Investor Presentaiton
28
Act reflects a calibrated mix of federal and state roles,
with an emphasis on the States. Congress found that
preventing and controlling air pollution—the statute's
overarching goal-"is the primary responsibility of
States and local governments." 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(3)
(emphasis added). This federalism-advancing policy is on
full display in Section 111(d): Congress established a
structure that, as in other cooperative-federalism
statutes, "allows the States, within limits established by
federal minimum standards, to enact and administer their
own regulatory programs, structured to meet their own
particular needs." Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288-89 & n.30
(1981). States, not EPA, set the performance standards
that bind each existing source. Only if States fail to submit
"satisfactory" plans may EPA step in, and then only with
certain procedural safeguards. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(2)(A);
see also Train, 421 U.S. at 79 (explaining that Section
111(d) "relegate[s]" EPA "to a secondary role").
The D.C. Circuit reasoned that Section 111 might
implicitly reorder federal and State roles precisely
because the CAA embraces cooperative federalism.
JA.156-58. But it is hard to square Congress' statutory
choices to preserve States' authority with a construction
that allows EPA to trample those same prerogatives. The
lower court, at least, could not convincingly do it. In the
first case it marshaled Congress had “unquestionably"
taken “regulation of [certain] local telecommunications
competition away from the States," AT&T Corp. v. Iowa
Util. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 378 n.6 (1999); in the second, the
Court did not address the federalism canon, see Alaska
Dep't of Env't Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461 (2004).
Nor does federalism fall aside-and with it the
unmistakably clear statement requirement-becauseView entire presentation