Investor Presentaiton
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Section 111 thus differs from parts of the CAA less
concerned with source-specific operations. The majority
stressed that Section 111(a)(1) does not read like other
parts of the CAA that discuss "retrofit application[s]" or
"retrofit technology." JA.120 (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7651f(b)(2), 7491(b)(2)(A), (g)(2)). But retrofits are for
existing buildings. It would be odd to see similar language
in a definition that applies when regulating new
construction, too. In reality, Congress designed Section
111 "exactly like other performance-based limits found
throughout the environmental laws," as it "clearly
contemplates individualized, performance-based
standards." Lisa Heinzerling & Rena I. Steinzor, A
Perfect Storm: Mercury and the Bush Administration, 34
ENV'TL L. REP. 10,297, 10,309 (2004). Its standards of
performance focus on "pollution control devices." Union
Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 257 (1976). Lagging
facilities must "install new control equipment." Nat'l-
Southwire Aluminum Co. v. EPA, 838 F.2d 835, 841 (6th
Cir. 1988). And emission limits must be "to the fullest
extent compatible with the available technology and
economic feasibility." H.R. REP. No. 1146, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess., at 10, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5356, 5365 (emphasis added).
The lower court's contrary construction flowed from an
unduly expansive view of the CAA's purposes. Though the
Act advances the important goal of improving air quality,
JA.129-30, that purpose is nuanced. The lower court
elided, for instance, Congress' statutory finding that
States and localities bear "primary responsibility" for
preventing and controlling air pollution. 42 U.S.C.
§ 7401(a)(3). It also minimized the many ways the CAA
balances environmental remediation with "the allowance
of reasonable economic growth." Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863 (1984).View entire presentation