#1THE IAEA FUKUSHIMA REPORT AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR NUCLEAR SAFETY AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS Nordic Perspectives of Fukushima Stockholm 12 January 2016 Lyn Bevington Office for Safety and Security Coordination Department of Nuclear Safety and Security IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency#2OVERVIEW IAEA Report on the Fukushima Daiichi accident Nuclear Safety Emergency Preparedness and Response Other relevant activities IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety The way forward IAEA 2#3KEY FACTS GENERAL September 2012 – announcement by DG Amano 3 years work September 2015 - report released DG Report + 5 Technical Volumes What happened + why • REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR GENERAL Executive Summary + Summary Report ~200 pages drawn from Technical Volumes 45 key observations and lessons Most not new IAEA activities + CNS Review Meetings 5 TECHNICAL VOLUMES 5 Working Groups 180 Experts 40 Member States Geographical representation ~1000 Pages + Annexes 102 observations and lessons IAEA website • • WORKING METHODS 6 rounds of 5 Working Group meetings Consultancy meetings Expert missions to Japan Bilateral meetings in Japan . Information received from Japan Independent advice Safety standards extant in 2011#4The Fukushima Daiichi Accident Technical Volume 5/5 Post-accident Recovery The Fukushima Daiichi Accident 收 Technical Volume 4/5 Radiological Consequences THE FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI ACCIDENT Report by the Director General Technical Volume 1 Description and Context of the Accident Technical Volume 2 Safety Assessment The Fukushima Daiichi Accident The Fukushima Daiichi Accident The Fukushima Daiichi Accident The Fukushima Daiichi Accident The Fukushima Daiichi Accident Technical Volume 3 Emergency Preparedness and Response Technical Volume 4 Radiological Consequences IAEA Technical Volume 5 Post-accident Recovery IAEA 24/7 Technical Volume 3/5 Emergency Preparedness and Response Technical Volume 2/5 Safety Assessment Technical Volume 1/5 Description and Context of the Accident Report by the Director General 09 1291 4241 e 1474 1824 Di 1211 4#5Section 1: Introduction The Report on the Fukushima Daiichi Accident Section 2: The accident and its assessment Description of the accident Nuclear safety considerations Technical Volumes 1 & 2 Section 3: Emergency preparedness and response Initial response in Japan to the Protecting emergency workers Protecting the public accident Section 4: Radiological consequences Radioactivity in the environment Transition from the emergency phase to the recovery phase and analyses of the response Protecting people against radiation exposure Radiation exposure Health effects Response within the international framework for emergency preparedness and response Radiological consequences for non-human biota Section 5: Post-accident recovery Section 6: The IAEA response to the accident Off-site remediation of areas affected by the accident IAEA activities On-site stabilization and preparations for de- commissioning Meetings of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety Management of contaminated material and radioactive Technical Volumes 1 & 3 waste Community revitalization and stakeholder engagement Technical Volume 5 Technical Volume 4 Technical Volume 3#6WHAT HAPPENED Description of the events presented in chronological order to highlight the integrated response to a multi-unit accident N 0 200 km 11 Mar 16:00 17:00 18:00 19:00 20:00 21:00 22:00 23:00 12 Mar 00:00 Higashidori NPP 01:00 02:00 03:00 04:00 05:00 Epicentre Onagawa NPP 06:00 07:00 Fukushima Daiichi NPP Fukushima Daini NPP Tokai Daini NPP Tokyo 08:00 09:00 10:00 Japan Trench 11:00 12:00 JAPAN Osaka 13:00 14:00 15:00 Confinement Control of reactivity Core heat removal AC power Critical support Spent fuel systems* pool cooling 15:36 Second tsunami wave starts 123456 12 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 flooding site (estimated inundation height OP+14.5 m) O cooling 15:42 Station blackout declared for Units 1-5 16:36 Presumed severe accident conditions in Units 1 and 2, - classification of a nuclear Bemergency 19:03 Declaration of a nuclear emergency by the national Government (16:03) RCIC à condensate storage tank 20:50 Fukushima Prefecture issues an evacuation order for an area of 2 km radius around the NPP 21:23 National Government issues an evacuation order for an area of 3 km radius and a sheltering order for a 10 km radius around the NPP 