Investor Presentaiton

33 That's not how statutory interpretation works. Courts "construe statutes, not isolated provisions." Graham Cnty. Soil & Water Cons. Dist. v. U.S. ex rel. Wilson, 559 U.S. 280, 290 (2010). Statutory construction "is a holistic endeavor," and only context shows whether a term "may or may not extend to the outer limits of its definitional possibilities." Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 60 (2004); Abuelhawa v. United States, 556 U.S. 816, 819-20 (2009). Courts accordingly do not divorce definitions from the provisions where they operate. Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver Cnty. Emps. Ret. Fund, 138 S. Ct. 1061, 1071 (2018). Indeed, as the Court noted for another environmental law, the importance of reading together "interlocking language and structure of the relevant text" increases with a statute's complexity. Territory of Guam v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1608, 1613 (2021) (CERCLA). The alternative-“[s]licing a statute into phrases while ignoring their contexts"-"is a formula for disaster." Herrmann v. Cencom Cable Assocs., Inc., 978 F.2d 978, 982 (7th Cir. 1992) (Easterbrook, J.). The Court should thus give fidelity to all the words Congress chose and the context where it used them—both immediate and "the broader context of the statute as a whole." UARG, 573 U.S. at 321. When properly read this way, Section 111 gives the lie to "no limits." It describes a process steeped in technological realities and focused on individual, achievable performance metrics. It does not empower EPA to regulate across industries, force shutdowns, or manage the nation's electricity supply. A. Section 111(a)(1) Reveals A Source-Specific Focus. Although the lower court was wrong to end with the definition of "standard of performance," that definition is

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