#1Central Bank of Sri Lanka Ministry of Finance, Economic Stabilization & National Policies Investor Presentation - 23 September 2022#2Disclaimer IMPORTANT: The attached presentation has been prepared solely for information purposes and on the basis of your acceptance of this disclaimer. This document and the information contained herein (the "Information"), do not contain all of the information that is material to a creditor of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (the "Republic") and has no regard to the specific objectives, financial situation or particular needs of any recipient. By accessing and/or using this presentation, you agree to be bound by the following limitations and conditions and, in particular, will be taken to have represented, warranted and undertaken that you have read and agree to comply with the contents of this disclaimer. 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Nandalal Weerasinghe Governor of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka Mr. KM Mahinda Siriwardana Secretary to the Treasury and Ministry of Finance Any questions during this presentation may be submitted directly through the platform's Q&A chat box#4I. SRI LANKA IS GOING THROUGH A SOCIO-ECONOMIC CRISIS UNLIKE ANY OTHER IN ITS HISTORY#5Some past policy mistakes, the global COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting global crisis have stunted Sri Lanka's growth projections, leaving the country exposed to the consequences of the energy and food crisis The COVID-19 pandemic jeopardized the key engines of the country's economic growth, including domestic demand and the tourism sector, the awaited rebound was further halted by the subsequent energy and food crisis Yearly Real GDP Growth' In % y.o.y change Earnings from Tourism |(0.2%) 2019A I (3.5%) In USDm 4,000 3,682 -81% reduction 4.3% 3.5% 3.3% 3.3% 3,000 2,000 Covid-19 impact Economic crisis impact 2020A Real GDP Growth IMF World Economic Outlook 2021 2021P I 1,000 (8.7%) 2022F IMF World Economic Outlook 2019 • 0 Average 2015-19 893 682 507 2020 2021 Jan-Aug 2022 As the COVID-19 pandemic had an immediate impact on travel, Sri Lanka's tourism earnings, a key strength of the country, declined by over 80% in 2020, and have not recovered since ▸ The energy crisis has further exacerbated the difficulties Sri Lanka has been facing since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic and resulting economic shock, hampering the recovery of some key sectors while affecting local production and consumption through record-high energy prices and shortages of basic goods Sources: Central Bank of Sri Lanka, IMF Note: (1) Actual GDP data for 2019, 2020 and 2021 are based on rebased GDP estimates (100-2015)#6The severe economic downturn, weak Sri Lanka's revenues, rising health expenditure and energy needs led to a worsening of the fiscal situation While the decline in growth partly led to shrinking revenues, Sri Lanka had to increase spending to safeguard its population from a double pronged health and energy crisis Primary balance, revenues¹ and expenditures In LKRbn (Revenue and Expenditures, on left-hand axis) and in % of GDP (Primary balance) 1500 0.6% (500) (2500) (4500) 2018A (3.4%) (4.0%)² (4.3%) (5.7%) Over 2020 and 2021, Sri Lanka faced increasing expenditure needs, resulting from the need to finance its vaccination program, provide assistance to low-income citizens impacted by lockdowns and the general provision of healthcare facilities and medical equipment In 2022, the rise in global energy prices has derailed the country's expected recovery and further deteriorated public finances, as the Government had to intervene to protect its citizens from sky-high energy and food prices 2019A Revenue and Grants (LKRbn) 2020A 2021A Expenditures (LKRbn) 2022P Primary balance (%GDP) ▸ Sri Lanka's primary deficit widened in 2020 on the back of the unprecedented COVID shock and the necessary rise in public health spending. Primary balance is expected to remain in negative territory this year as the Government is obliged to assist its population confront the scarcity of energy resources and food supplies Sources: Central Bank of Sri Lanka, IMF Notes: (1) Including grants, (2) 2022 expected primary balance figure is already reflective of policies committed (or already implemented) as part of the IMF-supported program#7Amidst adverse