Investor Presentaiton
Raising the Stakes in Jammu and Kashmir
Crisis Group Asia Report N°310, 5 August 2020
Page 30
ence is fuelling hatred of Indian rule. In this regard, allowing the local press to func-
tion normally, as elsewhere in the country, and resuming regular mobile internet
connectivity would contribute to lowering the present level of resentment. The
recent spike in militancy-related incidents proves the government's justification for
the internet ban - to lessen the risk of "coordinating acts of terror" - is flawed. 161
Kashmiris, particularly the youth, perceive it as unfair collective punishment.
B.
Resuming Dialogue with Pakistan and Track II Initiatives
The lack of direct communication channels between Indian and Pakistani leaders,
and their countries' military confrontation along Kashmir's Line of Control, inevita-
bly increases dangers of an unintended escalation. External actors should push for
rapprochement before it is too late. Given the present level of animosity, resuming bi-
lateral dialogue, suspended since 2016, will necessitate concerted action, particularly
from Western capitals. The task will not be easy. Leaders on both sides are playing to
uncompromising constituencies. New Delhi refuses to even contemplate re-engaging
with Islamabad until it takes credible action against anti-India jihadists operating
from its soil. International actors who have some influence in Pakistan, particularly
the U.S., will need to exert pressure for it to do so. The FATF remains, thus far, the
channel most likely to yield results: for economic reasons, and to maintain its diplo-
matic credibility, Pakistan could ill afford to appear on the terrorist financing watch-
dog's black list. 162 Still, Islamabad's track record suggests that even with such pressure,
compelling it to entirely withdraw support for jihadist groups is likely to be a hard slog.
Despite India's legitimate concerns about the infiltration of jihadists from across
the border, resuming dialogue with Pakistan is in its interest. As a senior New Delhi-
based security analyst noted, efforts to deal with the Kashmir conflict through military
means are "counterproductive because of the considerable allocation of expenditure
and manpower, and because that approach has failed to contain militancy”. 163 If New
Delhi is uncomfortable with engaging publicly for domestic reasons, it could revive
more discreet communication channels, which would no doubt prove useful in case
of a terrorist attack in Kashmir or major incident on the Line of Control.
Until such time that both countries are willing to engage, New Delhi and Islama-
bad should reduce risks by respecting the 2003 ceasefire along Kashmir's Line of
Control. Frequent skirmishes have claimed scores of lives, both military and civilian,
displaced families, and destroyed livelihoods in the bordering regions. A quiet bor-
der would, in that sense, also alleviate Kashmiri grievances. New Delhi and Islama-
bad should also revive earlier confidence-building measures such as resuming travel
161 ❝Indian government 2G restrictions in Kashmir fail to curb online criticism", Atlantic Council, 25
May 2020.
162 Officially known as “High Risk Jurisdictions Subject to a Call for Action", the black list is intend-
ed to warn investors and banks of the high risk of money laundering and terror financing involved
in dealing with countries listed, thereby depriving them of funds but also hurting their international
reputation. Pakistan is presently on the FATF grey list, and the International Monetary Fund has
warned that its blacklisting could result in a freeze of capital flows and slow progress in refinancing/
re-profiling of loans from major bilateral creditors. Only two countries are presently on the black
list: Iran and North Korea.
163 Crisis Group interview, New Delhi, June 2019.View entire presentation