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Investor Presentaiton

43 Section 111 thus differs from parts of the CAA less concerned with source-specific operations. The majority stressed that Section 111(a)(1) does not read like other parts of the CAA that discuss "retrofit application[s]" or "retrofit technology." JA.120 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651f(b)(2), 7491(b)(2)(A), (g)(2)). But retrofits are for existing buildings. It would be odd to see similar language in a definition that applies when regulating new construction, too. In reality, Congress designed Section 111 "exactly like other performance-based limits found throughout the environmental laws," as it "clearly contemplates individualized, performance-based standards." Lisa Heinzerling & Rena I. Steinzor, A Perfect Storm: Mercury and the Bush Administration, 34 ENV'TL L. REP. 10,297, 10,309 (2004). Its standards of performance focus on "pollution control devices." Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 257 (1976). Lagging facilities must "install new control equipment." Nat'l- Southwire Aluminum Co. v. EPA, 838 F.2d 835, 841 (6th Cir. 1988). And emission limits must be "to the fullest extent compatible with the available technology and economic feasibility." H.R. REP. No. 1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., at 10, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5356, 5365 (emphasis added). The lower court's contrary construction flowed from an unduly expansive view of the CAA's purposes. Though the Act advances the important goal of improving air quality, JA.129-30, that purpose is nuanced. The lower court elided, for instance, Congress' statutory finding that States and localities bear "primary responsibility" for preventing and controlling air pollution. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(3). It also minimized the many ways the CAA balances environmental remediation with "the allowance of reasonable economic growth." Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863 (1984).
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