Investor Presentaiton

17 or even substantially, rate-regulated to agency discretion"). Major-questions review is no stranger to the CAA, either the Court has already deployed the doctrine to hold that Congress did not give EPA certain powers it claimed. UARG considered whether EPA could extend permitting requirements to a vast category of greenhouse gas-emitting sources. 573 U.S. at 315. It could not. Otherwise, EPA would have worked "an enormous and transformative expansion [of its] regulatory authority without clear congressional authorization." Id. at 324. If EPA "lay[s] claim to extravagant statutory power over the national economy," then it must explain why the statute "compel[s]" that interpretation. Id.; see also Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assocs., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (holding EPA could not consider implementation costs when setting national ambient air quality standards without a "clear" "textual commitment" on that score). This case is cast from the same mold. The decision below improperly reads Section 111 to extend EPA's regulatory powers to a major issue "without clear congressional authorization." UARG, 573 U.S. at 324. 2. Make no mistake: Congress never provided a clear statement of authority that could permit the powers the D.C. Circuit read into Section 111(d). No one below offered a "serious and sustained argument that § 111 includes a clear statement." JA.206. The majority instead went hunting through "the statute and subject matter" for something that might make a broad delegation to EPA "implausible." JA.135-36. Demanding a clear denial rather than a clear grant of authority, however, gets the analysis backward. Cf. Atl. City Elec. Co. v. FERC, 295 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2002) ("Were courts to presume a delegation of power absent an express withholding of such

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