Investor Presentaiton
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smaller efforts the routine, interstitial work of the
administrative state. See Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v.
Dep't of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 90 (2007). But the Court
"expect[s] Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to assign
to an agency decisions of vast economic and political
significance." UARG, 573 U.S. at 324 (cleaned up).
The reason? Major questions are poor candidates for
agency decision-making. Top-level, political decisions
"should be made by the national legislature, the branch
best equipped by its structure and constituency" to
respond to competing interests and priorities. United
States v. District of Columbia, 669 F.2d 738, 744 (D.C. Cir.
1981). Further, "[a]dministrative knowledge and
experience largely account for the presumption that
Congress delegates interpretive lawmaking power to [an]
agency." Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2417 (2019)
(cleaned up). Major questions, however, implicate
crosscutting matters extending beyond one agency's core
expertise.
The major-questions doctrine therefore responds to
"the danger posed by the growing power of the
administrative state." City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S.
290, 315 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). It rests on “two
overlapping and reinforcing presumptions"-that
Congress "intends to make major policy decisions itself,"
and that Congress should make those choices under a
"separation of powers-based" default against delegating
"major lawmaking authority." U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC,
855 F.3d 381, 419 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). The doctrine
also acts "in service of the constitutional rule that
Congress may not divest itself of its legislative power."
Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2142 (2019)
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting); see also, e.g., William N.View entire presentation