Investor Presentaiton
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for criminal enforcement," after all, did not empower the
Attorney General to "declare[] certain conduct criminal"
in the first place. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 262. Neither can
EPA dictate industry shakeups because some of its prior
rules had second-order consequences for electricity
generation.
Fourth, the lower court's interpretation sanctions
regulatory authority over countless new entities. The
CPP asserted for the first time power to regulate source
"owners and operators" directly, rather than identifying
technology and setting standards for individual sources.
JA.543 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1)). Untying Section
111(d) from "the sources themselves" allowed EPA to
appoint itself regulator of the "complex machine" of "the
North American power system." JA.543, 569. And though
the CPP focused on the energy sector, the same move in
the majority's hands now allows EPA to regulate any
producer in any economic sector-or really any building
owner. Yet remember what UARG said: Imposing new
regulatory burdens on "the operation of millions[] of
sources nationwide falls comfortably within the class of
authorizations" the Court has been "reluctant to read into
ambiguous statutory text." 573 U.S. at 324; see also, e.g.,
Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159-60 (rejecting
expanded agency jurisdiction over new “portion[s] of the
American economy"). The CPP's reach alone thus more
than suggests a major question; the D.C. Circuit's reading
confirms it.
The majority again moved too quickly past this factor.
Yes, Section 111(d) has covered existing power plants
before. JA.136, 140-41, 147. But nothing before the CPP
suggested that their owners, or power grids as singular
units, were subject to standards of performance, too. To
view this shift as within "the heart of the EPA's mandate,"View entire presentation