Investor Presentaiton

29 "interstate air pollution is not an area of traditional state regulation." JA.156. That broad-brush notion suggests that an agency need only invoke a traditional federal interest to erase a traditional state interest. But Congress always has some federal interest in mind when it delegates to an agency. Particularly when Congress went out of its way to reinforce the States' roles in the CAA, there is vanishingly little basis to assume it authorized this agency mission creep. 3. With no clear statement in sight, the CPP and the decision below significantly upend the federal-state balance of power. The CPP handicapped States by taking away even Section 111's express avenues for tailoring. First, it required stringent, region-wide emission reductions that state plans could meet only by restructuring. See JA.578- 79, 705. Second, despite Section 111(d)'s guarantee that EPA "shall permit” States to consider “remaining useful life" and similar factors, EPA decreed that "consideration of facility-specific factors" would not have justified "further adjustments to [sources'] performance rates." JA.1237. Both elements are far from FERC's "notable solicitude toward the States" in the form of "veto power" over issues States worried skirted too close to their core powers. EPSA, 577 U.S. at 287. The CPP's follow-on consequences would have been worse. States would have had to account for EPA's judgments touching on electricity reliability. They would have needed to reorder their regulatory regimes to allow new ways to dispatch electricity-moving fossil-fuel-fired sources from the front of the pack to the back. The agency also knew the CPP would create generation gaps, and it expected state regulators to make non-fossil-fuel generators "responsible for compliance and liable for

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