Investor Presentaiton

Raising the Stakes in Jammu and Kashmir Crisis Group Asia Report N°310, 5 August 2020 Page ii India's August 2019 decision is enabling a variety of armed groups, local and foreign, to recruit more young Kashmiris. Although most Kashmiris still aspire to independ- ence, many locals now support any militants they consider capable of confronting Indian security forces, including pro-Pakistan and Islamist groups. Over the last months, militancy-related incidents have steadily increased, giving the lie to the Indi- an government's claims that its moves would reduce violence in the Himalayan region. Although for now little suggests it will rethink its approach to Kashmir, the BJP government could act to calm tensions. Restoring the region's statehood, a prospect to which the Modi government has said it is open, would help. For now, it should also release politicians still in detention and allow political activity to resume; the jailing of even pro-India leaders threatens to leave New Delhi bereft of local allies. New Del- hi should also take steps to curb abuses by security forces; heavy-handed measures fuel resentment of Indian rule and push more youth toward militancy. Emboldened by the political hegemony it presently enjoys in India, and driven by a Hindu nation- alist ideology, the BJP seems uninclined to walk back its Kashmir policy. Still, its in- ternational partners should do their utmost to highlight that the present approach will sow the seeds of long-term instability and harm India's international standing. New Delhi's actions have also heightened tensions with Pakistan. Islamabad char- acterises the Indian government's moves in Kashmir as illegal and inhumane, while New Delhi accuses its neighbour of supporting, if not orchestrating, cross-border terrorism. Concerned to deflect pressure over its fostering of terrorist groups, Paki- stan's reaction has largely been limited to attempts at rallying international opinion against India's August 2019 moves. But homegrown Kashmiri militants, with or with- out links to Pakistani groups, do not necessarily rely on orders from across the bor- der. The suicide bomber behind the February 2019 Pulwama attack, which killed scores of Indian security personnel and triggered the last escalation between the two countries, was a local claiming allegiance to Jaish-e-Mohammed. Should local mili- tants launch another such assault on Indian security forces, India will almost cer- tainly blame Pakistan and its militant proxies, increasing the risks of confrontation. The absence of dialogue between the two countries since New Delhi attributed another attack to Pakistan-based jihadist groups in 2016 heightens risks. India refuses to re-engage its neighbour until Islamabad takes tangible measures against jihadists operating in Kashmir from its territory. Given its track record of supporting such groups over the last three decades, this is unlikely to happen without sustained in- ternational pressure; even then, persuading Islamabad will be a hard slog. Yet, even in the present circumstances, India and Pakistan have much to gain from lowering risks of escalation on the border. Both should at a minimum abide by the ceasefire they agreed to in 2003 along Kashmir's Line of Control that divides the disputed ter- ritory into one zone administered by New Delhi and another by Islamabad. Until the top leadership of both countries reopen direct lines of communication, Track II initi- atives and people-to-people contacts could help build trust. Srinagar/Brussels, 5 August 2020

View entire presentation