US Sectoral Sanctions slide image

US Sectoral Sanctions

CAATSA / Guidances / Lists (cont'd) CAATSA stiffened existing OFAC Directives 1, 2 and 4 (this is essentially for US persons - see slides 18-20) Directive 1: permissible "new debt" of designated Russian banks was reduced from max. 30 to 14 days Directive 2: permissible new debt of designated Russian energy cos. was reduced from max. 90 to 60 days Directive 4: the prohibition on goods / services / technology involvement in deepwater, Arctic offshore or shale projects was expanded from Russia to worldwide ܀ ܀ but, for outside Russia, applies only to "new" projects (see slide 21 above) if one or more of the designated Russian energy companies has ≥33% ownership or >50% voting interest All of this was then implemented by OFAC amendments of the relevant Directives - see slides 19-26 above Per CAATSA section 223(a), expansion of potential industry coverage of the OFAC sanctions (beyond financial services, energy, engineering / defense-related) - see FAQ 539 to state-owned (i) railway (= RZhD, the Russian State Railway), and (ii) mining & metals companies but shipping industry was left off this expanded list; and nuclear power industry also didn't appear despite previous consideration of including it and even as to railway and mining & metals sectors, the Oct. 2017 OFAC Guidance makes clear that this is only discretionary - no such actual expansion since then to date, and no sign of its coming Requiring review/approval by Congress per CAATSA section 216 – before President can terminate or waive existing sanctions (or grant any non-routine-type license that "significantly alters" foreign policy re Russia) apparently including SDN delistings - such as those of of En+, RUSAL and EuroSibEnergo last year (Congress was notified, and opposition was insufficient to block) Reality check: Despite all the "President shall impose" CAATSA sanctions language (see slides 51-54) to date there has been no case of such imposition on any non-US person save for a few in the cyber-security and defense sectors – i.e., none yet in the purely civilian-economy space (see slides 41-43 above) but notable recent secondary sanctions imposed on non-US persons under Venezuela (two Rosneft oil trading subs.) and Iran (two Chinese entities) sanctions programs (see slides 11-12) Morgan Lewis 50
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