US Sectoral Sanctions
CAATSA / Guidances / Lists (cont'd)
per CAATSA section 231 (and see Oct. 2017 State Dep't List and Guidance), US or non-US
companies and individuals that knowingly engage in a significant transaction with a Russian
defense intelligence sector entity on the List of Specified Persons
see the List, expanded as of December 2018 (see slides 41-42 above) - and again note that a
company's appearance on it doesn't itself mean any new sanction against it ... (but some are already
SDNS or SSIS - e.g., Rosoboronexport, which was on the list, has since been made an SDN)
these include some defense-sector companies that also have important civilian-oriented production
(e.g. Sukhoi, Tupolev, and holding companies United Aircraft, United Shipbuilding)
but the State Dep't Guidance (in FAQ) stresses that:
ā for now at least, purely civilian end-use / end-user transactions, and not involving intelligence sector, are
not likely to be considered "significant"
and that transactions with the FSB (which is also on the List) are unlikely to be considered "significant" if
necessary to comply with FSB rules or law enforcement / admin. actions / investigations involving FSB re
import / distribution / use of IT products in Russia and payment of related processing fees to FSB (i.e.,
this dovetails with OFAC General License No. 1 of Feb. 2017 - see slide 44 above)
and from another State Dep't release of Sept. 2018 it appears that only the actual listed companies
and not necessarily their subsidiaries are covered (at least not yet)
per CAATSA section 233 (and see Oct. 2017 OFAC Guidance), US or non-US cos. and
individuals that with actual knowledge make or facilitate investments into privatization of
Russian state-owned companies (of $10M, or combination $1M+ bites for $10M total in a
year) where the process "unjustly benefits" RFG officials or their close associates / family
(this is also one of the CAATSA sections covered in further Sept. 2018 EO - see slide 58)
Morgan Lewis
52
2View entire presentation