Insurgency Success Factors and Rebel Legitimacy slide image

Insurgency Success Factors and Rebel Legitimacy

economic and infrastructure damage. By the end, civilian and soldier casualties nearly doubled, as did displacement, and destruction of property. The Russian military had effectively destroyed what was left of Grozny's infrastructure and Chechen oil refineries, incapacitating independent economic productivity in Chechnya³ 303 Fearon (2000) argues that insurgency's main goal is survival, that military action is the staunchest way to secure this goal, and that when in survival mode this goal will come before all else, including protection of civilians and provision of services. From 2000 to 2007, the Chechen insurgency appears very much to be in survival mode. The insurgency not only failed to provide services to Chechen populations, but appears to have ceased trying to provide them. The bulk of the insurgency's resources after 2000 consisted of weapons procurement, mainly through extremist networks304, further delegitimating perceptions of the insurgency to actively create and manage a political system. The lack of rebel focus and ability to provide basic services to civilian populations and establish control of governance further reduced rebel legitimacy amongst civilians. The group's failure to support civilian protection, livelihoods, and interests discouraged civilian support to the rebellion. By 2002, Russian forces had re-gained control of military bases and government administration buildings in Chechnya 305. Control of these buildings reinstated Russian control of Chechen political space. Without formal structures, the insurgency found itself removed from the means through which to provide programs, services, or goods to the Chechen population ³06. Russia's insertion of Kadyrov to power further reduced the power and control of the rebellion in official political space. Kadyrov allowed Russia to funnel financial, economic, and infrastructure support to Chechnya, while maintaining control of political affairs 307. The insertion of Kadyrov challenged de facto legitimacy, as he presented an alternate option for domestic and external 62 62
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