Insurgency Success Factors and Rebel Legitimacy slide image

Insurgency Success Factors and Rebel Legitimacy

crises in 1995 and 1996, and an attempted impeachment of Maskhadov in 1992165. Maskhadov's inability to gain control of economic and political activity in Chechnya, further reduced international support by alienating expectations of benefiting from an independent Chechen oil ,166 economy" A succession of high-profile attacks launched by Chechen insurgents in the late 1990's formally secured the reduction in international support of the Chechen government. In 1998, Chechen insurgents initiated a hostage crisis that resulted in the deaths of four British engineers at the hands of Chechen extremists 167. That following year, Chechen insurgents committed the Moscow apartment bombing, and invasion of Dagestan. The government's inability to secure economic productivity or security led the majority of foreign investors, humanitarian organizations, and diplomats to cease investment, implementation, and economic activity in Chechnya168. International opinions of the Second Chechen War were mixed. In 1999, Russia severely reduced foreign state and institutional access to Chechnya, reducing the international community's involvement in monitoring war crimes and providing humanitarian assistance 169. International support further declined after the September 11th. Following the attacks, Russia framed the Chechen rebellion as part of the greater global trend towards Islamic extremism. Putin attempted to develop relations with the U.S. based on a shared sense of victimization from Islamic extremism¹70. The ideological War on Terror, further alienated the insurgency's legitimacy in the international community due growing fears counterinsurgency activities targeting Islam, terrorism, and the transnational al-Qaeda network, which Chechen insurgents were known to be connected with 17¹. Increasingly brutal attacks launched in retaliation against Russian military brutality during the Second Chechen War seemed to confirm the title 172. From 40 40
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