Investor Presentaiton
45
Yet courts do not jump to invalidate statutes on
constitutional grounds. If "fairly possible," they will
construe a statute "to avoid not only the conclusion that it
is unconstitutional but also grave doubts upon that score."
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 237-38
(1998). Thus, unless "plainly contrary to the intent of
Congress," courts reject constructions that “would raise
serious constitutional problems” even if they are
"otherwise acceptable." Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook
Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 173,
(2001). Even if the lower court's interpretation were
acceptable, it would raise grave doubts about Section 111's
constitutionality because it endorses an improper
delegation of legislative power. The Court should reject it
on this basis, too.
First, the standard. Delegation is constitutional only
through statutes with “specific restrictions” that
"meaningfully constrain[]" agency discretion. Touby v.
United States, 500 U.S. 160, 166-67 (1991). The
Constitution bars Congress from giving "literally no
guidance" or overly vague standards when conferring
agency power. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 474. At a minimum,
Congress must provide “an intelligible principle to which
[the agency] is directed to conform." Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at
2123 (cleaned up); see also id. at 2139-40 (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting) (questioning whether even a few “intelligible
principles" are enough to save an overbroad delegation of
legislative power). Agencies may fill in statutory gaps
with "judgments of degree,” Whitman, 531 U.S. at 475
(cleaned up), but Congress cannot ask them to set "the
criteria against which to measure" their own decisions,
Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2141 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
Policymaking directives must instead be “sufficiently
definite and precise" to know whether the agency staysView entire presentation