external funding conditions, Sri Lanka had to rely on domestic financing As the COVID-19 induced global economic downturn led to a significant fall in the price of Sri Lanka's International Sovereign Bonds ("ISBS") and to the loss of international market access, the Government had to rely mostly on domestic financing Price evolution of Sri Lanka's selected ISBS In % of nominal value Sri Lanka's Government foreign versus domestic financing¹ In LKRbn 2,500 2,000 100 2,072 June 2021-June 2022 comparison 1,500 1,751 896 1,000 80 500 437 947 759 543 324 60 (83) 21 60 (500) 33.7 2018A 2019A 2020A 40 40 29.6 Foreign Financing (14) 2021P 2021P June 2022P June Domestic Financing (44) 28.3 CBSL net credit to Government² 20 28.2 Outstanding amount, in LKRbn Jan-18 Jul-18 Jan-19 Jul-19 Jan-20 Jul-20 Jan-21 Jul-21 Jan-22 Jul-22 Sri Lanka 2022 USD 1bn 5.875% Sri Lanka 2025 USD 1.5bn 6.85% Sri Lanka 2027 USD 1.5bn 6.2% Sri Lanka 2030 USD 1.5bn 7.55% As at end 2018 2019 2020 2021 473.1 363.5 870.3 2,095.5 Sources: Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Ministry of Finance, Economic Stabilization and National Policies, Bloomberg Note: (1) The chart shows net foreign and net domestic financing, (2) The chart shows outstanding stock figures as at year end#86 420 Jan-20 Foreign exchange reserves in USDm, yearly FX debt service in % of reserves as at end of previous year¹ 10 70% 8 Sri Lanka Central Government's foreign currency yearly debt service in % of Gross Official Reserves as at end-2019, end-2020 and end-2021 May-20 Consequently, foreign reserves were depleted to preserve citizens' access to basic needs and to service foreign debt obligations As the energy crisis reinforced the need for foreign currency to finance fundamental imports, the scarcity of available funding sources triggered the depletion of foreign reserves and the collapse of the Sri Lankan Rupee, hence fueling rising inflation Foreign exchange reserves and debt service payments CCPI Inflation In y-o-y change and in annual average Sep-20 98% 139% 0% 20% Jan-20 40% 60% May-20 PBOC swap CCPI based Headline Inflation (Y-o-Y) CCPI based Headline Inflation (Annual Avg.) The decline in foreign reserves hampered Sri Lanka's ability to mitigate the effects of the crisis through the subsidization of imports, whilst its currency was steadily losing value on the back of ever-increasing inflation- leading to adverse conditions for all Sri Lankan people, in particular the poor and vulnerable Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka Note: (1) The debt service showcased is the Central Government foreign currency debt service for the entire year as percentage of Gross Official Reserves as at end-2019, end-2020 and end-2021 respectively. 2022 Central Government foreign currency debt service is calculated at end-2021 Sep-20 Jan-21 May-21 6 +58p.p. in the last year 28% 64%#9II. FOLLOWING THE CRISIS, SRI LANKA HAS EMBARKED ON AN ACTION PLAN TO ADDRESS THE DIFFICULTIES IT FACES#10As its economic crisis worsened, Sri Lanka had to declare a moratorium on its external public debt As FX debt service payments became unfeasible in view of dire shortfalls in basic needs, the Authorities announced on 12 April 2022 an Interim Debt Policy to address this situation, whereby Sri Lanka suspended the servicing of affected external public debt obligations USD amounts safeguarded by the Interim Debt Policy In USDm, from 12 April 2022 to 30 June 2022 Focus on SLDBs' treatment during the Interim Debt Policy In USDm, Debt service on SLDBS, 12 April 2022 - 30 June 2022 Category Type of Safeguarded amounts of debt debt Interest Principal Total² Paid in USD USDM USDM USDM % of FX reserves4 % of import of essential Paid in LKR 96 goods5 Refinanced³ Local Law CG 25 217 242 13.3% 5.5% Pending Settlements CG 290 185 476 26.2% 10.8% Foreign Law SOES¹ 3 38 41 2.3% 0.9% Total debt service TOTAL 319 440 759 41.8% 17.3% 58 The Authorities have ensured that the ad-hoc treatment of SLDBs has not depleted FX reserves further 397 242 ▸ The Interim Debt Policy allowed to alleviate external liquidity pressure, giving some time for the country to engage with the IMF Sources: Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Ministry of Finance, Economic Stabilization and National Policies Notes: (1) Guaranteed SOEs' debt, (2) All saving figures displayed are indicative and subject to changes further