Investor Presentation

|||||BRINKS HOME Brinks Home Strategy Changes Under New Management (cont'd) New Management has led to clear improvements in core KPI's and the Company's financial strength EOP subscribers & RMR 'Old Brinks' (1) Management chased growth with escalated creation multiples resulting in poor unit economics Attrition elevated due to low liquidity and limited retention investment RMR relatively consistent under previous and new Management, highlighting the stability of the industry 'New Brinks'(2) Focus on Profitable growth ■ Scaling customer additions through both Dealer and DTC channels Used bulk strategy and AT&T leads to build a bridge as customer additions scale ARPU ■ Dealer ARPU higher than Direct to Consumer due to professional installation and equipment subsidization Direct to Consumer ARPU in mid $30's as prior management was focused on DIY rather than professional installation. Without a holistic consumer financing option customers purchase smaller equipment packages at lower ARPU's Overpaying for dealer generated subscribers with creation multiples averaging 36x+ leading up to filing Creation multiples DTC creation multiples elevated due to poor lead conversion ■ " ■ New contracted multiples incent higher dealer ARPU Re-focused DTC package on professional installation (ARPU > $45 more recently) and offering non-recourse, subsidized 0% financing which has translated into materially higher average ticket prices (north of $900 in the most recent month) Substantial upside for ARPU and ticket size as consumer financing adoption grows Negotiated an up to 6x reduction to the largest dealer accounts comprising ~50% of the channel volume Expected to reduce Dealer multiple for these accounts into the mid-32x's, to be fully implemented by Q1'22 - Each 1x of creation multiple reduction results in ~100bps of IRR improvement While DTC Channel is still scaling, Management's clear vision and improved internal sales metrics expected to result in lower creation multiples for the channel Attrition RMR and core unit attrition topped out at ~17-18% as prior Management lacked discipline when acquiring accounts and didn't utilize technology effectively to predict accounts at risk Balance sheet Over levered the balance sheet with $1.8bn+ in debt by pursuing an aggressive account acquisition strategy Gross debt / Adj. EBITDA leverage of 6.3x and Total debt/ RMR of 43.5x at the end of 2018 1: Q2 2019 unless noted otherwise 2: Q3 2021 unless noted otherwise ■ RMR and core unit attrition have both been reduced over 300bps to ~13-14% under new Management team - A new account often has 15-20% IRR while an extended account has 40%+ IRR's so meaningful impact to the bottom line More disciplined account acquisition strategy that has been focused on small upfront payments, risk sharing and not overburdening the Company's balance sheet Gross debt / Adj. EBITDA leverage of 4.5x and Total debt/ RMR of 26.1x at the end of Q3'21 12 22

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