Investor Presentaiton

195 and accuracy of decisions and ensuring independence and impartiality of adjudicators.2 224 However, this solution is also the most difficult to implement as it would require a complete overhaul of the current regime through a coordinated action by a large number of States. At the same time, the consensus would not need to be universal. A standing investment court may well start as a plurilateral initiative, with an opt-in mechanism for those States that will wish to join. Finally, it is questionable whether a new court would be fit for a fragmented regime that consists of a huge number of mostly bilateral IIAs. It has been argued that this option would work best in a system with a unified body of applicable law. 225 Nonetheless, even if the current diversity of IIAs is preserved, a standing investment court would likely be much more consistent and coherent in its approach to the interpretation and application of treaty norms, compared with numerous ad hoc tribunals. C. Promoting alternative dispute resolution and dispute prevention policies Conventional wisdom suggests that the best way to resolve a dispute is to avoid it altogether or resolve it at an early stage. In this respect, an increased resort to so-called alternative dispute resolution (ADR) methods and dispute prevention policies (DPPs) may be beneficial. ADR and DPPs can be either enshrined in IIAS or implemented at the domestic level, without any specific references in the IIA. 224 A system where judges are assigned to each case, as opposed to being appointed by the disputing parties, would also save significant resources currently spent on researching arbitrator profiles. 225 An obvious analogy is the European Court of Human Rights, which adjudicates claims brought under the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. UNCTAD Series on International Investment Agreements II

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