Investor Presentaiton
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violations" if they failed to fill them in. JA.1148; 40 C.F.R.
§§ 60.5745(a)(7), 60.5780(a)(5)(iii) (2015). And, of course,
the concrete task of building up EPA's preferred
generation sources would have required immense state
investment. Consequences like these are a significant
affront to state sovereignty-if not outright
commandeering. See, e.g., Nat'l Fed. of Indep. Business
v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2602 (2012) ("forc[ing] the
States to implement a federal program" threatens vital
"political accountability").
The lower court dismissed these impositions by
suggesting that the CPP "merely ... alter[ed] consumers'
incentives." EPSA, 577 U.S. at 284 (cited at JA.156). Yet
the CPP's entire purpose was to force grid-wide changes
through standards custom-made for that goal-
generation shifting was not an incidental effect of the
CPP, but the key variable in its "adjusted CO2 emission
rate." JA.1605.
The lower court also supposed that the CPP gave
States flexibility in how to hit the CPP's targets. JA.159-
60. This response forgets, though, that the targets were
reverse-engineered to be "unachievable or too costly to
meet" without shifting generation. JA.223; see also
JA.890, 928-29, 966-67. EPA calculated how much change
it thought the grids could tolerate without collapsing and
set standards accordingly. JA.993-1008. Because of that
uncompromising approach, EPA admitted that every
purported "choice" led back to implementing the CPP's
mandate. JA.579-80 (recognizing that States would "need
to" replace some forms of generation with others). States
would have had to "ensure" that any alternate program
incorporated the CPP's "relative incentives," which
advanced EPA's goals of shuttering fossil-fuel-fired plants
and promoting other generators. JA.1008-14. ThoseView entire presentation