23:50 Unit 1 primary containment vessel exceeds maximum design pressure 01:40 Safety relief valve opens in - Unit 5 02:45 Unit 1 reaches maximum containment pressure 04:00 Increased radiation levels at main gate, start of alternate water injection into Unit 1 (first batch) 04:55 Confirmation and notification that dose rate at main gate increased cooling or make-up or make-up O cooling or make-up No cooling or make-up, (15:50) No indication for water level and temperature Not applicable 11:36 Loss of reactor core isolation cooling system (RCIC) in Unit 3 and automatic switch to emergency cooling 12:35 Automatic actuation of emergency cooling in Unit 3 to high pressure core injection system (HPCI) 14:00 Operators open venting line of Unit 1 and receive confirmation of venting at 14:30 15:30 Establishment of temporary seawater injection line to Unit 1 and power lines to Units 1 and 2 with high voltage power supply trucks 15:36 Explosion in Unit 1: destruction of water and power provisions, degrading site radiological conditions * Includes DC power and instrument air 1-6 Fukushima Daiichi NPP units (15:50) Loss of DC power through flooding (21:19) Portable batteries (15:50) Loss of DC power through flooding (20:47) Portable generator (15:50) Loss of DC power through flooding (21:27) Portable batteries (15:36) Two emergency diesel generators (EDGS) trip, one remains operational▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ No cooling or make-up, (15:50) No indication for water level and temperature No cooling or make-up, (15:50) No indication for water level and temperature▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ (15:37) Emergen (15:41) Emergency diesel generators trip causing a station blackout in) Primary containmen secondary containment (reactor building) m(15:38) Emergency diesel generators trip causing a station blackout (15:38) Emergency diesel generators trip causing a station blackout (15:40) Emergency diesel generators trip causing a station blackout t vessel cover open, only secondary containment esel generators trip causing a station blackout▬▬▬▬▬ ((08:13) Connection to Unit 6 EDG (for certain equipment) damages some equipment in support of low pressure core cooling Primary containment vessel exceeds maximum design pressure▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬Venting cooling sytem (RCIC) from condensate storage tank (06:06) Head vent nozzle is opened 5:00) RCIC from suppression chamber HPCI 16:00 Izu-Bonin Trench Source: Esri, NASA Available Onerating Limited or partially available/operating Not available Alternative measure 05:44 National Government issues an evacuation order for an area of 10 km radius around the NPP 09:20 Continuous fresh water (FW) injection by fire engine into Unit 1#7WHY IT HAPPENED Vulnerability to external events The defence in depth concept • The fundamental safety functions Beyond design basis accidents and accident management • Regulatory effectiveness • Human and organizational factors IAEA 7#8VULNERABILITY TO EXTERNAL EVENTS FINDINGS No apparent damage to SSC's from earthquake Tsunami far exceeded design basis causing major damage Major conclusion: the treatment of external hazards was not fully in line with international practice OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS Need for periodic update of external hazards assessment Appropriate conservatism to account for uncertainties Predictions that challenge current assumptions need prompt corrective actions need to be taken promptly Multi-unit and multi-site accidents need to be assessed IAEA#9Section 1-1 Common spent fuel pool building OP +35.0 m OP +36.25 m OP +27.2 m Reactor building service floor OP +57.33 m Main control room (OP +13.6 m) Turbine building OP +35.75m 2B 4B OP +10.0| m 4'4 22 4 OP +10.0 m 4.4A Water level 5 m contour line Emergency diesel generator Switchgear Batteries Estimated inundation height OP +14.5 m Condenser#10ランク#11BEYOND DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENTS AND ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT FINDINGS Deterministic and probabilistic treatment of beyond design basis accidents was not in line with international best practices Limited scope PSA did not identify plant vulnerability to flooding PSA results for Fukushima Daiichi NPPs were several orders of magnitude lower than similar plants in other Member States Limited scope deterministic analyses contributed to weaknesses in accident management procedures Incomplete knowledge of potential accident sequences and consequences led to inadequate procedural