Insurgency Success Factors and Rebel Legitimacy slide image

Insurgency Success Factors and Rebel Legitimacy

by Russia¹36. Yagil Henkin (2009) notes the shift in rhetoric of the notorious Chechen insurgent leader, Shamil Basayev, in the hostage crisis in 1996, in which he promises not to kill civilians, and in hostage situations in 2004 and 2005, in which Basayev openly celebrates the killing of civilians 137 . Increasing reliance on terrorist tactics to communicate and negotiate with Russia and civilian populations contributed significantly to decreasing the insurgency's legitimacy. Russia's non-negotiation policy dislocated Chechen insurgents from legitimate avenues of communication and diplomacy with the Russian government. This policy indicated an end to the Russian government's treatment of the rebellion as a legitimate political force, and as such, reduced the rebellion's ability to have its needs heard, justified, and addressed through traditional political corridors. The removal of negotiations from Russian-rebel relations contributed to rebel territorial losses during the war, loss of economic independence from the destruction of oil refineries, and inability of rebel leaders to represent, voice, and secure the needs of ethnic Chechens in domestic political space" 138 The non-negotiation policy also led rebel groups to pursue non-traditional means of communicating with and overpowering the Russian state. Following Putin's retraction of negotiations, rebels increasingly performed acts of terrorism, hostage taking, and intimidation to gain power 139. Growing use of these methods, further developed state, civilian, and external perceptions of the rebellion as an Islamist extremist movement, versus a separatist movement. External perceptions of the rebellion as a terrorist organization further alienated rebel ability to access negotiations with state and external actors. Virginia Page Fortna (2015) conducted a study that found that rebel groups that utilize terrorism as a tactic produce longer conflicts, but ultimately achieve fewer successes as terrorism alienates groups from external support and resources. 35
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