Insurgency Success Factors and Rebel Legitimacy slide image

Insurgency Success Factors and Rebel Legitimacy

The 1997 Treaty marked the final negotiation between Russia and the Chechen insurgency. In 1999 Putin implemented a policy of non-negotiation with Chechen separatists, mimicking international trends of non-negotiation with terrorists 128. This policy effectively severed avenues for communication and negotiation between the Russian state and rebel leaders. This policy also signaled an end to Russia's treatment of the de facto government as a legitimate power that warranted a diplomatic and economic relationship with Russia 129. Putin's non-negotiation policy was increasingly effective during the Second Chechen War. Maskhadov reached out to Putin several times to negotiate cease-fire agreements or peace settlements during the Second Chechen War and was repeatedly rejected 130. Russia's failure to acknowledge negotiations was met by increasingly brutal, guerilla-type warfare enacted by the rebellion 131.. The Russian rejection of two requests for cease-fires in 1999 were immediately followed by large-scale terrorist attacks. Rebel leadership stated that these attacks were a response to lack of Russian acknowledgement of cease-fire discussions 132. Near the end of the war Maskhadov attempted to negotiate a settlement of succession, entering a peace agreement in which Chechnya would no longer operate as an independent state, but this too was rejected by Russia 133. The Second Chechen war, itself, ended without a formal peace agreement or negotiation. Putin declared the war over in 2000, but has retained an active troop presence and counterterrorism operations through to 2007134. Despite Russia's declaration of victory, incidences of terrorism, insecurity, and violence continued to rise 135 The non-negotiation policy was followed by a rapid rise in terrorism at the hands of the rebellion. The end of negotiations removed the rebellion from legitimate means of communication with the state, which reduced their ability to express needs, to advocate for Chechen needs and separatist movement, and to have their needs acknowledged and addressed 34
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