guidance IAEA#12BEYOND DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENTS AND ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS Deterministic and probabilistic analyses need to be comprehensive and account of internal + external events Extremely low PSA numbers need to be reviewed as they can impact decision making + lead to unidentified plant vulnerabilities Accident management provisions need to be clear, comprehensive and well designed Training/exercises to be based on realistic accident conditions. Regulatory bodies need to ensure that adequate accident management provisions are in place IAEA#13REGULATORY EFFECTIVENESS FINDINGS Complex regulatory system - several different organizations Distribution of regulatory authority decision making was unclear Some practices were not in line with international best practices Inspection program was overly limited in scope and influence Periodic safety reviews lacked effective regulatory oversight OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS Where several bodies have responsibilities for safety, government coordination is needed Clear lines of authority and decision making ability so that all stakeholders understand the process Regulator needs an effective inspection program and effective enforcement authority + access to independent technical expertise IAEA#14Cabinet Office Prime Minister Recommendation Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) Nuclear Safety Commission ■ Consultation and report Report NISA Minister of METI Commission Report and direction Report Commission and direction Agency for Natural Resources and Energy Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency Report and support Commission and direction Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization (Technical Support Organization)#15HUMAN AND ORGANIZATIONAL FINDINGS FACTORS Basic assumption that plants were safe All stakeholders shared and mutually reinforced this belief OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS Individuals + organizations need to continuously question their basic assumptions and implications on actions that impact safety. The need to be prepared for the unexpected A systemic approach to safety needs to be taken in event and accident analysis, considering all stakeholders and their interactions over time. Regulatory authorities should provide oversight and independent review of safety culture programs IAEA#16EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE • Initial response in Japan to the accident Protecting emergency workers Protecting the public • Transition from the emergency 出口方向 Fukushima City 20 km 4 60 km Fukushima Prefecture phase • International response IAEA 5 km 250 km Fukushima Daiichi NPP © Ibaraki Tokyo Chiba Tokyo#17PROTECTING THE PUBLIC FINDINGS The criteria for protective actions were not expressed in terms of measurable quantities No predetermined criteria for relocation Evacuees were relocated several times during the first 24 hours OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS Decisions on urgent protective actions based on predefined plant conditions or monitoring results Protective actions need to do more good than harm Medical staff need to be trained in basic medical response to a nuclear emergency and in adequate management of (possibly) contaminated patients IAEA#18TRANSITION FROM THE EMERGENCY FINDINGS PHASE Specific policies, guidelines, criteria and arrangements for the transition from the emergency phase to the recovery phase were not developed before the accident In developing these arrangements, the Japanese authorities decided to apply the latest recommendations of ICRP OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS Arrangements need to be developed at the preparedness stage for termination of protective actions and other response actions, and transition to the recovery phase Timely analysis of an emergency and the response to it, drawing out lessons and identifying possible improvements, enhances emergency arrangements IAEA#19INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE FINDINGS Assistance Convention was not invoked and RANET not used Different States either recommended different protective actions for their nationals in Japan in response to the accident These differences were generally not well explained to the public and occasionally caused confusion and concern OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS The implementation of international arrangements for notification and assistance needs to be strengthened There is a need