a time when anti-Indian sentiment in Kashmir is at an all-time high. As a rights
activist said, "If their absence in the past (because of frequent detentions) was occa-
sional... it now appears permanent. In the absence of a political group that Kashmir-
is can trust and feel represented by, the appeal of the gun is enhanced". 160
Politics apart, blocking Kashmiris from freely expressing their opinions at a time
when their homeland is undergoing the most radical changes since India's independ-
159 "I will raise my voice, I will fight, but I will not give somebody in a uniform with a gun an excuse
or a reason to kill one of us" (interview), The Indian Express, 29 July 2020.
160 Crisis Group interview, Srinagar, May 2019.View entire presentation