to the ongoing reconciliation exercise, (3) Maturities were extended through a refinancing of the outstanding instruments (4) Gross Official Reserves as at end July 2022 (USD 1,817m), including the swap from PBOC, (5) Jan-July 2022 total Import of essential goods was equivalent to USD 4.4bn 8#11Even faced with a complicated outlook, Sri Lanka took immediate measures to achieve a certain degree of normalcy with support from international partners... Immediately after the announcement on the moratorium, the Government and the Central Bank took the necessary steps to contain the economic impact of the foreign exchange crisis and assist the population, while obtaining some fundamental help from key partners The Government and the Central Bank did not hesitate to undertake key measures to come to the aid of the local population, including energy and living costs reductions: ○ The Government implemented measures to alleviate pressure on the most vulnerable citizens, including imposing price ceilings on essential food items, smoothing out the distribution of limited fuel stocks, cancelling farmer loans and distributing cash grants to the poor and vulnerable The Central Bank reacted swiftly to rising prices, hiking the key policy rates by 700bps in the April monetary policy meeting followed by a further tightening of 100bps in July 2022 О Sri Lanka received key financial and humanitarian aid from international partners, including (but not limited to): Immediate financial aid in the form of fuel lifelines to the Government, and swap lines signed with the Central Bank Loans, grants and humanitarian assistance focused on food, fuel and fertilizer provision, originating from key partners ▸ Even in a highly complicated outlook, the authorities were able to react quickly by announcing and implementing key fiscal reforms while reaching out to key partners for immediate and urgent help Sources: Ministry of Finance, Economic Stabilization and National Policies, Central Bank of Sri Lanka 9#12... and simultaneously adopted a first batch of fiscal reforms that will be complemented by new measures implemented towards the 2023 budget The Government took courageous measures to restore public finance sustainability, relying on a balanced mix between revenue enhancement, expenditure rationalization and measures minimizing fiscal risks from SOES Revenue-enhancement Increasing tax rates (Personal Income Tax (PIT), Corporate Income Tax (CIT), Value Added Tax (VAT), Telecommunication Levy and Betting and Gaming Levy) <> Broadening tax bases (PIT and VAT) Removing tax exemptions (CIT, VAT) Increasing tax compliance through strengthening tax administration |日日日 Expenditure-rationalization Better targeted allocation of resources focusing on the most vulnerable segments of the economy Minimizing fiscal risks from SOEs e.g., cost-recovery based pricing for fuel and electricity (significant increases already implemented) Sources: Ministry of Finance, Economic Stabilization and National Policies, Central Bank of Sri Lanka 10#13Showing their commitment to reform, the Authorities achieved a Staff-Level Agreement ("SLA") with the IMF in record time The SLA provides a clear roadmap in terms of policy implementation and will serve as an anchor for the economic recovery On September 1st, after months of negotiations and in a major step towards addressing the country's ongoing crisis, the Sri Lankan Authorities reached a Staff-level Agreement with the IMF Staff on a set of comprehensive economic policies supported by a 4-year US$2.9 billion Extended Fund Facility The objectives of the contemplated IMF program are: ○ An ambitious primarily revenue-based fiscal consolidation, accompanied by fiscal institutional reforms and cost-recovery based energy pricing, aimed at restoring fiscal sustainability and strengthening fiscal discipline О A stronger social safety net to protect the most vulnerable O O О A public debt management strategy aimed at restoring public debt sustainability A multipronged strategy to restore price stability and rebuild international reserves under greater exchange rate flexibility Commitment to greater central bank independence and to phase out monetary financing O Policies to safeguard financial system stability О Focused reforms to address governance and corruption vulnerabilities Broader structural reforms to unlock Sri Lanka's growth