Investor Presentaiton
Raising the Stakes in Jammu and Kashmir
Crisis Group Asia Report N°310, 5 August 2020
Page 4
ent Kashmir or a merger with Pakistan, these measures initially satisfied more mod-
erate Kashmiri political opinion and mainstream (pro-India) parties.⁹
The Indian government, however, quickly started chipping away at the regional
authorities' constitutional powers in order to assert its control. The regional bureau-
cracy was controlled by non-locals, and pro-India state governments made several
pieces of national legislation applicable to Jammu and Kashmir.10 New Delhi's grad-
ual erosion of the region's special constitutional status steadily deepened local aliena-
tion." The Indian government's growing interference in the state's electoral process,
combined with the forcible suppression of dissent and denial of civil liberties, sparked
widespread unrest following the gravely rigged state elections of March 1987.12 Indi-
an authorities jailed most of the candidates from the opposition separatist party Mus-
lim United Front, along with many party workers. In the following years, these pris-
oners came out of jail convinced that India would never allow those critical of its rule
to make their way to positions of power through the electoral process. Many soon
picked up weapons, marking the birth of Kashmir's insurgency, which Pakistan would
soon support. ¹³
Founded in 1989, the secular Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), which
supported the creation of an independent, unified Kashmir, dominated the first phase
of militancy. 14 At first, Pakistan supported it financially and logistically, including by
providing military training. But as more armed groups emerged, Islamabad's sup-
port soon shifted to Kashmiri outfits that backed a merger with Pakistan. Among the
most prominent of these groups was Hizbul Mujahideen, which today remains the
longest-surviving homegrown militant outfit, and one of the most active. 15
From the mid-1990s onward, Islamabad tightened its control over militancy by
creating Pakistan-based jihadist proxies, which exploited the infighting between pro-
independence and pro-Pakistani Kashmiri militants. Harkatul Mujahideen and Lash-
kar-e-Tayyaba were among these chosen proxies; Jaish-e-Mohammed joined their
ranks after it was founded in 2000.16 The emergence of these battle-hardened groups,
10
9 In Kashmir, mainstream parties are those that participate in local elections, thereby recognising
Jammu and Kashmir as an integral part of India. They are also known as "pro-India" parties.
Since 1954, only six of the 30 chief secretaries - the highest-ranking administrative official in the
state - have been local Muslims, and by August 2019, more than 260 articles of the Indian constitu-
tion had been applied to Jammu and Kashmir. Hilal Mir, "Past, present of Kashmiri disempower-
ment", Anadolu Agency, 24 November 2019; "Neither abrogated nor removed: the ploy behind cen-
tre's 370 move", The Wire, 28 August 2019.
Crisis Group Report, Learning from History, op. cit.
12 Crisis Group Reports, The View from Srinagar; The View from New Delhi, both op. cit. See also
Kristoffel Lieten, "Jammu and Kashmir: Half a Century of Conflict" in Monique Mekenkamp, Paul
van Tongeren and Hans van de Veen (eds.), Searching for Peace in Central and South Asia (Boul-
der, 2003).
13 Crisis Group Report, The View from Islamabad, op. cit.
14 Headed by Yasin Malik, the JKLF disbanded its militant wing in 1994 and opted for non-violent
resistance. Crisis Group Reports, Learning from History; The View from Srinagar; Confrontation
and Miscalculation, all op. cit.
15 Crisis Group Report, The View from Srinagar, op. cit. Also Steve Coll, "The back channel", The
New Yorker, 2 January 2009.
16 Jaish-e-Mohammed was founded by Masood Azhar after he was released by India in 1999 in ex-
change for passengers of an Indian aircraft hijacked in Afghanistan. Fazlur Rehman Khalil's Harka-View entire presentation