to improve consultation and sharing of information among States on response actions. IAEA assessment and prognosis IAEA#20THE IAEA ACTION PLAN ON NUCLEAR SAFETY KEY FACTS · 12 key actions, 39 sub-actions • Unanimously adopted in September 2011 EBP funded projects: • 52 from Japan • 10 from USA MAKING NUCLEAR POWER SAFER The IAEA Action Plan 7 from Russia Over 900 activities completed 2 40 Million euro since September 2011 ABOUT US IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency OUR WORK NEWS CENTRE PUBLICATIONS- SCIENTIFIC RESOURCES Mi Carmenes in Fare EA Action Plan on Nutler Safety IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety wwwwww MAKING NUCLEAR SAFER The IAEA Action Plan Search TRANSPARENCY Mission calendar of peer reviews International experts missions reports International Experts Meetings reports IAEA Related News 27 November 2015 New AEA Safety Standarts Rentanca Emergency Preparedness and Response 17 November 2015 General Assembly Resolution Recognizes the IAEA's Work Devlopment, Nuclear Safety and Non- Proliferation 20 October 2015 Open for Registration: A Conference on Safety Culture 30 Years Aer Chernobyl 19 October 2015 Prepa Effectively A Hosts Nuclear Emergency Preparedness and Response Conce DG's Statements 19 October 2015 NEA D' Statement at the meational Conference anbul Emergency pass and Repor Shaning IAEA Action Plan information across the world nuclear community. IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety A Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety adopted a Declaration that requested the Director General to develop a draft Action Plan on Nuclear Safety in September 2011, the E Plan on Nuca Safity was adopted by the IAEA's Board of Governors and subsequently unanimously endorsed by the AEA General Comfemince The ultimate goal of the Action Plans to strengthen muclear safety worldwide At the AEA General Conference in September 2012, the Desctor General announced that the AEA would prepare a report on the Fukushima Daiichi accident. He stated that this report would be an authoritative, factual and balanced assessment, addressing the cases and consequences of the accident as well as lessons leamed The Fukushima Daichi Accident, the Report by the IAEA Director General and five technical volumes, is the result of an extensive international collaborative effort involving the working groups with about 100 experts from 42 Member States with and without nuclear power programmes and several international bodies. This ensured a broad representation of experience and knowledge. An International Technical Advisory Group provided advice on technical and scientific With the breadth of coverage and detailed description and analyses, the Report by the Director General and the five technical volumes provide a description of the accident and its causes, evolution and consequences, based on the evaluation of data and information from a large number of sources available at the time of writing The Report by the Director General and the five techescal volumes will be of use to national authorities, international organizations, nuclear regulatory bodies, muclear power plant operating organizations, designers of nuclear facilities and other experts in matters relating to Fukushima Nuclear Accident In Focus Fushma Nuclear Acciden The Fukushima Daichi Accidere Rapon by the Dector General and technical Mission Maps EA Operational Safety T OSAR) in 2006-2003 WEA Emergency Preparedness and Review Services (EPREV) Mini, 2006-2012 Agent Mom, 2006-2012 Matory Review Service RRS) Moos 2006-2012 Meetings intaational Confec Engency Preparedness and Response 19 23 Остове 2015 tional Experts' Hering on Aman Prognosis in Response to radical Emergency 20-24 April 2015 20#21Fukushima Accident THE IAEA EXPERT MISSIONS TO JAPAN Remediation of large contaminated area off-site Fukushima NPP Mar 2011 1st Mission Oct 2011 Fact-Finding Mission May 2011 IAEA Action Plan Sept 2011 2011 Expert Mission Onagawa NPP Aug 2012 Review Japan Safety Assessments NPPs Jan 2012 Follow-up Oct 2013 Marine Monitoring Confidence Building & Data Quality Assurance Sept 2014 Nov 2014 Seawater and Expert visit Nov 2013 sediment sample collection May 2015 1st Mission Apr 2013 2nd Mission 3rd Mission Dec 2013 Feb 2015 Peer Review Mid-and-Long-Term Roadmap towards Decommissioning 2012 2013 2014 2015#22IAEA REPORTS - LESSONS LEARNED IAEA Report on Reactor and Spent Fuel Safety in the Light of the Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant IAEA Report on Enhancing Transparency and Communication