potential The agreement is subject to the approval of the IMF management and its Executive Board, after the timely implementation by the Authorities of a set of Prior Actions and the provision by official creditors of assurances to assist Sri Lanka in restoring public debt sustainability Sources: Ministry of Finance, Economic Stabilization and National Policies, Central Bank of Sri Lanka, IMF#14Showing their commitment to reform, the Authorities achieved a Staff-Level Agreement with the IMF in record time (Cont'd) The focus of the IMF program will be to restore macroeconomic stability and public debt sustainability, while safeguarding financial system stability, protecting the vulnerable, and stepping up structural reforms to address corruption vulnerabilities and unlock Sri Lanka's growth potential Real Growth Trajectory In %, YoY change Inflation¹ Path In %, YoY change 2.6% 3.0% 3.1% 1.5% 48.2% 2022E 2023E 2024F 2025F 2026F 2027F (8.7%) (3.0%) Primary Balance In % of GDP 29.5% 6.0% 5.9% 5.2% 5.0% 2022E 2023E 2024F 2025F 2026F 2027F Current Account In % of GDP 2.3% 2.3% 2.3% 0.8% 2022E 2023E 2024F 2025F 2026F 2027F 2022E 2023E 2024F 2025F 2026F 2027F (4.0%) (0.7%) Sources: Ministry of Finance, Economic Stabilization and National Policies, Central Bank of Sri Lanka Note: (1) Average (3.4%) |(1.2%) (1.2%) (1.2%) (1.2%) (2.0%)#15III. RESTORING PUBLIC DEBT SUSTAINABILITY REQUIRES AN UPFRONT COMPREHENSIVE DEBT TREATMENT#16Sri Lanka's Public Debt has grown rapidly and now reaches unsustainable levels In the absence of an upfront comprehensive debt treatment, Sri Lanka's public debt is set to remain at unsustainable levels in the coming years Sri Lanka's public debt indicators in the absence of an upfront comprehensive debt treatment¹ In % of GDP² Barbados GFN target, 15.0% Ukraine GFN target, 10.0% Actuals 89.0% 21.7% Ecuador GFN target, 6.0% Argentina GFN target, 5.0% 2019A 2020A Estimates 136.6% 37.9% 2021E 2022P 2023P Central Government Gross Financing Needs Projections 2024P Public Sector Debt Stock 2025P 2026P 2027P Projections presented above assume that the macro-fiscal framework and underlying policy package agreed with the IMF are implemented, and that Sri Lanka benefits from financial support from development partners as contemplated under the IMF program It is therefore a << theoretical » exercise designed to illustrate the relief to be delivered by the expected comprehensive upfront debt treatment and should be seen as optimistic. Absent such debt treatment, none of the above assumptions should materialize, leading to a far worse macro-fiscal framework and therefore further deteriorated debt trajectory Sources: Ministry of Finance, Economic Stabilization and National Policies, Central Bank of Sri Lanka, IMF Notes: (1) The above DSA trajectory reflects a "pre-restructuring scenario" (i.e., a DSA scenario assuming the IMF program's adjustment path and foreseen multilateral financing and in which the remaining financing gap is financed with an illustrative 10% interest rate debt instrument), (2) CG Debt/GDP and CG GFN/GDP indicators are not presented on the same scale 14#17Sri Lanka's Public Debt is multifaceted... As at End-June 2022, Public Debt¹ stood at 122% of GDP, of which 70% of GDP is denominated in foreign currency, from a public debt level of 115% of GDP as at end-December 2021, out of which 54% of GDP were denominated in foreign currency In USDbn equiv. Central Government Debt Multilateral Bilateral Private³ Bonded Non-bonded CBSL advances Guaranteed SOEs Debt Multilateral Bilateral Commercial (incl. SOE debt) 5 Central Bank of Sri Lanka Debt Multilateral Bilateral4 TOTAL Foreign Currency Total 38.0 Local Currency Total 32.4 Total USDbn % of GDP² 70.3 106.2% 9.6 9.6 14.5% 9.6 9.6 14.5% 18.8 31.8 50.5 76.3% 14.5 30.9 45.4 68.6% 4.2 0.9 5.1 7.7% 0.6 0.6 0.9% 5.5 1.7 7.2 10.8% 0.5 0.5 0.7% 0.3 0.3 0.5% 4.6 1.7 6.3 9.6% 3.2 3.2 4.9% 1.1 1.1 1.7% 2.1 2.1 3.2% 46.7 34.1 80.7 121.9% Sources: Ministry of Finance, Economic Stabilization and National Policies, Central Bank of Sri Lanka Notes: (1) The debt stock showcased reflects the DSA coverage currently contemplated by the Authorities, (2) Assuming a 2022 nominal GDP of LKR 23.84trn, (3) Includes ECA- backed facilities, (4) Bilateral swap lines with the People's Bank of China, Reserve Bank of India and the Bank of Bangladesh, (5) SOES' FX payables benefiting