Insurgency Success Factors and Rebel Legitimacy

The ability to mobilize goods, services, and programs presented one of the Chechen rebels greatest weaknesses. By the end of the First Chechen War, and rise of Maskhadov to power, the failure of the de facto government to control basic services significantly reduced their legitimacy amongst domestic and external actors 290. The removal of Russian military forces and administration from Chechnya in 1991, awarded the rebellion with a wealth of resources procured from Soviet facilities and infrastructure. The de facto government built a military from volunteers and captured military bases. The Chechen administration filled Soviet-Chechen administrative buildings in Grozny. The Chechen economy remained dependent on Soviet built oil refineries that continued production outside of Grozny291 In many ways, Dudayev and the Republic of Ichkeria inherited an uncontrollable system. Soviet rule left Chechen systems weak, corrupt, and unkempt 292. However, in gaining positioning to control these systems, Dudayev securely inserted the rebellion into official Chechen political space. With access to political space came a responsibility to control governance in Chechnya, especially in the absence of Russian administration and governance 293. The Chechen population initially believed the existence of an independent Chechen state would improve civilian life, political representation, and economic productivity 294. The hope for a better life encouraged many to support the cause through voting, military service, and resource contributions. These beliefs contributed to legitimacy of Dudayev and his administration's early initiatives to control Chechen resources and governance, despite severe challenges and ineffectual governments in early years. Similarly, the de facto government's assuming ability to mobilize goods encouraged legitimacy amongst foreign states that the government could effectively maintain political and economic control and management. Such activity fostered perceptions of the de facto government as a viable alternative to Russia in managing oil production out of Chechnya, and 60 60

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