Insurgency Success Factors and Rebel Legitimacy
The assassination of Maskhadov in 2005 marked a shift in the rebellion's democratic
determination of leadership. By 2002, Russia had fully regained control of government buildings
and had reestablished a Russian-controlled administration and military presence¹10. In 2002,
Putin hand-picked Ahkmad Kadyrov to be inserted into Chechen leadership. Kadyrov's
Presidency was confirmed in 2003, although the democratic nature of elections was contested 111.
Russia's recapturing of control of official Chechen political space, challenged the
legitimacy and capacity of rebel leadership. As the rebellion lost access to formal political
institutions, rebel activity was forced to operate increasingly underground. Formal elections,
leadership, and management of administration facilitated by Kadyrov presented ideological and
capacity threats to rebel leaders. In 2005, the rebellion lacked access to the means through which
formal elections could be facilitated. As such, the leadership positions of Sadulayev, and later
Dokku Umarov, were determined by a small council of rebel leaders 112.
The declining inclusion of Chechen populations in determination of rebel leadership
represents a growing distance between the population and the rebel movement. As the
movement is forced to move underground, becoming less accessible to Chechen civilians. The
insurgent's lack of representation of populations, due to lack of access to political space and the
populations themselves, contributes to decreased the legitimacy of insurgent leadership. Without
elections, there is no confirmation that insurgent leaders represent popular opinion, belief, or
choice 113. There is also no communication or connection between insurgent leaders and civilians
that would indicate democratic leadership. This dislocation decreases the legitimacy of insurgent
leadership to successfully enact, determine, and fulfil the needs of Chechen citizens.
Potential for Negotiations
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