from a state guarantee are assumed to be constant between end 2021 and end June 2022 15#18including with a wide range of bilateral creditors... Central Government and Guaranteed SOEs' external public debt has a broad variety of bilateral creditors, for USD 11.2bn in overall bilateral debt - USD 9.9bn in direct exposure and USD 1.3bn in indirect exposure Direct Exposure Indirect Exposure² Total As at End-June 2022, in USDM Top 10 creditors (94.5% of total) Total Total USDM in % of Total¹ Total Bilateral and ECA-Backed debt¹ (1+2) 9,917 1,278 11,195 100.0% in % of Total¹ 1. Paris Club Members 3,752 922 4,673 41.7% Japan 2,720 2,720 24.3% 1. China 40.1% France 207 204 411 3.7% Korea 312 312 2.8% 2. Japan 24.3% Netherlands 293 293 2.6% Germany 202 202 1.8% 3. India 15.0% UK 198 198 1.8% 4. France 3.7% Austria 142 142 1.3% USA 132 132 1.2% 5. Korea 2.8% Spain 76 19 95 0.9% Sweden 41 41 0.4% 6. Netherlands 2.6% Russia 35 35 0.3% Denmark 32 32 0.3% 7. Germany 1.8% Australia 8 24 31 0.3% Canada 19 19 0.2% 8. UK 1.8% Belgium 11 11 0.1% 2. Non-Paris Club Members 6,165 356 6,521 58.3% 9. Austria 1.3% China 4,127 356 4,483 40.1% India 1,683 1,683 15.0% BUS 10. Saudi Arabia 1.2% Saudi Arabia 138 138 1.2% Kuwait 98 98 0.9% Iran 68 68 0.6% Hungary Pakistan 47 3 47 0.4% 3 0.0% Note: (1) Central Government and Guaranteed SOEs external official bilateral debt (includes ECA-backed debt, includes arrears as at end-June 2022). All amounts may evolve further to the reconciliation exercise currently undertaken by the Authorities, (2) Indirect exposure includes only ECA-backed debt 16#19and with private creditors concentrated in International Sovereign Bonds Bondholders of Sri Lanka's International Sovereign Bonds have organized themselves around two main creditor committees ISBS stand for a significant share of PPG FX commercial debt In % of total commercial FX denominated public debt, excluding ECA-backed debt, as at end-June 2022 Total: USD 22.1bn ISBS international bondholders have formed an ad-hoc creditor committee The group comprises close to 100 members and is led by a steering committee of around 10 members The group represents more than 55% of ISBS non- domestic holdings The group is advised by Rothschild and White & Case 41.3% ■ISBS 58.7% Other (FCBUS, SLDBS, ...) A group of local private banks holding ISBS have formed a group The group has holdings in excess of US$ 1 billion across all series of ISBS The group comprises 8 local banks and is led by a steering committee The group is advised by Baker & Mackenzie Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka#20Key principles and update on the creditor engagement 1 2 3 AA Good faith efforts for Transparency a collaborative process Fair and comparable treatment across creditors Official creditors Where do we stand in the engagement with creditors? 4 Consistency with IMF debt sustainability analysis Private creditors Initiated engagement with official creditors, including the largest bilateral creditors and the Paris Club ✓ Provided updates on the ongoing process, including a post-SLA process update Encouraged bilateral creditors to regroup in an ad-hoc coordination platform ✓ Initiated engagement with appointed advisors of the international and local committees of sovereign bondholders Published a creditor update presentation, disclosing publicly debt data and information on the process ▸ IMF SLA allows Sri Lanka to accelerate and intensify engagement with all categories of creditors 18#21IV. NEXT STEPS AND LOGISTICS#22Financing assurances from bilateral creditors are required as a pre-requisite to the IMF Board adoption of the Program The IMF does not lend to countries whose debt is deemed unsustainable, requiring Sri Lanka to undertake an upfront comprehensive debt treatment. In practice, this requires financing assurances to be given by the bilateral creditors, resulting in a sufficient level of comfort to the IMF that bilateral creditors will support Sri Lanka's efforts to restore public debt sustainability FOR PUBLIC CREDITORS What are financing assurances? Bilateral financing assurances are a commitment from official bilateral creditors to grant Sri Lanka a debt treatment compatible with the macroeconomic framework and debt sustainability constraints underpinning the contemplated IMF program. They are the flagship step to the IMF being able to move forward with a