Insurgency Success Factors and Rebel Legitimacy
supporting Chechen independence in international diplomatic arenas. Jordan and Syria also
implemented changes in immigration policy, reducing Chechen diaspora and refugee access to
visas¹
193
Provision of Resources, Financing, and Access to Logistical Networks
External provision of resources, financing and access to logistical networks presents
another important indicator of rebel legitimacy. Upon declaring independence, the de facto
Chechen state benefited from many of the resources Russia left behind 194. The use and
destruction of rebel resources and destruction of Chechen oil pipelines forced rebels to seek
alternative methods of procuring resources from 1996-2007195. A devastating war, followed by a
deteriorating security environment meant that businesses were producing little productivity, and
had little security in the safety of infrastructure and employees 196. By 2002, Russia had regained
control of Chechen government buildings, oil refineries, and military bases. Rebel losses in these
areas resulted in the movement being completely cut off from the legitimate Chechen
economy 197
Initially, the de facto government attempted to distance itself from Islamic extremism in
Chechnya 198. The Chechen separatist insurgency, alternatively, welcomed training, arms, and
resources from Islamist supporters, particularly al-Qaeda affiliates 199. After the First Chechen
War, a desperate need for supplies, soldiers, and allies increasingly influenced the de facto
government's dependence on Islamist supporters, warlords, and criminal networks to obtain
200. While the numbers of foreign fighters are contested, an active presence of foreign
Islamic fighters has been confirmed in both Chechen wars 201. Following the Second Chechen
War, the complete retraction of assistance and support from the international community, led the
movement to rely almost exclusively on al-Qaeda to obtain funding, arms, and other materials 202.
resources
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