Effectiveness in the Event of a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency IAEA Report on Protection against Extreme Earthquakes and Tsunamis in the Light of the Accident/ at the Fukushima Dalichi Nuclear Power Plant IAEA Report on Decommissioning and Remediation after a Nuclear Accident IAEA Report on Strengthening Nuclear Regulatory Effectiveness in the Light of the Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant IAEA Report on Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency in the Light of the Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant International Experts Meeting 19-22 March 2012, Vienna Austria IAEA Reactor and Spent Fuel Safety 2012 International Experts Meeting 18-22 June 2012, Vienna, Austria IAEA International Experts Meeting 4-7 September 2012. Vienna, Austria IAEA International Experts Meeting 28 January-1 February 2013, Vienna, Austria IAEA IAEA Transparency & Communication 2012 Protection Against External Events 2012 Decommissioning and Remediation 2013 Strengthening Nuclear Regular Effectiveness 2013 IAEA Preparedness and Response 2013 IAEA Report on Human and Organizational Factors in Nuclear Safety in the Light of the Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant IAEA Report on Radiation Protection after the Fukushima Daiichi Accident: Promoting Confidence and Understanding IAEA Report on Severe Accident Management in the Light of the Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant IAEA Report on Strengthening Research and Development Effectiveness in the Light of the Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant IAEA Report on Assessment and Prognosis in Response to a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency IAEA Report on Capacity Building for Nuclear Safety International Experts Meeting 21-24 May 2013, Vienna, Austria IAEA Human & Organizational Factors 2014 International Experts Meating 17-21 February 2014, Vienna, Austria IAEA International Experts Meeting 17-20 March 2014, Vienna, Austria IAEA International Exports Meeting 16-20 February 2015, Vienna, Austria IAEA Radiation protection 2014 Severe accident management 2015 Research & Development 2015 International Exports Meeting 20-24 April 2015, Vienna, Austria IAEA Intion Atasy Assessment & Prognosis 2015 IAEA Capacity Building 2015#23THE WAY FORWARD MEMBER STATES RESPONSE Board of Governors + 2015 General Conference Wide support for the Action Plan activities the publication of the IAEA Fukushima Report "Important to follow up to ensure the Action Plan and IAEA Report contribute to a continuous improvement in nuclear safety worldwide" "It is essential that the IAEA ensure that the momentum to improve global nuclear safety is improved and further increased building on the Fukushima report" PRESIDENT IAEA IAEA CTOR CENCE#24IAEA General Conference 2015 Resolution GC(59)/RES/9 September 2015 Welcomes the publication of the IAEA Report on the Fukushima Daiichi accident, consisting of the Director General's Report and five technical volumes Requests the Secretariat, in close consultation with Member States, to integrate actions arising from the Observations and Lessons in the Report into the Agency's regular programme; Requests the Secretariat to continue follow-up on the projects/activities arising from the Action Plan and to build upon the findings, lessons learned, and measures implemented from the Fukushima Daiichi accident; Requests the Agency to continue to build upon: the Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, the experience of States in implementing the Action Plan, the observations and lessons contained in the IAEA Fukushima Report and • the principles of the Vienna Declaration, and use them for defining its nuclear safety strategy and its programme of work. IAEA#25IMPLEMENTATION The Agency is developing an implementation plan to facilitate the transition of the relevant activities into its regular work programme The aim of the implementation plan is to establish the framework for the work of the relevant Departments and Divisions of the Agency for the coming years "I believe that this IAEA report will provide a solid knowledge base for the future and will help to improve nuclear safety throughout the world. I hope that governments, regulators and nuclear power plant operators in all countries will continue to act on the lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident." Director General Amano DIRECTOR GENERAL (C) IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA#26Thank you for your attention [email protected]