program for Sri Lanka Aug. 2022 Sep. Oct. What does it mean for private creditors? Private financing assurances are considered as obtained by the IMF once Sri Lanka is making a "good faith" effort to reach a collaborative agreement with its private creditors, defined as: • Engaging in early dialogue Sharing relevant information on a timely basis Giving creditors the early opportunity to provide input in the framework underpinning the debt restructuring From SLA to mid-November 2022 • Window to obtain financing assurances from public and private partners before IMF Board Approval, envisaged for mid-December Nov. Dec. Jan. 2023 SLA O IMF Board Approval 20#23Authorities are currently promoting the formation of an ad-hoc bilateral creditor coordination platform. To expedite the process of obtaining financing assurances from official bilateral creditors, the authorities of Sri Lanka encourage the formation of a unique ad-hoc coordination platform for all bilateral creditors 888 The most effective way to obtain the financing assurances quickly is the creation of an ad-hoc bilateral creditor coordination platform allowing the official bilateral creditors to give their financing assurances to the IMF collectively after having debated among themselves, with the IMF and the Government of Sri Lanka on the general contours of the debt treatment required to support the restoration of debt sustainability Benefits of such structure include: Deliver financing assurances and validate the IMF program through a fast-track solution, allowing Sri Lanka's economy to recover Position all bilateral creditors on an equal footing for accessing relevant information Enable a suitable forum for the negotiation of the bilateral debt restructuring Offer a forum for discussions on emergency credit lines amongst creditors themselves Increase trust and build an environment for constructive discussions The creation of an ad-hoc bilateral creditor coordination platform would offer a direct mean of communication to all bilateral creditors, expediting Sri Lanka's obtention of required financing assurances from bilateral creditors#24Expected timeline for the Debt Restructuring Process September Q4 2022 • Staff Level agreement (✓) . Engagement with official creditors in view of securing assurances to restore debt sustainability • Preliminary information sharing with creditors under NDA¹ • Follow-up technical discussions with IMF Staff, notably on the DSA IMF Board Approval 2023 Q2 2023 Finalization of the discussions Legal implementation of the agreements 1st IMF review 2022 SLA August 2022 • IMF Staff Mission End Q4 2022-Q1/Q2 2023 Pursued information sharing efforts with all creditors • Negotiations with private and official creditors on restructuring terms compliant with IMF DSA targets and comparable across the different creditor categories Reaching agreements in principle with all creditors Authorities' objectives Source: Ministry of Finance, Economic Stabilization and National Policies Note: (1) Information and data could be shared to private creditors prior to IMF Board Approval but only under Non-Disclosure Agreements ("NDA") 22#25Contact Information • • The Sri Lankan Authorities thank all creditors and attendees of this presentation for their kind attention If creditors are interested in obtaining more information and engaging in discussions with the Government, please contact Sri Lanka's Financial Advisors Lazard Frères and Legal Advisor Clifford Chance at the email addresses [email protected] and [email protected] for any request or other inquiry they may have Creditors wishing to contact the International Bondholder Committee can do so at the following e-mail address: [email protected] and [email protected] • Creditors wishing to contact the Local Bondholder Committee can do so at the following e-mail address: [email protected] • • This presentation and the follow up Q&A document, including answers to questions raised in writing following this webcast, will be posted on the Ministry of Finance, Economic Stabilization and National Policies' website We invite all bondholders to participate in the identification exercise to be launched shortly in cooperation with Morrow Sodali • Visit the following website https://projects.morrowsodali.com/srilanka or contact the following email [email protected] to participate in the identification exercise 23