Insurgency Success Factors and Rebel Legitimacy
The increasing interdependence between the Chechen insurgency and al-Qaeda affiliates
contributed to the Chechen black market becoming a trafficking hub for Afghan trafficking and
poppy trade 203
Greater legitimacy amongst al-Qaeda affiliates opened avenues for rebel actors to profit
from al-Qaeda criminal and poppy networks, increased affiliation with these networks further
alienated international perceptions of the rebellion a legitimate political entity 204. As the
government, insurgency, and crime became increasingly intertwined, differentiation between
legitimate political actors and criminals became blurred. Efforts to provide foreign diplomacy
and assistance to Chechnya became increasingly challenging, as the politicians and leaders in
Chechen political space were increasingly associated with criminal networks and activity 205. By
the start of the Second Chechen War, Russia had become a more appealing ally, through which
foreign assistance and diplomacy could be channeled 206. Increasing reliance on Russian over the
de facto government to manage economic and political matters in Chechnya, signaled a reduction
in external perceptions of rebel legitimacy. Ultimately, this shift contributed to a distancing of
external material support and diplomacy with the de facto government, in favor of Russia.
Delegitimization of the rebellion was further confirmed by earmarking of foreign
assistance for terrorism from 2003-2007. During this time, Russia welcomed a stream of foreign
assistance for Chechnya 207. The bulk of this assistance was earmarked as part of a greater “hearts
and minds" campaign to help Russia combat its growing “Chechen terrorist problem”208. The
targeted nature of this assistance had several key effects on shifting legitimacy in the Chechen
insurgency. First, the provision and negotiation of funds with the Russian Federation clearly
identified the international community's recognition of Russia as the legitimate ruler of
Chechnya. Second, the targeting of the assistance as part of a "hearts and minds campaign"
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